Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function

Economics Letters

Volumn 107, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1-3

  Liu, Shulin ^a   Wang, Mingxi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS   (China)

Author keywords

Bidding strategy; Cobb Douglas utility function; Expected revenue; First price and second price sealed bid auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 77249155999     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.05.019     Document Type: Article

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