Global implications of the U.S.-India deal

Daedalus

Volumn 139, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 20-31

  Perkovich, George ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 75949118408     PISSN: 00115266     EISSN: 15486192     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/daed.2010.139.1.20     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review introduced "dissuasion" as a purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, meaning that U.S. strategic superiority should remain great enough that no other actor would think it feasible to build forces to compete.
2. Ashley Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States, Carnegie Endowment Report, July 2005, 13.
3. The argument that it was wise for the United States to pay India to ensure its responsible behavior appears, among other places, in Ashley Tellis, "Should the U.S. Sell Nuclear Technology to India?", http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6487. Tellis argues: "India's commendable nonproliferation history, however, is owed entirely to sovereign decisions made by its government, not to its adherence to international agreements. As a result, any unilateral change in the Indian government's policy of strict nonproliferation could pose serious problems for American security. This concern has acquired particular urgency in the post-9/11 era because of the incredibly sophisticated capabilities present in India today and because India remains at the cutting edge of research and development activities in new fuel cycle technologies. Bringing New Delhi into the global nonproliferation regime through a lasting bilateral agreement that defines clearly enforceable benefits and obligations, therefore, not only strengthens American efforts to stem further proliferation but also enhances U.S. national security."
4. http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/ThirdKhushabReactor.pdf.
5. Sunil Saraf and Mark Hibbs, "Russia to supply more reactors to India, bringing total to 12," Nucleonics Week, December 18, 2008.
6. http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=24507.
7. The preamble of the iaea agreement with India contains provisions that suggest safeguards in India would not be in perpetuity.
8. Discussion with North Korean diplomat, July 23, 2008.
9. Discussion with knowledgeable official, May 2, 2009.
10. Discussion with Norwegian diplomat, December 16, 2008.
11. Pierre Goldschmidt, "Strengthening the Non-proliferation Regime," paper for the 7th rok-un Joint Conference on Disarmament, November 24-26, 2008, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/goldschmidt_rok_20081124.pdf.