Public key encryption without random oracle made truly practical

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5927 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 107-120

  Wei, Puwen ^a   Wang, Xiaoyun ^a,b   Zheng, Yuliang ^c  

^a SHANDONG UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY   (China)

^c University of North Carolina at Charlotte   (United States)

Author keywords

Public key encryption; Random oracle; Universal hash

Indexed keywords

CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT ATTACK; CRYPTOGRAPHIC SCHEMES; ENCRYPTION SCHEMES; FORMAL SECURITY; PROVABLE SECURITY; PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION; PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION SCHEME; RANDOM ORACLE; RESEARCH AREAS; UNIVERSAL HASH;

COMPETITION; PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY;

NETWORK SECURITY;

EID: 76549132748     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-11145-7_10     Document Type: Conference Paper

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