Hume on pride and love of fame

Polity

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 333-355

  Manzer, Robert A ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DALLAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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EID: 7744226470     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3235376     Document Type: Article

References (104)

1. Many scholars have drawn attention to the realism of early modern thought and its correspondent emphasis on using men's passions for political goals, including Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 177-202; J. O. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), ch. 14; and Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 42-66. For a nice recent discussion of the importance of this orientation to modern liberal constitutionalism, see Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 133-43.
2. Many scholars have drawn attention to the realism of early modern thought and its correspondent emphasis on using men's passions for political goals, including Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 177-202; J. O. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), ch. 14; and Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 42-66. For a nice recent discussion of the importance of this orientation to modern liberal constitutionalism, see Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 133-43.
3. Many scholars have drawn attention to the realism of early modern thought and its correspondent emphasis on using men's passions for political goals, including Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 177-202; J. O. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), ch. 14; and Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 42-66. For a nice recent discussion of the importance of this orientation to modern liberal constitutionalism, see Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 133-43.
4. Many scholars have drawn attention to the realism of early modern thought and its correspondent emphasis on using men's passions for political goals, including Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 177-202; J. O. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), ch. 14; and Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 42-66. For a nice recent discussion of the importance of this orientation to modern liberal constitutionalism, see Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 133-43.
5. The best known statement of this view remains: Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter [New York: Mentor, 1971], p. 322)
6. Hume, "Of Commerce" in Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1987), p. 263. All other references to Hume's essays are to this volume, and future citations will give only the name of the essay. Hume's other major works will be cited as follows: (Treatise) Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); (EPM) Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and (EHU) Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); (History) History of England: from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688, 6 volumes (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983).
7. Hume, "Of Commerce" in Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1987), p. 263. All other references to Hume's essays are to this volume, and future citations will give only the name of the essay. Hume's other major works will be cited as follows: (Treatise) Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); (EPM) Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and (EHU) Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); (History) History of England: from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688, 6 volumes (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983).
8. Hume, "Of Commerce" in Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1987), p. 263. All other references to Hume's essays are to this volume, and future citations will give only the name of the essay. Hume's other major works will be cited as follows: (Treatise) Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); (EPM) Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and (EHU) Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); (History) History of England: from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688, 6 volumes (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983).
9. Hume, "Of Commerce" in Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1987), p. 263. All other references to Hume's essays are to this volume, and future citations will give only the name of the essay. Hume's other major works will be cited as follows: (Treatise) Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); (EPM) Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and (EHU) Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); (History) History of England: from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688, 6 volumes (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983).
10. Hume, "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science," pp. 14-31; "Idea of Perfect Commonwealth," pp. 512-29.
11. Hume, "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science," pp. 14-31; "Idea of Perfect Commonwealth," pp. 512-29.
12. E.g., Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965); H. L. A. Hart, "Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morals," in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
13. E.g., Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965); H. L. A. Hart, "Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morals," in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
14. E.g., Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965); H. L. A. Hart, "Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morals," in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
15. E.g., Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965); H. L. A. Hart, "Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morals," in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
16. Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, 2 vol. (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1988), i, pp. 24, 37, 369, 411-12.
17. Hume's prideful moral psychology has been almost wholly ignored in discussions of his moral theory. Though mistaken in certain particulars, the outstanding exception is Pall Steinthorsson Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1989).
18. In the Treatise, "justice" and the laws of property (the prerequisites of justice) are the basis of all human society: We have now run over the three fundamental laws of nature, that of the stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises. 'Tis on the strict observance of those three laws, that the peace and security of human society entirely depend; nor is there any possibility of establishing a good correspondence among men, where these are neglected. Society is absolutely necessary for the well-being of men; and these are as necessary to the support of society, (p. 526) On the second point - that his account of justice is his basis for claiming that utility is the main criterion of moral virtue - see the following passage from the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals: The necessity of justice to the support of society is the sole foundation of that virtue; and since no moral excellence is more highly esteemed, we may conclude that the circumstance of usefulness has, in general, the strongest energy, and the most entire command over our sentiments. (pp. 203-04)
19. Treatise, p. 604; EPM, p. 257.
20. Treatise, p. 604; EPM, p. 257.
21. On benevolence, sympathy, or humanity as the necessary underpinning of the experience of moral beauty, see especially Treatise, pp. 470-71, and EPM, p. 173; on benevolence, sympathy, or humanity as the basis of moral distinctions, see especially Treatise, pp. 499-501, 618, and EPM, pp. 218-32, 270-76.
22. On benevolence, sympathy, or humanity as the necessary underpinning of the experience of moral beauty, see especially Treatise, pp. 470-71, and EPM, p. 173; on benevolence, sympathy, or humanity as the basis of moral distinctions, see especially Treatise, pp. 499-501, 618, and EPM, pp. 218-32, 270-76.
23. On benevolence, sympathy, or humanity as the necessary underpinning of the experience of moral beauty, see especially Treatise, pp. 470-71, and EPM, p. 173; on benevolence, sympathy, or humanity as the basis of moral distinctions, see especially Treatise, pp. 499-501, 618, and EPM, pp. 218-32, 270-76.
24. On benevolence, sympathy, or humanity as the necessary underpinning of the experience of moral beauty, see especially Treatise, pp. 470-71, and EPM, p. 173; on benevolence, sympathy, or humanity as the basis of moral distinctions, see especially Treatise, pp. 499-501, 618, and EPM, pp. 218-32, 270-76.
25. This point is less clear in the Treatise than in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Compare Treatise, pp. 597 and 600, with EPM, pp. 252 and 260.
26. This point is less clear in the Treatise than in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Compare Treatise, pp. 597 and 600, with EPM, pp. 252 and 260.
27. EPM, pp. 270, 322.
28. EPM, p. 270. In both his works on morals, Hume refers to the bad influence of religion on morals, and in his two works on religion he ends by discussing the negative impact of religion on morality (Dialogues, pp. 220-28; Natural History, pp. 70-73). Moreover, his History of England contains Hume's famous advocacy of an institutional solution to the problematic impact of religion: an established church that curbs the "interested diligence of the clergy" (iii, pp. 135-36). In this regard, his view resembles Hobbes's, which stresses the pernicious influence of the cultivators of the "seeds" of religious belief (Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson [Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986], ch. 12).
29. EPM, p. 270. In both his works on morals, Hume refers to the bad influence of religion on morals, and in his two works on religion he ends by discussing the negative impact of religion on morality (Dialogues, pp. 220-28; Natural History, pp. 70-73). Moreover, his History of England contains Hume's famous advocacy of an institutional solution to the problematic impact of religion: an established church that curbs the "interested diligence of the clergy" (iii, pp. 135-36). In this regard, his view resembles Hobbes's, which stresses the pernicious influence of the cultivators of the "seeds" of religious belief (Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson [Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986], ch. 12).
30. EPM, p. 270. In both his works on morals, Hume refers to the bad influence of religion on morals, and in his two works on religion he ends by discussing the negative impact of religion on morality (Dialogues, pp. 220-28; Natural History, pp. 70-73). Moreover, his History of England contains Hume's famous advocacy of an institutional solution to the problematic impact of religion: an established church that curbs the "interested diligence of the clergy" (iii, pp. 135-36). In this regard, his view resembles Hobbes's, which stresses the pernicious influence of the cultivators of the "seeds" of religious belief (Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson [Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986], ch. 12).
31. EPM, p. 279.
32. See Stephen Salkever, " 'Cool Reflection' and the Criticism of Values: Is, Ought and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science," American Political Science Review, 74 (1980): 75; Annette Baier, "Hume, The Women's Moral Theorist?" in Women and Moral Theory, eds. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyer (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987), p. 43; and Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 69-70.
33. See Stephen Salkever, " 'Cool Reflection' and the Criticism of Values: Is, Ought and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science," American Political Science Review, 74 (1980): 75; Annette Baier, "Hume, The Women's Moral Theorist?" in Women and Moral Theory, eds. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyer (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987), p. 43; and Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 69-70.
34. See Stephen Salkever, " 'Cool Reflection' and the Criticism of Values: Is, Ought and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science," American Political Science Review, 74 (1980): 75; Annette Baier, "Hume, The Women's Moral Theorist?" in Women and Moral Theory, eds. Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyer (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987), p. 43; and Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 69-70.
35. EPM, pp. 254-55.
36. See in particular Hume's essay "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations," pp. 377-464; and Ernest Mossner's edifying commentary in "Hume and the Ancient-Modern Controversy 1725-1752," University of Texas Studies in English, 28 (1949): 139-53.
37. See in particular Hume's essay "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations," pp. 377-464; and Ernest Mossner's edifying commentary in "Hume and the Ancient-Modern Controversy 1725-1752," University of Texas Studies in English, 28 (1949): 139-53.
38. Treatise, p. 601.
39. Donald T. Siebert, The Moral Animus of David Hume (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990), ch. 1, offers an alternative but similar view of this aspect of Hume's moral theory.
40. EPM, pp. 252-53, 256; cf. Treatise, p. 599.
41. EPM, pp. 252-53, 256; cf. Treatise, p. 599.
42. Compare Hume's treatment of Alexander the Great with Adam Smith's censorious description of Alexander's "excessive self-admiration" and "vanity that approached almost to insanity and folly" (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, eds. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie [Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1982], p. 250).
43. Also see Mandeville's attack on those who "have been so serious on the subject of the Macedonian Madman" (Fable of the Bees, i, pp. 53-54).
44. Treatise, p. 600.
45. Treatise, p. 596. For some other implications of "comparison," see "Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature," pp. 81-84.
46. Treatise, p. 596. For some other implications of "comparison," see "Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature," pp. 81-84.
47. Treatise, p. 596.
48. EPM, p. 253.
49. EPM, p. 253.
50. In EPM, p. 240, Hume describes the natural jealousy of character or "self-satisfaction" as "an advantage which equally attends the fool and the wise man" and keeps both from "bearing patiently the imputation of ignorance and stupidity."
51. EPM, pp. 314-15.
52. EPM, p. 314. Hume also suggests that the sentiment of conscious worth acts as a kind of "internal estimation" of virtue and vice: we can tell virtue from vice by determining whether the possession of a certain quality is attended by the sentiment of conscious worth (EPM, p. 314). See also Hume's discussion of the relation of this sentiment to pride and amour propre in the accompanying footnote.
53. EPM, p. 283.
54. EPM, pp. 176-77; compare Treatise, pp. 602-06.
55. EPM, pp. 176-77; compare Treatise, pp. 602-06.
56. EPM, pp. 176-77.
57. EPM, p. 176.
58. Treatise, p. 321.
59. Treatise, p. 316.
60. Treatise, pp. 321, 322, 321.
61. Treatise, p. 324; cf. p. 501. Hume casts the naturalness of the love of fame in a more positive light in "Of the Dignity or Meanness of Mankind." In contrast to animals, in man "we see a creature, whose thoughts are not limited by any narrow bounds, either of place or time; who carries his researches into the most distant regions of this globe, and beyond this globe, to the planets and heavenly bodies; [who] looks backward to consider the first origin, at least, the history of the human race; [and who] casts his eye forward to see the influence of his actions upon posterity, and the judgments which will be formed of his character a thousand years hence," p. 82, emphasis added.
62. Pangle, The Spirit of Modem Republicanism, p. 70.
63. "Of the Dignity of Human Nature," p. 86, emphasis added.
64. "Of the Passions," in Four Dissertations (London: A. Millar, 1757), p. 150.
65. EPM, p. 276.
66. EPM, p. 276. Also see Hume's description of Sir Isaac Newton as a man "more anxious to merit than acquire fame," in the History, vi, p. 450.
67. EPM, p. 276. Also see Hume's description of Sir Isaac Newton as a man "more anxious to merit than acquire fame," in the History, vi, p. 450.
68. "Of Refinement in the Arts," p. 272. On the scope of Hume's writings on commerce, see John Sekora's remark that he attempted nothing less than an "all encompassing reappraisal of mercantile society," Luxury, the Concept in Western Thought: Eden to Smollet (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 119; cf. Eugene Rotwein, "Introduction" to Hume's Economic Writings (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), p. xci.
69. "Of Refinement in the Arts," p. 272. On the scope of Hume's writings on commerce, see John Sekora's remark that he attempted nothing less than an "all encompassing reappraisal of mercantile society," Luxury, the Concept in Western Thought: Eden to Smollet (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 119; cf. Eugene Rotwein, "Introduction" to Hume's Economic Writings (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), p. xci.
70. "Of Refinement in the Arts," p. 272. On the scope of Hume's writings on commerce, see John Sekora's remark that he attempted nothing less than an "all encompassing reappraisal of mercantile society," Luxury, the Concept in Western Thought: Eden to Smollet (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 119; cf. Eugene Rotwein, "Introduction" to Hume's Economic Writings (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), p. xci.
71. See the criticisms of Hume's conception of commercial society by Ralph Lerner, "Commerce and Character in The Thinking Revolutionary (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 206; Paschal Larkin, Property in the 18th Century (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1969), p. 100; and Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975): "This is Hume at his least skeptical: he had none of the doubts and misgivings which Adam Smith and all the other leading thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment had about the all-round benefits of commercial civilization," pp. 87-88.
72. See the criticisms of Hume's conception of commercial society by Ralph Lerner, "Commerce and Character in The Thinking Revolutionary (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 206; Paschal Larkin, Property in the 18th Century (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1969), p. 100; and Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975): "This is Hume at his least skeptical: he had none of the doubts and misgivings which Adam Smith and all the other leading thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment had about the all-round benefits of commercial civilization," pp. 87-88.
73. See the criticisms of Hume's conception of commercial society by Ralph Lerner, "Commerce and Character in The Thinking Revolutionary (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 206; Paschal Larkin, Property in the 18th Century (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1969), p. 100; and Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975): "This is Hume at his least skeptical: he had none of the doubts and misgivings which Adam Smith and all the other leading thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment had about the all-round benefits of commercial civilization," pp. 87-88.
74. "Of Avarice," p. 571.
75. On the novelty of Hume's defense of luxury, see Sekora's remark that during "the first three-quarters of the 18th centry, there were fewer arguments for luxury than defenses of deism or greater democracy," Luxury, p. 111.
76. Hume indicates that religious asceticism, classical republicanism, and the modern hedonistic understanding of human psychology have all contributed to forming the severe moralists' view that all selfishness and self-indulgence is vicious. In "Of Refinement in the Arts," he cites the classical republican objection to self-indulgence (luxury) but indicates that the force of the opposition to it is more religious than republican (pp. 268-69). Modern hedonistic psychology also contributes to this view by reducing the complexity of the passions to the difference between selfish and unselfish passions. On the role of hedonistic psychology in contributing to the severe moralists' view, see "Of the Dignity and Meanness of Human Nature" and the conclusion and Second Appendix of the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.
77. Hume indicates that religious asceticism, classical republicanism, and the modern hedonistic understanding of human psychology have all contributed to forming the severe moralists' view that all selfishness and self-indulgence is vicious. In "Of Refinement in the Arts," he cites the classical republican objection to self-indulgence (luxury) but indicates that the force of the opposition to it is more religious than republican (pp. 268-69). Modern hedonistic psychology also contributes to this view by reducing the complexity of the passions to the difference between selfish and unselfish passions. On the role of hedonistic psychology in contributing to the severe moralists' view, see "Of the Dignity and Meanness of Human Nature" and the conclusion and Second Appendix of the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.
78. Hume indicates that religious asceticism, classical republicanism, and the modern hedonistic understanding of human psychology have all contributed to forming the severe moralists' view that all selfishness and self-indulgence is vicious. In "Of Refinement in the Arts," he cites the classical republican objection to self-indulgence (luxury) but indicates that the force of the opposition to it is more religious than republican (pp. 268-69). Modern hedonistic psychology also contributes to this view by reducing the complexity of the passions to the difference between selfish and unselfish passions. On the role of hedonistic psychology in contributing to the severe moralists' view, see "Of the Dignity and Meanness of Human Nature" and the conclusion and Second Appendix of the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.
79. "Of Refinement in the Arts," p. 280; EPM, pp. 180-81. On this point, it is worth noting Hume's argument in "Of Avarice" that avarice should be attacked with "wit and Humour" rather than in "a serious manner." The former approach is superior because there "being so little hopes of doing good to people infected with this vice, I would have the rest of mankind, at least, diverted by our manner of exposing it: As indeed there is no kind of diversion, of which they seem so willing to partake," pp. 571-72.
80. "Of Refinement in the Arts," p. 280; EPM, pp. 180-81. On this point, it is worth noting Hume's argument in "Of Avarice" that avarice should be attacked with "wit and Humour" rather than in "a serious manner." The former approach is superior because there "being so little hopes of doing good to people infected with this vice, I would have the rest of mankind, at least, diverted by our manner of exposing it: As indeed there is no kind of diversion, of which they seem so willing to partake," pp. 571-72.
81. "Of Refinement in the Arts," p. 276.
82. See, for example, Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, i, pp. 24, 37, 369, 411-12.
83. "Of Refinement in the Arts," p. 279.
84. "Of Refinement in the Arts," p. 280, emphasis added.
85. "That Politics May be Reduced to a Science," pp. 15-16.
86. "Of the Independency of Parliament," p. 42.
87. "Of the Independency of Parliament," p. 43.
88. "Of the Independency of Parliament," p. 42.
89. Lerner, "Commerce and Character," p. 215. Cf. pp. 201-04.
90. Cf. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, pp. 56-66, 69-93.
91. For example, Hume writes that we need not "fear, that men, by losing their ferocity, will lose their martial spirit, or become less undaunted and vigorous in defence of their country or their liberty." He reasons that while ferocity may wane, "a sense of honor, which is a stronger, more constant and more governable principle, acquires fresh vigour by that elevation of genius which arises from knowledge and a good education," "Of Refinement in the Arts," pp. 273-74.
92. "Of Refinement in the Arts," p. 271.
93. EPM, p. 261.
94. EPM, pp. 261-67; Treatise, pp. 597-98.
95. EPM, pp. 261-67; Treatise, pp. 597-98.
96. EPM, p. 265; cf. Treatise, p. 598.
97. EPM, p. 265; cf. Treatise, p. 598.
98. "Of the Balance of Power," p. 334; "Of Commerce," p. 259.
99. "Of the Balance of Power," p. 334; "Of Commerce," p. 259.
100. "Of Refinement in the Arts," p. 274.
101. Cf. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, eds. Anne Cohler, Basia Miller, and Harold Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 32.
102. History, ii, p. 271.
103. EPM, p. 283.
104. Hamilton, Federalist #9, pp. 71-72.