The power of the devout bourgeoisie: The case of the justice and development party in Turkey

Middle Eastern Studies

Volumn 45, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 953-968

  Gumuscu, Sebnem ^a   Sert, Deniz ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CLASS; DEMOCRATIZATION; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL CHANGE; SOCIAL JUSTICE;

TURKEY;

EID: 77649090183     PISSN: 00263206     EISSN: 17437881     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00263200903268710     Document Type: Article

References (59)

1. Although Milli Gorus is translated as National Outlook in English, the adjective Milli carries the double meaning of national and/or religious. The National Outlook movement has never specified which meaning it refers to, but uses whichever meaning is more suitable depending on the context. Often, the leaders of the MG refer to the religious connotation and mean Muslim/Islamic when they use the term 'Milli'.
2. For a detailed analysis of this process see U. Cizre and M. Cinar, 'Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process', The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol.102, No.2/3 (2003), pp.309-32.
3. Welfare Party Election Manifesto (1995), p.5.
4. A.Y. Saribay, 'Milli Nizam Partisinin Kurulusu ve Programinin Icerigi', in Modern Turkiyede Siyasi Dusunce: Islamcilik (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2004), p.583.
5. N. Erbakan, Turkiye'nin Meseleleri ve Cozumleri (Istanbul: Semih Ofset, 1991), p.46.
6. R. Cakir, Ne Seriat Ne Demokrasi (Istanbul: Metis, 1994), p.206.
7. Governments established in 1975 and 1977 by the right-wing parties in the parliament (Justice Party, National Salvation Party, Nationalist Action Party, Republican Trust Party) to prevent the formation of a leftist government by the Republican People's Party.
8. Saribay, Milli Nizam Partisinin Kurulusu ve Programinin Icerigi', p.584.
9. Welfare Party Election Manifesto (1995), pp.20-22.
10. Erbakan here refers to communism and anarchism trying to convince those who fear that communism may spread if such freedoms are acknowledged. N. Erbakan, Milli Gorus (Istanbul: Dergah Yayinlari, 1975), p.33.
11. Ibid., p.55.
12. Erbakan's speech in Bingol on 25 Feb. 1994.
13. Erbakan's speech in a party meeting in Sivas on 13 Jan. 1991.
14. Cited in D. Brumberg, 'Rhetoric and Strategy: Islamic Movements and Democracy in the Middle East', in M. Kramer and D. Brumberg (eds.), The Islamism Debate (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997), p.20.
15. Erbakan's opening speech at RP's 4th Party Congress, 11 Sept. 1993.
16. U. Tekin, Ak Partinin Muhafazakar Demokrat Kimligi (Ankara: Orient, 2004), p.111
17. Ibid., p.143, and the AKP Party Programme, Introduction.
18. M. Karaalioglu, Hilal ve Ampul (Istanbul: Bakis, 2001), p.146.
19. N. Ilicak, in Yeni Safak, 29 June 2001.
20. AKP Party Programme, pp.14-15.
21. An ongoing debate about secularism and its application in Turkey has occupied the political agenda since the establishment of the AKP. Kemalists insist on the application of Jacobin secularism (or more appropriately laicité), which seeks control of Islam and banning all of its visible manifestations in the public life. Interpretation of the public sphere is another significant dimension of the issue since the Kemalists reject a distinction between those who give and those who receive service in the public institutions. Along these lines a university student and a professor should both be the object of the headscarf ban. The AKP, on the other hand, demands a reinterpretation of the secularism principle of the state along the Anglo-Saxon tradition of freedom of conscience and religious practice and protecting religion from state intervention.
22. AKP Party Programme, pp.7-8.
23. Ibid., p.14.
24. Ibid., pp.15-16. It is often leftists who are victims of such violations. The MG parties have never mentioned these violations of human rights in their party manifestos.
25. Ibid., p.17.
26. Ibid., pp.25-6.
27. Despite the fact that the AKP increased its vote share in the 2007 elections, the seats it won in the parliament slightly decreased compared to 2002 elections because in the 2007 elections four parties passed the national electoral threshold (10 per cent) as opposed to two parties in 2002 elections.
28. One such step was to appoint a civilian secretary to the NSC.
29. For instance, before these changes the NSC had a right to appoint a member in the board of the Higher Education Institute and the Higher Board of Radio and Television Broadcasting.
30. F. Atacan, 'Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP', Turkish Studies, Vol.6, No.2 (2005), pp.187-99.
31. U. Cizre and M. Cinar, 'Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process', The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol.102, No.2/3 (2003), pp.309-32.
32. S. Taniyici, 'Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: Islamist Welfare's Pro-EU Turn', Party Politics, Vol.9, No.4 (2003), pp.463-83.
33. Z. Onis, 'The Political Economy of Islam and Democracy in Turkey: From the Welfare Party to the AKP', in D. Jung (ed.), Democracy and Development: New Political Strategies for the Middle East (New York: Palgrave, 2006), pp.103-28.
34. R. Cakir and F. Calmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Bir Donusumun Hikayesi (Istanbul: Metis, 2001), p.56.
35. MUSIAD, established in 1990, is the largest voluntary businessmen association in Turkey with more than 2000 members spread across 28 cities. The Association represents conservative businessmen owning small to medium enterprises.
36. Nureddin Nebati, personal interview, November 2005.
37. Bulent Arinc, one of the leaders of yenilikciler and a founder of AKP, complains that a core group in the RP did not allow it to become a center party (quoted in Cakir and Calmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, pp.130-33).
38. Ibid., p.145.
39. Ibid., p.98.
40. Ibid., pp.60, 65.
41. Personal interview, 14 March 2007.
42. Personal interview, 6 September 2007.
43. Cakir and Calmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, p.154.
44. also see Karaalioglu, Hilal ve Ampul, n.14.
45. Cakir and Calmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, p.151.
46. For details see the issues of Yeni Safak in May and June 2000.
47. Personal interview with Nazli Ilicak, a former Fazilet Party MP and a columnist, 16 Feb. 2007. Of course ASKON has attracted little attention and could never become as popular as MUSIAD.
48. Based on the information provided by the Grand National Assembly on MPs in the official website at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr.
49. Several MUSIAD members, during the interviews conducted in September and November 2007, reported that they have served in AKP Konya organization.
50. Reported by Nihat Alayoglu, The General Secretary of MUSIAD, personal interview, 25 Sept. 2006.
51. 'Muhafazakar MUSIAD, Metroseksuel olabilir mi?' Milliyet, 4 April 2004.
52. For details see MUSIAD report 'Anayasa Reformu ve Demokratiklesme' (2000)
53. AKP Party Programme (2001).
54. E. Ozbudun, 'From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey', South European Society and Politics, Vol.11, No.3-4 (2006), pp.543-57.
55. For further details see A. Insel, 'The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey', The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol.102, No.2/3 (2003), pp.293-308.
56. Ibid., p.306.
57. Cakir and Calmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, p.203.
58. Y. Akdogan, AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi (Istanbul: Alfa, 2004).
59. The Indictment against the AKP, available at http://www.netbul.com/superstar/ozeldosyalar/siyaset/Akpye_kapatma_davasi/akp_kapatma_davasi_18.asp (accessed 22 September 2008).