A case for performance management for political appointees

Public Personnel Management

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1-18

  Kim, Pan Suk ^a  

^a Yonsei University Wonju   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 76249126107     PISSN: 00910260     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/009102600903800401     Document Type: Article

References (104)

1. Lewis, David E. (2008). The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and bureaucratic Performance, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press;
2. Mackenzie, G. Calvin, (ed.). (1987). The In-and-Outers. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press;
3. Hess, Stephen. (1988). Organizing the Presidency (revised edition). Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press;
4. Pfiffner, James P. (ed.). (1999). The Managerial Presidency. (2nd edition). College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press;
5. Jones, Charles O. (2000). Preparing To Be President: The Memos of Richard E. Neustadt. Washington, DC: AEI Press;
6. Patterson, Bradley H. (2000). The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and Beyond. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press;
7. Kumar, Martha J. (2002). "Recruiting and Organizing the White House Staff," Political Science and Politics 35(1): 35-40;
8. Kim, Pan Suk. (2002a). "Public Hearings for Ministerial Appointments in the Standing Committee of the National Assembly for Ministerial Appointments," (Series 5 on changing the imperial presidency) Joong-Ang-Daily (October 7), 10. (in Korean);
9. Kim, Pan Suk. (2002b). "Chapter 5: Presidential Personnel," Park, Se Il and Associates. The Keys to a Successful Presidency (I), 293-378. Seoul: East Asia Institute, (in Korean);
10. Kim, Pan Suk. (2004). "Presidential Personnel Innovation for Presidential Appointees in Korea: Toward an Institutional Presidency," Public Administration and Development 24 (3): 235-246;
11. Kim, Pan Suk. (2005). 'A Comparative Study on Political Appointment: Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States," Korean Public Personnel Administration Review 4 (2): 1-40. (in Korean).
12. Gilmour, John B. and David E. Lewis. (2006). "Political Appointees and the Competence of Federal Program Management," American Politics Research 34 (1): 22-50.
13. Wye, Chris. (2004a). Performance Management for Political Executives: A "Start Where You Are, Use What You Have" Guide. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government;
14. Ferrara, Joseph and Lyn C. Ross. (2005). Getting to Know You: Rules of Engagement for Political Appointees and Career Executives. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government;
15. Michaels, Judith E. (2005). Becoming an Effective Political Executive: Seven Lessons from Experienced Appointees. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government.
16. Wye, Becoming An Effective Political Executive: Seven Lessons from Experienced Appointees op. cit, p. 23;
17. Civil Service Commission of Korea. (2004). Manual for Government Executives'Adaptation in Public Service. Seoul: Civil Service Commission of Korea, (in Korean);
18. Ferrara and Ross, Manual for Government Executives'Adaptation in Public Service.op. cit.;
19. Michaels, Manual for Government Executives'Adaptation in Public Service. op. cit.
20. [US] General Accounting Office (GAO). (1999). Management Reform: Elements of Successful Improvement Initiatives (GAO/T-GGD-00-26). Washington, DC: General Accounting Office;
21. [US] General Accounting Office (GAO). (2000). Confirmation of Political Appointees: Eliciting Nominees' Views on Leadership and Management Issues (GAO/GGD-00-174). Washington, DC: General Accounting Office;
22. [US] General Accounting Office (GAO). (2004). Result-Oriented Government (GAO-04-38). Washington, DC: General Accounting Office;
23. Melkers, Julia. (2004). Staying the Course: The Use of Performance Measurement in State Governments. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government;
24. Demond, John and Rick Eden. (2005). "Improving Government Processes," Robert Klitgaard and Paul C. Light, eds. (2005). High-Performance Government: Structure, Leadership, Incentives. Santa Monica, CA: Pardee Rand Graduate School, pp. 217-253;
25. Klerman, Jacob A. (2005). "Measuring Performance," Robert Klitgaard and Paul C. Light, eds. High-Performance Government: Structure, Leadership, Incentives. Santa Monica, CA: Pardee Rand Graduate School, pp. 343-379.
26. Wye, (2005). "Measuring Performance," High-Performance Government: Structure, Leadership, Incentives. op. cit., p. 17.
27. Jordan, Mark H. and Mike Schraeder. (2003). "Executive Selection in a Government Agency," Public Personnel Management 32(3): 357-370.
28. Patterson, (2003). "Executive Selection in a Government Agency," Public Personnel Management op. cit.;
29. Kumar, (2003). "Executive Selection in a Government Agency," Public Personnel Management op. cit.
30. Felzenberg, Alvin. (2000). The Keys to Successful Presidency. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation;
31. Melkers, (2000). The Keys to Successful Presidency op. cit.;
32. Wye, (2000). The Keys to Successful Presidency op. cit.
33. Klerman, (2000). The Keys to Successful Presidency op. cit., p. 344.
34. Risher, Howard. (2004). Pay for Performance: A Guide for Federal Managers. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government;
35. Demond and Eden, (2004). Pay for Performance: A Guide for Federal Managers op. cit.
36. Lichtblau, Eric. (2002). "Bush Restoring Cash Bonuses for Political Appointees," New York Times (December 4). The Washington Post reported the White House Office staff salaries on July 19, 2006 and it was from a White House report to Congress on White House office staff as of June 30, 2006. For more details, visit the Washington Post's Web site at http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/opinions/graphics/2006staffiistsalary.html (accessed on October 1, 2007).
37. Also, see a GAO's letter to the U.S. Congress at http://www.gao.gov/new. items/d011081r.pdf (accessed on January 5, 2008).
38. Mackenzie, (2002). "Bush Restoring Cash Bonuses for Political Appointees" New York Times op.cit.;
39. Hess, (2002). "Bush Restoring Cash Bonuses for Political Appointees" New York Times op. cit.;
40. Weko, Thomas J. (1995). The Politicizing Presidency. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas;
41. Pfiffner, (1995). The Politicizing Presidency op. cit.;
42. Burke, John P. (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton. (2nd edition). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press;
43. Lewis, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
44. Felzenberg, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
45. Patterson, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
46. Kumar, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
47. Kim, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
48. Kim, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
49. In US, for example, the Director of Presidential Personnel in the White House is Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel (http://www.whitehouse.gov/appointments/). In addition, Counsel to the President is in charge of background investigation of candidates. For more details on the organization of the Office of the President in Korea, visit its Web site at http://english.president.go.kr/cwd/en/pub/government/cnt01010101.html (accessed on October 10, 2007).
50. Mackenzie, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit. Other countries have different problems. In the United States, for example, the vetting process takes several months so that prospective candidates hesitate to apply for political appointments.
51. Mackenzie, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
52. Hess, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
53. Weko, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
54. Pfiffner, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
55. Burke, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
56. Patterson, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
57. Kim, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
58. [US] GAO published a report including the list of the questions on eliciting Presidential nominees' views on leadership and management issues for the confirmation of political appointees;
59. [US] GAO, Kim, (2000). The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton op. cit.;
60. During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, there were three offices in the Office of the Senior Secretary to the President for Personnel Affairs: (1) Secretary to the President for Personnel Management; (2) Secretary to the President for Personnel Policy; and (3) Secretary to the President for Balanced Personnel Management. For more details, visit the Web site of the Office of the President at http://english.president.go.kr/cwd/en/pub/government/cnt01010101. html (accessed on August 13, 2007).
61. Kim, op. cit. It should be noted that the improvement of the system itself is not enough to guarantee success. Success will take the concerted effort of a concerned executive and a talented leader in charge of the personnel function. In addition, institutionalization must be supported by further studies and efforts from various viewpoints concerning customary presidential personnel practices and operations in order to answer fully the question of "how to get the right person in the right place at the right time."
62. Tobias, Robert. (2000). "The New World Appointee," Government Executive (December 1);
63. Wye, (2000). "The New World Appointee," Government Executive op. cit.
64. Ferrara and Ross, (2000). "The New World Appointee," Government Executive op. cit., p. 65.
65. Michaels, (2000). "The New World Appointee," Government Executive op. cit.
66. Michaels, (2000). "The New World Appointee," Government Executive Ibid.
67. Michaels, (2000). "The New World Appointee," Government Executive Ibid., p. 6.
68. Abramson, Mark A and Paul R. Lawrence, eds. (2001). Transforming Organizations. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
69. Wye, (2001). Transforming Organizations op. cit.
70. Wye, (2001). Transforming Organizations Ibid.
71. Wye, (2001). Transforming Organizations Ibid.
72. Wye, (2001). Transforming Organizations Ibid. Partially modified by the author.
73. Civil Service Commission of Korea, Wye, (2001). Transforming Organizations op. cit. The Civil Service Commission of Korea had close consultation with the Office of the President in Korea to make a useful reference for political appointees. The author was personally involved in compiling this publication as then Secretary to the President for Personnel Policy, Office of the President, Republic of Korea.
74. Wye, (2001). Transforming Organizations Ibid.
75. Council for Excellence in Government. (2000). A Survivor's Guide for Presidential Nominees. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
76. Michaels, (2000). A Survivor's Guide for Presidential Nominees op.cit.
77. Benton, D. A. (2003). How to Act Like a CEO. New York: McGraw-Hill;
78. Bates, Suzanne. (2005). How to Think Like a CEO. New York: McGraw-Hill.
79. Such unethical cases can be found in many developing countries. Family members and close friends of political appointees could take advantages for private gain.
80. The Presidential Appointee Initiative (PAT) had three primary goals: (1) to identify a pragmatic, nonpartisan reform agenda that will resolve serious flaws in the appointments process; (2) to have an immediate impact by offering practical assistance and support to the next class of presidential nominees;; and (3) to rekindle an appreciation for public service. For more details, visit the Brookings Institution's Web site at http://www.brookings.edu/media/ NewsReleases/2002/20020725pai.aspx (accessed on October 20, 2007).
81. In this regard, the [British] National School of Government often provides selective programs for politically appointed officials. It also established the Centre for Working with Ministers and Parliament. For more details, visit its homepage at http://www.nationalschool.gov.uk/downloads/cwmp- brochure.pdf
82. Kiel, Geoffrey, Garvin Nicholson, and Mary A. Barclay. (2004). Board, Director and CEO Evaluation. New York: McGraw-Hill;
83. Wye, (2004). Board, Director and CEO Evaluation op. cit.
84. Ban, Carolyn, and Patricia W Ingraham. (1990). "Short-Timers: Political Appointee Mobility and Its Impact on Political-Career Relations in the Reagan Administration," Administration and Society 22 (1):106-124.
85. Civil Service Commission of Korea, Ban, Carolyn, and Patricia W Ingraham. (1990). "Short-Timers: Political Appointee Mobility and Its Impact on Political-Career Relations in the Reagan Administration," Administration and Society op cit.
86. Civil Service Commission of Korea, Ban, Carolyn, and Patricia W Ingraham. (1990). "Short-Timers: Political Appointee Mobility and Its Impact on Political-Career Relations in the Reagan Administration," Administration and Society op cit.
87. Klerman, (1990). "Short-Timers: Political Appointee Mobility and Its Impact on Political-Career Relations in the Reagan Administration," Administration and Society op. cit., pp, 377-378.
88. Tobias, (1990). "Short-Timers: Political Appointee Mobility and Its Impact on Political-Career Relations in the Reagan Administration," Administration and Society op. cit.
89. For more details, visit the following homepage: http://www.osti.gov/ policy/library/secagree.html (accessed on March 16, 2007).
90. This idea could run concurrently with an organizational-level performance management system. With regard to the organizational-level performance management system, each agency's overall performance can be evaluated in terms of major policy execution, financial performance, and other key areas (personnel, organization, and e-government). In order to assess organizationallevel performance, the balanced scorecard (BSC) approach could be utilized in government and business. As a matter of fact, organizational-level performance assessment is currently handled by the Office of the Prime Minister in cooperation with several agencies in the areas of finance, personnel, organization, auditing, and e-government.
91. http://www.csc.go.kr/eng/news/news01-02.asp?bbs-id=500&brd-id=134 (accessed on October 5, 2007).
92. OECD. (2007). Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants: OECD and Other Country Experiences. Paris: OECD.
93. Tobias, (2007). Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants: OECD and Other Country Experiences op. cit.;
94. Wye, (2007). Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants: OECD and Other Country Experiences op. cit.;
95. Ferrara and Ross, (2007). Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants: OECD and Other Country Experiences op. cit.;
96. Michaels, (2007). Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants: OECD and Other Country Experiences op. cit.
97. Benton, (2007). Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants: OECD and Other Country Experiences op. cit.;
98. Kiel et al.,(2007). Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants: OECD and Other Country Experiences op. cit.;
99. Bates, (2007). Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants: OECD and Other Country Experiences op. cit.
100. Abramson and Lawrence, (2007). Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants: OECD and Other Country Experiences op. cit.;
101. [US] GAO, (2007). Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants: OECD and Other Country Experiences op.cit.;
102. Melkers, (2007). Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants: OECD and Other Country Experiences op. cit.;
103. Risher, (2007). Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants: OECD and Other Country Experiences op. cit.
104. Wye, (2007). Performance-Based Arrangements for Senior Civil Servants: OECD and Other Country Experiences op. cit.