Analytic conservatism

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 34, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 675-691

  Brennan, Geoffrey ^a   Hamlin, Alan ^b  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 7644219791     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123404000249     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Conservatism might seem to be a poor relation in the contemporary political theory literature, partly because it presents less as an analytic theory and more as a kind of mystique. For example, there is no discussion of conservatism in Raymond Plant, Modern Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). For a discussion of conservative ideology that raises the contrast between conservatism as ideology and conservatism as disposition, see Anthony Quinton, 'Conservatism', in Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds, A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 244-68. See also Samuel P. Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 454-73; Noel O'Sullivan, Conservatism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976); Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (London: Penguin, 1980); Ted Honderich, Conservatism (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990).
2. Conservatism might seem to be a poor relation in the contemporary political theory literature, partly because it presents less as an analytic theory and more as a kind of mystique. For example, there is no discussion of conservatism in Raymond Plant, Modern Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). For a discussion of conservative ideology that raises the contrast between conservatism as ideology and conservatism as disposition, see Anthony Quinton, 'Conservatism', in Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds, A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 244-68. See also Samuel P. Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 454-73; Noel O'Sullivan, Conservatism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976); Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (London: Penguin, 1980); Ted Honderich, Conservatism (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990).
3. Conservatism might seem to be a poor relation in the contemporary political theory literature, partly because it presents less as an analytic theory and more as a kind of mystique. For example, there is no discussion of conservatism in Raymond Plant, Modern Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). For a discussion of conservative ideology that raises the contrast between conservatism as ideology and conservatism as disposition, see Anthony Quinton, 'Conservatism', in Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds, A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 244-68. See also Samuel P. Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 454-73; Noel O'Sullivan, Conservatism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976); Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (London: Penguin, 1980); Ted Honderich, Conservatism (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990).
4. Conservatism might seem to be a poor relation in the contemporary political theory literature, partly because it presents less as an analytic theory and more as a kind of mystique. For example, there is no discussion of conservatism in Raymond Plant, Modern Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). For a discussion of conservative ideology that raises the contrast between conservatism as ideology and conservatism as disposition, see Anthony Quinton, 'Conservatism', in Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds, A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 244-68. See also Samuel P. Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 454-73; Noel O'Sullivan, Conservatism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976); Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (London: Penguin, 1980); Ted Honderich, Conservatism (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990).
5. Conservatism might seem to be a poor relation in the contemporary political theory literature, partly because it presents less as an analytic theory and more as a kind of mystique. For example, there is no discussion of conservatism in Raymond Plant, Modern Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). For a discussion of conservative ideology that raises the contrast between conservatism as ideology and conservatism as disposition, see Anthony Quinton, 'Conservatism', in Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds, A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 244-68. See also Samuel P. Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 454-73; Noel O'Sullivan, Conservatism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976); Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (London: Penguin, 1980); Ted Honderich, Conservatism (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990).
6. Conservatism might seem to be a poor relation in the contemporary political theory literature, partly because it presents less as an analytic theory and more as a kind of mystique. For example, there is no discussion of conservatism in Raymond Plant, Modern Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). For a discussion of conservative ideology that raises the contrast between conservatism as ideology and conservatism as disposition, see Anthony Quinton, 'Conservatism', in Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds, A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 244-68. See also Samuel P. Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 454-73; Noel O'Sullivan, Conservatism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976); Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (London: Penguin, 1980); Ted Honderich, Conservatism (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990).
7. Freidrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960) makes the same point in his well-known piece on 'Why I am not a Conservative'. The situation can scarcely be said to have improved over the intervening years.
8. Anthony O'Hear, 'Conservatism', in Edward Craig, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), section 1.
9. Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1991), p.407.
10. Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology' refers to conservatism as a 'positional' ideology, somewhat in the same spirit as our 'posture'; the conservative 'temper' is discussed by O'Hear, 'Conservatism'.
11. Indeed, pragmatism might in some ways be a more descriptive term if it had not been appropriated for other purposes by Richard Rorty and his followers.
12. We characterize Hayek as a conservative despite his famous protestations to the contrary because he, as much as any recent writer, provides the sort of analytic foundation for a principled defence of the status quo of the type that we take to be characteristic of the conservative position.
13. We recognize other forms of analysis - such as the conceptual analysis offered in some parts of political philosophy - and their value; we merely argue that this economic form of analysis has value here.
14. A fuller account of the distinction between issues of feasibility and desirability is provided by Geoffrey Brennan, 'Disciplinary Contributions: Economics', in Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds, A Companion to Contemporary Political Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), pp. 123-56.
15. Jerry Z. Muller, Conservatism: An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from David Hume to the Present (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 7.
16. Paul Pierson, 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 251-67, p. 251.
17. Muller, Conservatism, p. 11.
18. Edmund Burke, 'Reflections on the Revolution in France', in Muller, Conservatism, p. 99.
19. In a different context, we have discussed the relationship between risk aversion and the idea of resilience that forms apart of the republican ideal of liberty; this might be seen as a particular aspect of conservative liberalism (see Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'Republican Liberty and Resilience', The Monist, 84 (2001), 45-59).
20. We leave on one side the distributional question involved in the case where the impact is positive for some and negative for others. In that case inequality aversion plays the role of risk aversion discussed here.
21. This fact makes it clear that our discussion assumes cardinal measurability - mirroring the standard economic account of risk aversion. If either dimension of Figure 2 is only ordinally measurable, it is not possible to distinguish between convex and concave value functions (since they may identify the same ordering). We do not pursue the ordinal case here.
22. An interesting and rather different line of defence for a conservative posture is found in Hao Li, 'A Theory of Conservatism', Journal of Political Economy, 109 (2001), 617-36. Li's argument revolves around the proposition that placing the burden of proof on those who would secure change provides an appropriate incentive for information gathering and encourages a more informed decision-making body. For an exploration of related issues from an economic viewpoint, see Timur Kuran, 'The Tenacious Past: Theories of Personal and Collective Conservatism', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 10 (1988), 143-72.
23. An interesting and rather different line of defence for a conservative posture is found in Hao Li, 'A Theory of Conservatism', Journal of Political Economy, 109 (2001), 617-36. Li's argument revolves around the proposition that placing the burden of proof on those who would secure change provides an appropriate incentive for information gathering and encourages a more informed decision-making body. For an exploration of related issues from an economic viewpoint, see Timur Kuran, 'The Tenacious Past: Theories of Personal and Collective Conservatism', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation, 10 (1988), 143-72.
24. Note that it is possible for posture to vary across dimensions - that is, the value function may be concave with respect to one argument and convex with respect to another. Beyond suggesting that the most thoroughgoing conservative would be one whose value function is convex in each of the arguments, we do not pursue the multidimensional case further here.
25. On the ex ante / expost distinction and its ethical relevance, see, for example, John Broome, 'Selecting People Randomly', Ethics, 95 (1984), 38-55; John Broome, 'Uncertainty and Fairness', Economic Journal, 94 (1984), 624-32.
26. On the ex ante / expost distinction and its ethical relevance, see, for example, John Broome, 'Selecting People Randomly', Ethics, 95 (1984), 38-55; John Broome, 'Uncertainty and Fairness', Economic Journal, 94 (1984), 624-32.