An Iowa immigration raid leads to unprecedented criminal consequences: Why ICE should rethink the Postville model

Iowa Law Review

Volumn 95, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 323-346

  Peterson, Cassie L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA COLLEGE OF LAW   (United States)

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EID: 76749098196     PISSN: 00210552     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (206)

1. Editorial, Raid a Reminder of Need for Reform, DES MOINES REG., May 14, 2008, at 12A. ICE surpassed the Postville largest-raid landmark just a few months after the Postville raid when it raided Howard Industries in Laurel, Mississippi, and detained 595 employees.
2. See Tony Leys, Critics Tie Scant New Charges to Wariness After Iowa Raid, DES MOINES REG., Aug. 28, 2008, at 1A [hereinafter Leys, Critics] (comparing the Postville and Laurel raids) ;
3. see also infra Part IV (describing the significance of the Laurel, Mississippi raid).
4. Nigel Duara, Grant Schulte & William Petroski, ID Fraud Claims Bring State's Largest Raid, DES MOINES REG., May 13, 2008, at 1A. According to the 2000 census, Postville had a population of 2273. U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS 2000, at 1 (2000), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/IA/1601964290.pdf.
5. Press Release, U. S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 297 Convicted and Sentenced Following ICE Worksite Operation in Iowa (May 15, 2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/ardcles/ 080515waterloo.htm [hereinafter ICE Postville Press Release]. Different sources cite the number detained as eidier 389 or 390.
6. See id. (citing 389 detained employees).
7. But see ERIK CAMAYD-FREIXAS, INTERPRETING AFTER THE LARGEST ICE RAID IN U. S. HISTORY: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT 2 (2008), available at http://graphics8.nydmes.com/images/2008/07/14/opinion/14ed- amayd.pdf (cidng 390 detained employees). This Note will use 389 as the official number of detainees. Erik Camayd-Freixas is a federally certified interpreter who participated in the criminal proceedings that followed the Postville raid.
8. Id. at 1. Camayd-Freixas' article relates, through his first-person account, what the public was largely shielded from seeing during the trials.
9. See generally id. (noting details of the proceedings-such as his personal interaction with the detainees and their lawyers-not covered by local news agencies).
10. See Sally Morrow, Families Still in Limbo After Raid in Postville, DES MOINES REG., June 13, 2008, at IB (explaining that ICE had warrants for suspected criminal activity and a civil search warrant for employees ICE believed were unlawfully present in the United States).
11. Leys, Critics, supra note 1.
12. See infra Part II. D (describing three raids preceding Postville where ICE criminally prosecuted a much smaller portion of the detainees).
13. See ICE Postville Press Release, supra note 3, at 1 ("'Based on the number of criminal convictions, this is the largest criminal worksite enforcement operation ever in the United States, '" according to U. S. Attorney Matt Dummermuth).
14. Id. Sources differ over whether ICE arrested 305 or 306 employees.
15. See id. (stating that ICE arrested 305 employees).
16. But see CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that ICE held 306 detainees for prosecution). For the purposes of this Note, ICE initially arrested 305 Agriprocessors employees on criminal charges.
17. See ICE Postville Press Release, supra note 3, at 1 (breaking the disposition of the charges down by crime, punishment, and the number of corresponding criminal defendants).
18. See infra Part III. C (discussing the immediate and long-term effects of the raid on the detainees, their employers, and all American citizens).
19. See CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 3, at 10 (discussing the difference between socialsecurity fraud and identity theft).
20. See id. at 5, 7 (noting that prosecutors had an increased incentive to fast-track the detainees because they only had seventy-two hours from the time of the raid to charge the detainees with a crime or else, once tile seventy-two hours lapsed, the detainees could bring a claim for habeas corpus).
21. See infra Part II. A-D (describing the changing political and historical landscape that led to the Postville raid).
22. See RICHARD A. bOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 10 (Stephanie L. Browning ed., 2006) (noting that after President Kennedy's assassination, President Johnson signed the Immigration Act).
23. 8 U. S. C. §§1101-1537 (2006).
24. BOSWELL, supra note 14, at 10.
25. See Kevin R. Johnson, Fear of an "Alien Nation": Race, Immigration and Immigrants, in IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 44, 45 (Stephen H. Legomsky ed., 2005) (refuting the point that the 1965 immigration reforms led to more legal immigration from Latin America when, in fact, the new ceilings limited legal immigration and so any later increase in immigration from Latin American countries must be attributed to illegal immigration).
26. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA nEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 49 (2007) (describing Congress' priorities as "curbing undocumented immigration, deporting criminal aliens, protecting the nation from terrorists, and guarding the public fisc").
27. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 8 U. S. C.) ;
28. see also DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 226 (2007) (describing the fines the IRCA imposes on employers for knowingly hiring undocumented workers).
29. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181
30. (codified in scattered sections of 21, 25, 28, 29, and 42 U. S. C.).
31. See KANSTROOM, supra note 19, at 227 (noting that Congress originally classified only three crimes as aggravated felonies: "murder, drug trafficking, and illicit trafficking in firearms").
32. See MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS 255-57 (3d ed. 2008) (listing possible consequences of conviction as removal, mandatory detention, ineligibility to claim asylum, inability to receive withholding of removal, and permanent disqualification from ever becoming a U. S. citizen).
33. Id. at 255. Voluntary departure is a remedy immigration judges may award to removable noncitizens, which means that if the immigration judge wishes to grant leniency to the noncitizen and allow the noncitizen to leave the country voluntarily, the judge may do so.
34. Id. at 340-43.
35. See id. at 306 (describing asylum as an immigration remedy available to noncitizens who face persecution in their home countries).
36. See id. at 307 (describing withholding of removal as a nondiscretionary judicial remedy available to noncitizens who demonstrate that they will be persecuted if they return to their home countries).
37. See id. at 257 (explaining that the government requires five years of good moral character before a noncitizen can become a U. S. citizen and that a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, which includes aggravated felonies, permanently bars the applicant from obtaining the requisite good moral character).
38. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U. S. C.).
39. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 23 (4th ed. 2005).
40. Id.
41. See BOSWELL, supra note 14, at 16 (noting that the expanded definition of aggravated felony effectively "eliminat[ed] numerous forms of relief for aliens convicted on aggravated felonies; creat[ed] mandatory detention provisions for many aliens with criminal convictions; and limit[ed] judicial review for certain removal orders and petition denials").
42. See 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (43) (P) (2006) (defining "aggravated felony" to include crimes under § 1546 (a), pertaining to document fraud).
43. See infra Part II. B (analyzing the various political subdivisions' views on immigration policy).
44. See Robert Pear & Carl Hulse, Immigrant Bill Dies in Senate; Defeat for Bush, N. Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A1 (discussing some of the biggest proposed changes to immigration law in the last twenty years).
45. See id. (noting that both Democrats and Republicans had reservations about the bill).
46. See Letters to the Editor, The Immigration Debate, in Full Cry, N. Y. TIMES, May 22, 2007, at A4 [hereinafter The Immigration Debate] (displaying a series of seven letters to the editor that reflect a wide range of political ideologies regarding immigration) ;
47. see also LECOMSKY, supra note 28, at 61-62 (noting that market-economy Republicans generally prefer higher ceilings for employment-based immigration). One scholar defines nativism as "a social and legal process in and through which self-identified natives try to secure or retain prior or exclusive rights to valued resources (e.g., admittance, citizenship, education, and so on) against the putative challenges posed by prospective or resident populations on the basis of their perceived foreignness." BRIAN N. FRY, NATIVISM AND IMMIGRATION: REGULATING THE AMERICAN DREAM 71 (Steven J. Gold & Rubén G. Rumbaut eds., 2007).
48. See The Immigration Debate, supra note 35 (exhibiting multiple immigration perspectives) ;
49. see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 28, at 61 (noting that labor-minded Democrats prefer limits on the number of immigrants admitted for employment).
50. From a restrictionist perspective, immigration is a national question in which "[t]he health of the American culture, economy, environment, and polity supercedes [sic] the desires of immigrants to enter the United States." FRY, supra note 35, at 143. From an expansionist perspective, however, immigration is a humanitarian and economic question in which "[t]he national interest is significant, but other aspirations also deserve special consideration, such [as] the rights of refugees, desires of immigrants, and needs of business."
51. Id. at 178.
52. See Pear & Hulse, supra note 33 (quoting Senator Ben Nelson, who described the failed bill as "'unsalvageable'").
53. See FRY, supra note 35, at 68-69 (concluding that while economic recessions do not cause nativism, they may precipitate it) ;
54. James F. Smith, A Nation that Welcomes Immigrants? An Historical Examination of United States Immigration Policy, 1 U. C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 230, 245 (1995) (citing the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and America's back-and-forth treatment of Mexican workers as tied to the economy's cycles).
55. See FRY, supra note 35, at 68-69 (offering the Japanese Internment Camps as an example of nativist behavior precipitated by a threat to our national security-the attacks on Pearl Harbor) ;
56. LEGOMSKY, supra note 28, at 23 (describing the "sweeping national security measures" Congress passed in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks).
57. See Smith, supra note 39, at 236-40 (describing undocumented workers "as the foot soldiers of 'silent invasion'" and noting that legalization of certain long-term undocumented residents led simultaneously to an increase in the number of foreign nationals legally living in the United States and to stricter policies on employment authorization).
58. See Steven A. Camarota, Immigrant Employment Gains and Native Losses, 2000-2004, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 139, 155-56 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007) (concluding, based on a study of job markets between 2000 and 2004, that immigrants are replacing natives in certain job markets).
59. See FRY, supra note 35, at 68 (noting that nativist activities are lower during periods of low immigration).
60. See id. at 67 ("The most egregious examples of nativism seemingly occur during or around wartime.").
61. See Rogers M. Smith, Alien Rights, Citizen Rights, and the Politics of Restriction, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 114, 119 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007) (stating mat despite the changes Congress made to immigration law before September 11, 2001, "the United States had failed horrendously to prevent the entry and operations of foreign terrorists").
62. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 6 U. S. C.).
63. BOSWELL, supra note 14, at 18.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2.
66. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 28, at 3 (listing ICE's operational duties as "investigations, intelligence-gathering, detention, certain elements of the deportation process, the registration of noncitizens, and other interior enforcement operations").
67. Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and "Aliens": Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1093-94 (2008).
68. See U. S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, BUDGET FACT SHEET-F ISCAL YEAR 2009, at 4 (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/index.htm [hereinafter FACT SHEET FISCAL YEAR 2009] (listing funding for detention beds at $71.7 million and the approximate number of beds added at 1400) ;
69. U. S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, BUDGET FACT SHEET-FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 3 (2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/factsheets/ 2008budgetfactsheet.pdf [hereinafter FACT SHEET FISCAL YEAR 2008] (listing funding for detention beds at $250.4 million and the approximate number of beds added at 4150).
70. Compare FACT SHEET FISCAL YEAR 2009, SUPRA note 52, at 5 (listing funding for worksite enforcement at $34 million)
71. with FACT SHEET FISCAL YEAR 2008, supra note 52, at 5 (listing funding for worksite enforcement at $15 million).
72. See infra Part II. D (stating statistical information on the raids).
73. Ellinor R. Coder, Comment, The Homeland Security Safe-Harbor Procedure for Social Security No-Match Letters: A Mismatched Immigration Enforcement Tool, 86 N. C. L. REV. 493, 494-95 (2008) (emphasis omitted) (noting that federal agents criminally charged managers, not employees, in the IFCO raid).
74. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Under Arrest: Immigrants' Rights and the Rule of Law, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 853, 863 (2008) (providing details of the Swift raid).
75. See Tony Leys, Jail Time After Raid a Surprise, DES MOINES REG., July 5, 2008, at 1A [hereinafter Leys, Jail Time] (citing the official count at 1297 detainees).
76. Id.
77. See Wadhia, supra note 56, at 865 (dating the raid in April of 2008).
78. Id.; see also Press Release, U. S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 91 Pilgrim's Pride Workers Face Criminal Charges in Ongoing Identity Theft Probe (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/ newsreleases/articles/080417dallas.htm (giving details of the Pilgrim raid).
79. See CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 3, at 11 (noting that immigration policy shifted toward criminal prosecution of a majority of raid detainees with the new fast-tracking system implemented in Postville) ;
80. see also Leys, Jail Time, supra note 57 (noting that the Postville raid had "the highest percentage of people prosecuted for crimes and sentenced to jail instead of just being deported").
81. The term "removal" is a legal term of art that encompasses both deportation-removing a noncitizen from the country after the noncitizen has been lawfully admitted-and exclusion-removing a noncitizen who was never lawfully admitted into the country. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 28, at 496 (describing changes the IIRIRA made to immigration vocabulary in the deportation context).
82. See infra Part II. E (describing the particular details of the Postville raid and its subsequent criminal proceedings in Waterloo, Iowa).
83. CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 3, at 1.
84. Id. at 2.
85. See id. at 2-3 (citing 390 arrests). While Camayd-Freixas cites 390 arrests, the official number is 389.
86. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the different sources and statistics cited).
87. See CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that the detainees included "290 Guatemalans, 93 Mexicans, four Ukrainians, and three Israelis").
88. See id. (noting that the released detainees were generally mothers, juveniles, or persons in need of medical attention).
89. See ICE Postville Press Release, supra note 3, at 1-2 (identifying the various fraudrelated crimes that ICE convicted the detainees of committing).
90. See FED. R. CRI.M. P. 5 (a) (1) (A) (requiring a defendant to appear before a judge "without unnecessary delay") ;
91. see also CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 3, at 5 (describing how detainees are eligible to claim relief under a habeas corpus claim if prosecutors do not charge them within seventy-two hours of their arrest).
92. See generally CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 3 (describing the fast-tracking process).
93. Id. at 1.
94. See generally id. (describing the preplanning required for ICE to bring together all of the parties necessary to expedite the judicial process).
95. Id. at 8;
96. see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c) (1) (C) (noting that an 11 (c) (1) (C) plea agreement includes a plea in exchange for a specific sentence).
97. See U. S. ATT'Y'S OFFICE, IOWA DEFENSE MANUAL 21 (2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/workplace/36219prs20080731.html (providing for immediate deportation in the Script for 11 (c) (1) (C) Guilty Pleas that the District Court used to accept the detainees' pleas).
98. See generally Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Obtains "Manual" for Prepackaged Guilty Pleas for Prosecutors of Immigrant Workers in Postville, Iowa (July 31, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/ workplace/36219prs20080731.html (outlining the terms of the pleas for the Postville detainees).
99. Supra note 75.
100. Supra note 75.
101. See supra Part II. A (noting the consequences of committing an aggravated felony under immigration law).
102. ICE Postville Press Release, supra note 3, at 1.
103. Id.
104. Lynda Waddington, Postville Aftermath: 302 Detainees Charged Criminally, 297 Plead Guilty, IOWA INDEP., May 22, 2008, http://iowaindependent.com/2366/postville-aftermath-302-detainees-charged- criminally-297-plead-guilty;
105. see also ICE Postville Press Release, supra note 3, at 1 (acknowledging that five detainees did not accept the plea bargain and have cases pending).
106. See infra Part III. A-B (breaking criticisms of the Postville model into two categories: criminalization and due-process violations).
107. See generally CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 3 (arguing that ICE's means unnecessarily exceeded its end-goal, which was to convict and remove unauthorized workers).
108. See id. at 11 (arguing that incarcerating the detainees prior to deportation, rather than simply detaining them in a detention facility, was a disproportionately severe punishment).
109. See id. ("It is no secret mat the Postville ICE raid was a pilot operation, to be replicated elsewhere, with kinks ironed out after lessons learned.").
110. See FACT SHEET FISCAL YEAR 2008, supra note 52, at 1, 5 (describing ICE's mandate to stop terrorism and also describing ICE's document-fraud and worksite-enforcement programs).
111. Trish Mehaffey, Agriprocessors Iowa Labor Law Trial Moves to 2010, GAZETTE (Cedar Rapids, Iowa), July 15, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 13494335 [hereinafter Mehaffey, Iowa Labor].
112. See Trish Mehaffey, New Charges Bring Agriprocessors Indictment Count to 163, GAZETTE (Cedar Rapids, Iowa), July 16, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 13625177 (listing the crimes in the indictment against Agriprocessors executives) ;
113. see also Mehaffey, Iowa Labor, supra note 87 (distinguishing between the state and federal trials).
114. Press Release, U. S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Agriprocessors and Management Criminally Indicted (Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0811/081121 cedarrapids.htm.
115. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Latinos and Their Families in Detention: The Growing Intersection of Immigration Law and Criminal Law, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 225, 236 (2008) (drawing the connection between food processing and bioterrorism).
116. See id. at 236-37 (noting that mere is likely not a connection between wastemanagement workers and national security) ;
117. see also Camarota, supra note 42, at 145 (diagramming that in 2004, immigrants accounted for 36% of the farming, fishing, and forestry workforce; 35% of the building-cleaning-and-maintenance workforce; and 24% of the construction workforce).
118. CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 3, at 2-3.
119. See Tony Leys, 300 Immigrants on Lam as Arrests Hang in Limbo, DES MOINES REG., June 11, 2008, at 1B (noting that a spokesperson for the U. S. Attorney's Office affirmed that federal authorities had not inputted the outstanding warrants into the National Crime Information Center's computer system).
120. Id.
121. See id. (quoting Jim Benzoni, an immigration lawyer in Des Moines, Iowa, as saying, "This was not about law enforcement. This was not even about immigration policy-This was about publicity. It was made-for-TV melodrama.'").
122. See Rekha Basu, Editorial, Trapped Between 'Can't Stay' and 'Can't Go', DES MOINES REG., July 19, 2008, at 15A (arguing that the government does not seriously enforce immigration laws against undocumented immigrants because the consequence would be to "watch entire industries collapse") ;
123. see also supra note 91 (listing major industries largely supported by an undocumented workforce).
124. ICE Postville Press Release, supra note 3, at 1.
125. See id. (noting that judges sentenced the defendants convicted of using an actual person's Social Security number to five months in prison and three years of supervision; they imposed no jail time and five years of probation on defendants who used Social Security numbers that did not belong to an actual living person). Camayd-Freixas describes this process as a "lottery of justice." CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 3, at 10.
126. 42 U. S. C. § 408 (a) (7) (B) (2006).
127. 18 U. S. C.§ 1028A (a) (1) (2006).
128. Id. §911.
129. Id. § 1015 (e).
130. Id. § 1546 (a).
131. 8 U. S. C. § 1326 (a) (2006).
132. 18 U. S. C.§1028A (a) (1).
133. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing the details of the plea bargain).
134. See DOUCLAS W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING: THE LANGUAGE OF NEGOTIATION 77 (1984) (explaining that plea bargaining includes "situations in which charges and/or sentences are reduced in exchange for guilty pleas").
135. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (a) (2008) (requiring that a prosecutor only restrict his or her behavior by "refrain [ing] from prosecudng a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause").
136. See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit split).
137. See CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 3, at 9 (arguing that, without the more serious charge, the government would not have had the bargaining power it required to force the detainees to take the five-month sentence).
138. See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit split).
139. 18 U. S. C. § 1028A (a) (1) (2006).
140. See United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (oudining the case's principal issue) ;
141. United States v. Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (same) ;
142. United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2008) (same), abrogated by Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009) ;
143. United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1236 (D. C. Cir. 2008) (same) ;
144. United States v. Hurtado, 508 F. Sd 603, 608-09 (11th Cir. 2007) (same), abrogated by Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009) ; United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 213-15 (4th Cir. 2006) (same), abrogated by Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009).
145. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 917;
146. Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 610;
147. Montejo, 442 F.3d at 217.
148. Godin, 534 F.3d at 55 (stating that a fact-finder must resolve the question of whether the defendant knowingly used the identification of another person beyond a reasonable doubt).
149. See ICE Postville Press Release, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that the defendants who used a Social Security number that did not belong to another person received no jail time, only probation).
150. Godin, 534 F.3d at 61;
151. Miranda-Lopez, 532 F. Sd at 1041;
152. llanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1246.
153. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct 1886 (2009).
154. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2, Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009) (No. 08-108).
155. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1889.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1894.
158. Id. at 1890.
159. Id.
160. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1890-91.
161. Id. at 1890 (quoting Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 9, Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct 1886 (2009) (No. 08-108)).
162. Id. at 1890-91.
163. Id. at 1896 (Alito. J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
164. Id.
165. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1896 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1894 (majority opinion).
168. See Tony Leys, Counterfeit Green Cards Tied to Plant, DES MOINES REG., July 30, 2008, at 1A (reporting that federal agents found ninety-six fake "green cards" in the plant's humanresources department).
169. Id.
170. ICE Postville Press Release, supra note 3, at 1.
171. U. S. CONST, amends. V-VI, XIV;
172. see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (contrasting a civil removal hearing, where an undocumented immigrant does not have a constitutional right to counsel, with a criminal trial, the Court held that "[c]onsistent with the civil nature of [a deportation] proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing") ;
173. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 349 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to all criminal defendants) ;
174. LEGOMSKY, supra note 28, at 663 (explaining the different rights of undocumented immigrants in criminal and civil proceedings).
175. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (describing the warnings custodial officers must give to criminal defendants prior to custodial interrogations).
176. See Immigration Raids: Postville and Beyond: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law of the H. Comm. on the fudiciary, 110th Cong. 102-14 (2008), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/ 43682. pdf [hereinafter Postville and Beyond] (statement of David Wolfe Leopold, Vice-President, American Immigration Lawyers Association) (arguing, among other things, that "[t]he expedited process used to convict the workers... deprived the defendants of due process").
177. See id. at 103-12 (outlining AILA's principal arguments).
178. Grant Schulte, Postville Worker Hearings End, but Questions Linger, DES MOINES REG., May 23, 2008, at 4B.
179. CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 3, at 1.
180. PostviUe and Beyond, supra note 138, at 100.
181. See United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that the aggravated-identity-theft charge "does not require the Government to prove thal the defendant knew that the means of identity belonged to another actual person"), abrogated by Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009).
182. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (oudining the different protections available to undocumented immigrants in civil and criminal proceedings).
183. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (developing immigration rights as civil in nature).
184. Jennifer Jacobs, Criminal Docket Alarms Attorneys, DES MOINES REG., May 15, 2008, at 6A (as explained by Iowa City immigration attorney Laz Pittman). ICE later allowed the represented detainees to consult wiuh their immigration attorneys late Tuesday evening. Id.
185. See supra Part II. A (discussing the consequences of an aggravated-felony conviction).
186. See CAMAYD-FREIXAS, supra note 3, at 3 (observing that, within one day, the town of Postville lost one-third of its population).
187. See Nigel Duara, Informed About Raid, Many Employees Hid, DES MOINES REG., May 14, 2008, at 8A (stating that once ICE announced its presence in the Agriprocessors plant, the employees attempted to either run or hide).
188. See Grant Schulte, Jennifer Jacobs & Jared Strong, Day After Churns Up Charges, Emotions, DES MOINES REG., May 14, 2008, at 1A (describing the tracking devices ICE requires detainees to wear so that they will not leave the area).
189. Id.
190. The detainees sentenced at the end of May 2008 finished their five-month sentences at the end of October 2008.
191. See Tony Leys, Hope at Any Cost, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 30, 2008, at 1 (telling Vincente Sanail Lopez's story of returning home to Guatemala after serving time in jail).
192. Id. (noting that while the workers convicted at Postville said they would not return to the United States, they do not think the threat of jail time will stop other Guatemalans from going to the United States).
193. See Fry, supra note 35, at 178 (noting that America's humanitarian interests include "the rights of refugees, desires of immigrants, and needs of business").
194. See id. at 143 (framing immigration as a national question).
195. See FACT SHEET FISCAL YEAR 2009, supra note 52, at 5 (noting that ICE will use its worksite-enforcement funds to target employers who specifically attract and employ undocumented workers).
196. See Leys, Critics, supra note 1 (noting that ICE arrested 206 more employees in Laurel, Mississippi, than in the Postville raid).
197. See id. (observing that ICE appears to be backing away from the Postville model).
198. See id. (comparing Postville's convictions (297 out of 389) with Laurel's charges (8 out of 595) and nodng the vast difference).
199. Id. One critic also observed that prosecutors took the eight detainees charged with identity theft in the Laurel, Mississippi raid to a federal courthouse for their hearings, instead of prosecuting them in a makeshift court. Id.
200. Before ICE started prosecuting for criminal violations, it removed most unauthorized workers through civil deportation proceedings.
201. See supra Part II. D (giving examples of raids in which ICE administratively removed the detainees whom it did not criminally charge).
202. See Leys, Critics, supra note 1 (suggesting that ICE may back away from the Postville model).
203. David Johnston, Janet Napolitano, N. Y. TIMES. Jan. 16, 2009, at A18.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Aldana, supra note 51, at 1093-94 (discussing ChertofFs directive to enhance worksite-enforcement operations).