Central Bank and intellectual property

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 123, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 730-751

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EID: 76649136650     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (206)

1. See 35 U.S.C. §271 (b)-(c), (f) (2006).
2. See John T. Cross, Contributory Infringement and Related Theories of Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement, 80 IOWA L. REV. 101 (1994);
3. Jay Dratler, Jr., Common-Sense (Federal) Common Law Adrift in a Statutory Sea, or Why Grokster Was a Unanimous Decision, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 413 (2006).
4. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
5. Id. at 930 (alteration in original) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. 456 U.S. 844 (I982).
7. Id. at 853-54.
8. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) ("[I]mplied causes of action are disfavored ...."); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-88 (2001).
9. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
10. 511 U.S. 164(1994).
11. Id. at 191. The Supreme Court reaffirmed Central Bank in 2008. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 768-69 (2008).
12. Boim v. Holy Land Found, for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
13. One court and one commentator have analyzed secondary intellectual property liability in light of Central Bank. See AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1429-33 (3d Cir. 1994);
14. John T. Cross, Contributory and Vicarious Liability for Trademark Dilution, 80 OR. L. REV 625, 669-75 (2001). Both discussions are thoughtful, but limited to trademark law.
15. This point is borne out by two unanimous Supreme Court decisions post-Central Bank that endorsed implied vicarious liability without raising a Central Bank objection. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003);
16. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588 (2001); see also Alvarado v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 333, 338-39 (D.P.R. 2006) (reasoning that Wharf demonstrates that Central Bank does not affect vicarious liability). Lower courts make the point more explicitly.
17. See, e.g., Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2008);
18. Alvarado, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 337 (collecting cases).
19. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (linking civil aiding and abetting with contributory copyright infringement); AT&T, 42 F.3d at 1432 (same with contributory trademark infringement);
20. Engineered Sports Prods, v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 727 (D. Utah 1973) (same with contributory patent infringement);
21. Charles W. Adams, Indirect Infringement from a Tort Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH. L. REV 635 (2008).
22. See Optimum Techs., Inc. v. Henkel Consumer Adhesives, Inc., 496 F.3d 1231, 1244-45 (11th Cir. 2007) (contributory trademark liability); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007) (contributory copyright liability);
23. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc on this issue) (contributory patent liability);
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§876(b), 877(a) (1977) (civil aiding and abetting liability). Compare Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[K]nowledge and participation [are] the touchstones of contributory infringement"), with Nathan Isaac Combs, Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REV 241, 274 (2005) ("The fundamental basis for aiding and abetting liability is that the defendant both (1) knows of the primary actor's wrongful conduct; and (2) substantially assists or encourages the primary wrongdoer to so act").
25. See Adams, supra note 13, at 636.
26. 15 U.S.C. §78j 2006).
27. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 177; cf. Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S. Ct 2102, 2106 (2009) (noting Congress's familiarity with the legal terms "aid" and "abet," as well as their equivalents).
30. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 176-77, 182-85. The Court even dwelled on 18 U.S.C. §2 (2006) which authorizes aiding and abetting liability for every federal criminal violation -thereby suggesting that Central Bank sets out a general approach to secondary liability for all federal statutes, civil and criminal. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 176, 181-82.
31. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 182. Unlike in criminal law, there is no general civil aiding and abetting statute. See id.
32. Id. at 188 (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)).
33. Id. at 177.
34. See id. at 180-84. Justice Stevens's dissent argued fervently that the 1934 Act incorporated such a traditional common law background principle. See id. at 195-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) ("[W]hen Congress creates a tort action, it legislates against a legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules and consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.").
35. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 182 (citing Elec. Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798, 805-06 (3d Cir. 1992)).
36. Id. at 166-67, 186 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191 n.7 (1976)).
37. Id. at 192 & n.i (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 192.
39. Id. at 196 & n.6, 201.
40. See id. at 177 (majority opinion).
41. Id. at 186.
42. Id. at 185. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 290-91 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the reenactment rule).
43. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 185-86.
44. AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1430 (3d Cir. 1994).
45. Boim v. Holy Land Found, for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
46. Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1006 n.I (9th Cir. 2006).
47. 29 U.S.C. §§621-634 (2006); see Wynn v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1114-15 (CD. CaI. 2002).
48. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2006); see, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring); id. at 288 n.5 (Hall, J., concurring).
49. 18 U.S.C. §§2331-2339D (2006); see, e.g., Boim, 549 F.3d at 689-90.
50. 7 U.S.C. §§1-25 (2006); see Damato v. Hermanson, 153 F.3d 464, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1998).
51. 18 U.S.C. §§2341-2346; see City of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., No. 06-CV-3620 (CBA), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19351, at *7-19 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 11, 2009).
52. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C);
53. see, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2003).
54. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C);
55. see Colleton Reg'l Hosp. v. MRS Med. Review Sys., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 896, 901-03 (D.S.C 1994);
56. see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 175 (1994) (interpreting Mertens v. Hewitt Assoes., 508 U.S. 248 (1993), as barring aiding and abetting liability for nonfiduciaries under section 502(a) of ERISA).
57. 31 U.S.C. §§3729-3731 (2006); see Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 701, 709 (D.N.J. 1998).
58. 15 U.S.C. §§80b-1 to -21 (2006); see SEC v. Bolla, 550 F. Supp. 2d 54, 58-63 (D.D.C. 2008).
59. 15 U.S.C. §§80a-1 to -64; see, e.g., McLachlan v. Simon, 31 F. Supp. 2d 731, 739 n.7 (N.D. CaI. 1998), aff' d in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2001).
60. Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C);
61. see AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1429-33 (3d Cir. 1994).
62. 18 U.S.C. §§1961-1968 (2006); see, e.g., Pa. Ass'n of Edwards Heirs v. Rightenour, 235 F.3d 839, 843-44 (3d Cir. 2000).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7; see MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Graphnet, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 126, 129-31 (D.N.J. 1995).
64. 18 U.S.C. §§2701-2712; see Jones v. Global Info. Group, Inc., No. 3:06-00246-JDM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23879, at *5-7 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 25,2009).
65. 47 U.S.C. §227 (2006); see Bait-Wash. Tel. Co. v. Hot Leads Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 736, 74546 (D. Md. 2008).
66. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1350 note (2006)); see, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172-74 (CD. Cal. 2005).
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f; see In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 385, 432-44 (S.D.N.Y 2003).
68. See, e.g., Boim v. Holy Land Found, for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 689-90 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (ATA); Damato v. Hermanson, 153 F.3d 464, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1998) (CEA); AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1429-33 (3d Cir. 1994) (Lanham Act); Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1172-74 (TVPA).
69. See, e.g., Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (§§ 2702 and 2707 of the ECPA); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2003) (§§ 2511 and 2520 of the ECPA);
70. Jones, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23879, at * 5-7 (SECTRA); City of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., No. 06-CV-3620 (CBA), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19351, at * 7-19 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 11, 2009) (CCTA);
71. Hot Leads, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 745-46 (TCPA); SEC v. Bolla, 550 F. Supp. 2d 54, 58-63 (D.D.C. 2008) (§ 209(e) of the IAA);
72. Currency Conversion Fee, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 432-44 (TILA);
73. Wynn v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1114-15 (CD. Cal. 2002) (ADEA); McLachlan v. Simon, 31 F. Supp. 2d 731, 739 n.7 (N.D. CaI. 1998) (§ 36 of the ICA), aff d in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2001);
74. Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 701, 709 (D.N.J. 1998) (§ 3730(h) of the FCA); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Graphnet, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 126, 129-31 (D.N.J. 1995) (§ 2 of the Sherman Act);
75. Colleton Reg'l Hosp. v. MRS Med. Review Sys., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 896, 901-03 (D.S.C 1994) (§ 502(a) of ERISA). Mruz v. Caring, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 701, involved conspiracy liability, not aiding and abetting liability.
76. Central Bank applies the same to both, see Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d 837 (2d Cir. 1998)
77. , so Mruz means there is no aiding and abetting liability under section 3730(h) of the FCA.
78. Compare, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (upholding aiding and abetting liability under the ATCA)
79. with Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C 2005) (rejecting it).
80. Compare, e.g., Pa. Ass'n of Edwards Heirs v. Rightenour, 235 F.3d 839, 843-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting civil RICO aiding and abetting), and Cobbs v. Sheahan, 385 F. Supp. 2d 731, 738-39 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (collecting cases rejecting it)
81. with, e.g., Young v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 4:08CV-507 RP-CFB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100419, at * 55-58 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 27, 2009) (collecting cases upholding it). Courts disagree because aiding and abetting liability under civil RICO was well established
82. pre-Central Bank. A few courts have stuck with those precedents, see, e.g., In re Managed Care Litig., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2001), but most find that Central Bank abrogated them just as it overturned many section 10(b) precedents
83. see e.g., King v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. CV 04-1029-HU, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11317, at *80-81 & *80 n.12 (D. Or. Mar. 8, 2005) (gathering civil RICO precedents displaced by Central Bank).
84. See, e.g., Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 317 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (42 U.S.C. §1983 (2006)); Shell Oil Co., 128 F.T.C. 749 (1999) (§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45).
85. See cases cited supra notes 54-58. The one exception, AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1429-33, is discussed infra pp. 748-49.
86. 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
87. See id. at 688-90.
88. Id. at 690 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332-2333 (2006)).
89. Id. at 689.
90. See AT&T, 42 F.3d at 1429-33.
91. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 TermForeword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV L. REV 26, 66-67 (1994).
92. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 188-89 (1994).
93. See Spicer v. Chi. Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., 977 F.2d 255, 257-58 (7th Cir. 1992).
94. Such tailoring occurred in Grokster. See infra pp. 743-44.
95. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV 965 (1984).
96. Cf. Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV L. REV 542 (2009) (arguing that one justification for textualism is the fairer notice it provides to individuals regulated by a statute).
97. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.3.3 (5th ed. 2007).
98. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964).
99. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV 533, 540-41 (1983).
100. See Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV 861, 882-84 (1996);
101. cf. Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam) ("[I]t frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law.").
102. For example, assume there is no express secondary copyright liability. The copyright statute would forbid the unauthorized downloading of copyrighted songs, but it would not bar knowingly selling programs that facilitate such downloading. Were a judge to read secondary liability into the statute, though, such conduct would be illegal.
103. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1994) ("We cannot amend the statute to create liability for acts that are not themselves [unlawful] within the meaning of the statute."). See generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999) (arguing for the moral superiority of legislative to judicial lawmaking).
104. See Easterbrook, supra note 73, at 544-51.
105. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV 885 (2003).
106. For a rich discussion, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006).
107. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 45 (1977). See generally FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note (discussing adjudicative and legislative facts).
108. HOROWITZ, supra note 80, at 47-49.
109. Id. at 45.
110. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005).
111. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at § 2.2.
112. See The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Leading Cases, 108 HARV L. REV 139, 370 (1994).
113. See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1417-19 (2006).
114. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654-62 (1834); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) ("The remedies for infringement 'are only those prescribed by Congress.'" (quoting Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123, 151 (1889))).
115. See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919-21 (secondary copyright liability and peer-to-peer file sharing software);
116. Playboy Enters, v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2004) (secondary trademark liability and search engines); i4í Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07CV113, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70104, at *4-7 (E.D. Tex. Aug. n, 2009) (secondary patent liability and word processing features);
117. see also Eric Goldman, Technology & Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/derivativeliability (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (compiling technology cases involving secondary liability).
118. See Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV 1831,1846-49 (2009).
119. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Secondary Liability and the Fragmentation of Digital Copyright Law 14-19 (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 09-5, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345355.
120. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994).
121. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 431; Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1360-61 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox, 2005 SUP. CT. REV 229,251-55.
122. See Depoorter, supra note 89, at 1846.
123. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 88.
124. See William Landes & Douglas Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: Napster and Beyond, J. ECON. PERSR, Spring 2003, at 113, 114-15, 120-23.
125. See Lynda J. Oswald, International Issues in Secondary Liability for Intellectual Property Rights Infringement, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 247,247 (2008).
126. See, e.g., Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (amending the trademark dilution statute in response to the Court's narrow statutory interpretation in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003));
127. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct 1746, 1750-51 (2007) (describing the passage of 35 U.S.C. §271(f) (2006) to countermand the Court's refusal to extend contributory patent liability beyond its statutory scope in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972));
128. Brief of Amici Curiae Sixty Intellectual Property and Technology Law Professors et al. in Support of Respondents at 25-27, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mpaa/iptechprofso30105brf.pdf (recounting congressional responses to judicially followed statutory limits on copyright liability).
129. See Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 369,371-76 (2006).
130. See Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 683-84 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 668-69 (:944).
131. See Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C).
132. Id. §271(b)-(c), 66 Stat, at 811 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §271(b)-(c)).
133. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (alteration in original) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court made the same assertion in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417. See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. REV 941, 976-83 (2007). This Note discusses only Grokster because it is more recent, but the analysis is similar for Sony.
134. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (citing, inter alia, Sony, 464 U.S. at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1911)).
135. Id. at 936-37.
136. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 439-42.
137. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTERS HIGH TECH. L.J. 399,399 (2006).
138. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929-30; Wu, supra note 92, at 229-41.
139. The defendants did cite Central Bank twice, but only as subsidiary support for other positions. See Brief for Respondents at 26, 39, Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (No. 04-480), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mpaa/respondents3105brf.pdf. One amicus brief cited Central Bank for the proposition that "secondary liability under statutory causes of action must be narrowly construed," but it did not argue that without a statutory basis, there could not be any secondary copyright liability. Brief of Amici Curiae the Consumer Elees. Ass'n et al. in Support of Affirmance at 15, Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (No. 04-480), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mpaa/ cea030105brf.pdf.
140. See Jonathan Band, Expert Report: The Grokster Playlist, 10 Electronic Com. & L. Rep. (BNA) 334, (Mar. 30, 2005), available at http://www.policybandwidth.com/doc/JBand-GroksterPlaylistpdf (summarizing Grokster amicus briefs).
141. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C).
142. See 17 U.S.C. §1 (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
143. See17 U.S.C. §106 (2006); see Menell & Nimmer, supra note 102, at 994-95.
144. 17 U.S.C. §501(a) (2006).
145. See Aden Allen, Note, What's in a Copyright? The Forgotten Right "To Authorize," 9 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV 87 (2008).
146. See, e.g., Venegas-Hernández v. Asociación de Compositores y Editores de Música Latinoamericana, 424 F.3d 50, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2005); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc);
147. see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.04[A], [D] (2006).
148. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 115. A House report explains that Congress added the words "to authorize" "to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers. For example, a person who lawfully acquires an authorized copy of a motion picture would be an infringer if he or she engages in the business of renting it to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674. Some commentators also look to foreign law. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 114. The United Kingdom codified secondary liability by adding the right "to authorize" to its copyright statute in 1911. See Ysolde Gendreau, Authorization Revisited, 48 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 341, 343 (2001). That Act may have been the inspiration behind Congress's choice of the same language in the 1976 Act; insofar as it was, the United Kingdom's pre-1976 interpretation of "to authorize" may shed light on what Congress meant by the term.
149. See ITSI TV Prods., Inc. v. Cal. Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 860-61 (E.D. Cal. 1992), aff' d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. ITSI TV Prods., Inc. v. Agrie. Ass'ns, 3 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993).
150. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 32-36 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
151. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 169 (1981) (citing dictionaries).
152. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C).
153. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii), (d)(1)(A)-(B) (2006).
155. Other provisions in the copyright statute create similar inferences. See, e.g., id. §111(a)(3) (shielding passive telecommunications carriers from contributory liability). The DMCA is also the only law that expressly acknowledges contributory copyright liability. See id. §1201(c)(2) (declaring that one of the DMCA's sections does not "enlarge or diminish ... contributory liability for copyright infringement in connection with any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof).
156. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930-31 (2005) (citing, inter alia, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 486 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 3 NlMMER & NlMMER, supra note 115, §I2.04[A]).
157. See cases cited supra note 87 and accompanying text.
158. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982).
159. 265 U.S. 526(1924).
160. 64 F. Supp. 980 (D. Mass. 1946), aff'd, 162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1947).
161. See Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854 (citing William R. Warner, 265 U.S. 526; Coca-Cola, 64 F. Supp. 980).
162. Ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C).
163. See Inwood, 456 U.S. at 853-54. Presumably, Inwood implicitly construed the Lanham Act's two direct liability provisions, 15 U.S.C. §§1114, 1125 (2006). See Brownstone Publ'g, LLC v. AT&T, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-1630-SEB-JMS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25485, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2009).
164. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Cross, supra note 2, at 101 n.3.
165. See Cross, supra note 2, at 101 n.3; cf. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170-73 (1995) (rejecting an argument premised on pre-Lanham Act precedents because that statute superseded them). Neither the Lanham Act's text nor its legislative history betray any hint that the 1946 Congress meant to codify contributory liability. See Cross, supra note 2, at 109-21.
166. See Optimum Techs., Inc. v. Henkel Consumer Adhesives, Inc., 496 F.3d 1231, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007).
167. See Elec. Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798, 805-08 (3d Cir. 1992);
168. Cross, supra note 2, at 117-19; see also supra section I.A.4, p. 733. But see Adams, supra note 13, at 648-49 (arguing that intellectual property statutes incorporate common law tort principles).
169. See supra section I.A.3, p. 733.
170. See supra section I.A.5, pp. 733-34.
171. See supra section I.A.6, p. 734. Laws amending the Lanham Act are collected at Roland Vogl, Stanford Law School: US Intellectual Property Law, http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/ttlf/law/us/ip (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). The one substantial revision of trademark law post-Inwood -the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 -did not save contributory trademark infringement liability via the reenactment rule because it did not reenact either of the provisions that Inwood presumably construed, 15 U.S.C. §§1114, 1125 (2006). The 1988 Act did revise §1114. See Pub. L. No. 100-667, §127, 102 Stat, at 3943-44. The revision apparently sought to "codify the interpretation [§ 1114] has been given by the courts." S. REP. No. 100-515, at 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603. But the revision (and Senate Report explaining its purpose) focused entirely on the proper scope of direct liability. Nothing in the text (or legislative history) of the 1988 Act suggests that it codified contributory liability.
172. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730;
173. Madrid Protocol Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, secs. 13401-13402, 116 Stat. 1758, 1913 (2002);
174. Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43, 113 Stat 218; Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 app. I, at 1501A-545 to -552 (1999);
175. Patent and Trademark Fee Fairness Act of 1999, Pub L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 app. I, at 1501A-554 to -555;
176. Patent and Trademark Office Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 app. I, at 1501A-572 to -591 (1999);
177. Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998);
178. Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, no Stat. 1386; Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
179. 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994).
180. Central Bank does not affect vicarious liability. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
181. See AT&T, 42 F.3d at 1432.
182. Id. (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 169 (1994)).
183. See supra section I.B, pp. 734-37.
184. See Pa. Ass'n of Edwards Heirs v. Rightenour, 235 F.3d 839, 843-44 (3d Cir. 2000);
185. Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 657 (3d Cir. 1998); see also supra note 57.
186. See Tate v. Showboat Marina Casino P'ship, 431 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[W]hen two decisions are inconsistent, one of them should give way").
187. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
188. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816-17 (2009);
189. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988).
190. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978).
191. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989);
192. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1989). But see CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008) (refusing to reexamine "well-established prior law" simply because it was crafted when the Court was less textualist than it is now).
193. See Cross, supra note 2, at 102.
194. See Rodriguez de Quijos, 490 U.S. at 484.
195. For example, Inwood's holding addressed contributory liability for only manufacturers and product distributors. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982). Courts should limit it to such parties. Contra AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1432 (3d Cir. 1994).
196. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
197. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730.
198. See 15 U.S.C. §1125(c) (2006).
199. See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION 285 (2002). Some district courts have permitted contributory dilution claims to survive motions to dismiss, thereby implying that such claims are valid.
200. See Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1394 & n.28 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Steinway, Inc. v. Ashley, No. 01 Civ. 9703 (GEL), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1372, at *7 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 29, 2002);
201. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1123 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 2001). A federal court has also allowed a state law contributory dilution claim to survive a motion for summary judgment. See Kegan v. Apple Computer, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1053 (N.D. 111. 1996).
202. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999)) aff'g 175 F.R.D. 640 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
203. See, e.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §25:21.75 (4th ed. 2009); WELKOWITZ, supra note 157, at 116-17, 284-86.
204. See Cross, supra note n, at 664-76.
205. See id. at 664.
206. See id. at 674.