The arbitrariness of supermajority rules

Social Science Information

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 61-82

  Schwartzberg, Melissa ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Amendment; Indeterminacy; Supermajority rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 77649262761     PISSN: 05390184     EISSN: 14617412     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0539018409354474     Document Type: Article

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