Intuitions, emotions and gut reactions in decisions about risks: Towards a different interpretation of 'neuroethics'

Journal of Risk Research

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 175-190

  Roeser, Sabine ^a  

^a DELFT UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Dual process theory; Emotions; Ethics; Intuitions; Neuroethics; Risk

Indexed keywords

DUAL PROCESS; DUAL PROCESS THEORY; EMPIRICAL FINDINGS; EMPIRICAL RESEARCH;

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS;

DECISION MAKING;

EID: 77049106340     PISSN: 13669877     EISSN: 14664461     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13669870903126275     Document Type: Article

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