Voter-weighted environmental preferences

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 655-671

  Bell, Jason ^a   Huber, Joel ^a   Kip Viscusi, W ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77049116999     PISSN: 02768739     EISSN: 15206688     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/pam.20459     Document Type: Article

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