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1
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75849136247
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The Socrates to whom wereferin this ppppris
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The "Socrates" to whom wereferin this ppppris the "SSoratee"of Plato's early dialogues.
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Ssoratee of Plato's Early Dialogues
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2
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75849142170
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The translations are our own, although we have frequently consulted others. We found it hard to improve upon the translation of the Protagoras by C.C.W. Taylor Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976
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The translations are our own, although we have frequently consulted others. We found it hard to improve upon the translation of the Protagoras by C.C.W. Taylor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).
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3
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0041012919
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Princeton: Princeton University Press
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Examples may be found in R. Kraut, Socrates and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 258-362
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(1984)
Socrates and the State
, pp. 258-362
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Kraut, R.1
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5
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0010855117
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The socratic paradoxes
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G. Santas, "The Socratic Paradoxes," The Philosophical Review 73 (1964), pp. 147-164
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(1964)
The Philosophical Review
, vol.73
, pp. 147-164
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Santas, G.1
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6
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60949223998
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G. Vlastos, Platonic Studies, 2nd Edition Princeton: Princeton University Press
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G. Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras," in G. Vlastos, Platonic Studies, 2nd Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 418-423.
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(1981)
The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras
, pp. 418-423
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Vlastos, G.1
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7
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39449133557
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The unity of virtue
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T. Penner, "The Unity of Virtue," The Philosophical Review 82 (1973), pp. 35-68.
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(1973)
The Philosophical Review
, vol.82
, pp. 35-68
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Penner, T.1
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8
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0007559576
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What laches and nicias miss-and whether socrates thinks courage is merely a part of virtue
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Penner attempts to bolster his account in T. Penner, "What Laches and Nicias Miss - And Whether Socrates Thinks Courage is Merely a Part of Virtue," Ancient Philosophy 12 (1992), pp. 1-27.
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(1992)
Ancient Philosophy
, vol.12
, pp. 1-27
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Penner, T.1
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9
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75849123455
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Socrates on the parts of virtue
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Taylor 103ff
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See also Taylor, 103ff.; P. Woodruff, "Socrates on the Parts of Virtue," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary volume, 2 (1976), pp. 101-116
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(1976)
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
, vol.2
, Issue.SUPPL.
, pp. 101-116
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Woodruff, P.1
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10
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0004146328
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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T.H. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 86-90
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(1977)
Plato's Moral Theory
, pp. 86-90
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Irwin, T.H.1
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11
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60949425509
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The unity of virtue and the objects of socratic inquiry
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M. Ferejohn, "The Unity of Virtue and the Objects of Socratic Inquiry," Journal of the History of Philosophy 20 (1982), pp. 1-21
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(1982)
Journal of the History of Philosophy
, vol.20
, pp. 1-21
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Ferejohn, M.1
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13
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75849127390
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The unity of the virtues
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In his recent contribution to this topic, D. Devereux argues that the position attributed to Socrates in the Laches cannot be reconciled with the position attributed to Socrates in the Protagoras
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In his recent contribution to this topic, D. Devereux argues that the position attributed to Socrates in the Laches cannot be reconciled with the position attributed to Socrates in the Protagoras (D. Devereux, "The Unity of the Virtues, The Philosophical Review 102 (1993), pp. 765-789).
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(1993)
The Philosophical Review
, vol.102
, pp. 765-789
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Devereux, D.1
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14
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75849124234
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Devereux's theory that theLaches expresses Plato's account of the virtues and that the Protagoras expresses Socrates' is a further elaboration of the position developed in an earlier essay
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The former position, Devereux speculates, is "Plato's attempt to strengthen the Socratic view (767). Devereux's theory that theLaches expresses Plato's account of the virtues and that the Protagoras expresses Socrates' is a further elaboration of the position developed in an earlier essay.
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Plato's Attempt to Strengthen the Socratic View
, pp. 767
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Speculates, D.1
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15
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0007516962
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Courage and wisdom in plato's laches
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where Devereux argues that the Laches "⋯ speaks for Plato, not for the historical Socrates". We know o no independent reason to count the Laches as later than the Protagoras. Thus, we count our position on this issue to be superior to Devereux's if we can provide a coherent account of what is said in both of the dialogues and, to that extent, preserve the view that the early dialogues express a single, coherent philosophy
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See D. Devereux, "Courage and Wisdom in Plato's Laches," Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (1977), p. 141, where Devereux argues that the Laches "⋯ speaks for Plato, not for the historical Socrates". We know o no independent reason to count the Laches as later than the Protagoras. Thus, we count our position on this issue to be superior to Devereux's if we can provide a coherent account of what is said in both of the dialogues and, to that extent, preserve the view that the early dialogues express a single, coherent philosophy.
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(1977)
Journal of the History of Philosophy
, vol.15
, pp. 14-17
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Devereux, D.1
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17
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75849132029
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Vlastos, p. 233
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Vlastos, p. 233.
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18
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75849156002
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Here we follow Taylor and Devereux against Vlastos and Woodruff in rendering by "entity" rather than "essence." The latter, technical meaning we think is n justified by the context
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Here we follow Taylor and Devereux against Vlastos and Woodruff in rendering by "entity" rather than "essence." The latter, technical meaning we think is n justified by the context.
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19
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75849135222
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Vlastos, p. 225
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Vlastos, p. 225.
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20
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75849133012
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Vlastos, pp. 227-228
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Vlastos, pp. 227-228.
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21
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75849116199
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This is Vlastos's theory of Pauline predication
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see Vlastos
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This is Vlastos's theory of "Pauline predication." For its full explication, see Vlastos, pp. 234-246.
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For Its Full Explication
, pp. 234-246
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22
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60949223998
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For an excellent summary of Vlastos's version of the equivalence thesis and the problems inherent in it, see Devereux, TThre is an extensive literature on Vlastos's "Pauline predication"
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For an excellent summary of Vlastos's version of the equivalence thesis and the problems inherent in it, see Devereux, "The Unity of the Virtues," pp.776--77.TThre is an extensive literature on Vlastos's "Pauline predication."
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The Unity of the Virtues
, pp. 776-777
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23
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75849164879
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This point is also made by Devereux
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This point is also made by Devereux, "The Unity of the Virtues," p. 771.
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The Unity of the Virtues
, pp. 77-83
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24
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3242748064
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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For a longer discussion of this point, see T. Brickhouse and N.D. Smith, Socrates on Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 91-94
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(1989)
Socrates on Trial
, pp. 91-94
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Brickhouse, T.1
Smith, N.D.2
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26
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75849126392
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See Penner
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See Penner, "The Unity of Virtue," pp. 164-166.
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The Unity of Virtue
, pp. 164-166
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27
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75849126392
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Penner sees the passage as actually lending support to the identity view, for he thinks that Socrates believes that courage is a kind of wisdom, from which it is a short step to the conclusion, courage is the of all goods and evils. Thus, Socrates must believe that courage is the whole of virtue. See Penner, esp. p. 183 n. 34
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Penner sees the passage as actually lending support to the identity view, for he thinks that Socrates believes that courage is a kind of wisdom, from which it is a short step to the conclusion, courage is the of all goods and evils. Thus, Socrates must believe that courage is the whole of virtue. See Penner, "The Unity of Virtue," pp.l77-177, esp. p. 183 n. 34.
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The Unity of Virtue
, pp. 77-177
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28
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75849164879
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We owe this point to Devereux
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We owe this point to Devereux, "The Unity of the Virtues," p. 772.
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The Unity of the Virtues
, pp. 77-82
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29
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75849164879
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This is Devereux's position. See Devereux
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This is Devereux's position. See Devereux, "The Unity of the Virtues," esp. pp. 771-773.
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The Unity of the Virtues
, pp. 771-773
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30
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75849142452
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We shall show how Socrates can accept this consequence in section 5, below
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We shall show how Socrates can accept this consequence in section 5, below.
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31
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75849134635
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Note
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Penner attempts to explain the fact that it is Socrates himself who introduces the notion that courage is a proper part of virtue into the discussion on the ground that Socrates ismerely trying "⋯ to lure Laches into giving the account of courage he is itching to give anyway ⋯" [Penner, "What Laches and Nicias Miss - And Whether Socrates Thinks Courage is Merely a Part of Virtue," p. 16]. One dubious consequence of Penner's interpretation is that Socrates feels free to exempt himself from the requirement he so often places on his interlocutors, that when developing an argument about a moral matter that they always "say what they believe" (see, e.g., Euthyphro 9d7-8; Cri. 49c11-d1; Prt. 331c4-d1; Rep. I 349a4-8, and Grg. 458a5-9, 500b5-c1). On the view we develop below, Socrates need not be seen as making such a disingenuous move against either Laches or Nicias. We should note that our view, that Socrates sincerely believes that courage is a proper part of virtue, is consistent with Penner's claim that he wishes "⋯to lure Laches into giving the account of courage he is itching to give anyway ⋯". But in our interpretation Socrates can do this without behaving in a way that would violate his own rules of elenctic dialogue.
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What Laches and Nicias Miss-and Whether Socrates Thinks Courage Is Merely A Part of Virtue
, pp. 1-6
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32
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75849124753
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Note
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We assume that Socrates is here using " and interchangeably, just as he does in so many places in the early dialogues.
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33
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75849147246
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Kraut, pp. 261-262
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Kraut, pp. 261-262.
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35
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75849134636
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Note
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Ferejohn defends the view that the individual virtues are constituted by knowledge of different sub-sets of good and evil, whereas virtue as a whole is the knowledge of all goods and evils [Ferejohn, "The Unity of Virtue as the Parts of Itself," pp. 384-388]. At one point Ferejohn offers the following parenthetical comment to illustrate his view of the whole of virtue/part of virtue relationship. "The point of such remarks" [by Socrates about various technai as "parts"] is not too unlike what is meant by the English sentence, "Knowledge of the Civil War is a part of knowledge of American history" (p. 385). Ferejohn's view, then, has the same failing as Kraut's, for both fail to show how the knowledge constituting one sub-discipline is the same knowledge as that constituting each of the others. To be sure, someone who has the knowledge of all goods and evils will have the knowledge that is piety and the knowledge that is justice, and so forth. But it does not follow from this, obviously, that someone who had the knowledge that constitutes one of the parts ipso facto has the knowledge that constitutes each of the others.
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The Unity of Virtue As the Parts of Itself
, pp. 384-388
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36
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75849161431
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To Kraut's suggestion (Kraut, p. 262 n. 29) that the gold/pieces of gold analogy not be taken too literally, we reply that Socrates chooses it deliberately. He does so precisely because he wishes to distinguish clearly his own view from one that allows the individual virtues to be different pieces of knowledge
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To Kraut's suggestion (Kraut, p. 262 n. 29) that the gold/pieces of gold analogy not be taken too literally, we reply that Socrates chooses it deliberately. He does so precisely because he wishes to distinguish clearly his own view from one that allows the individual virtues to be different pieces of knowledge.
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37
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75849152370
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We first introduced this analogy
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We first introduced this analogy in Brickhouse and Smith, Plato's Socrates, pp. 70-71.
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Plato's Socrates
, pp. 70-71
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Brickhouse1
Smith2
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38
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75849158057
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H.B. Miller suggested these particular examples to help us make our point regarding the relationship between a general discipline and its various applications. One should not assume, however, that he agrees with our interpretation of how Socrates' conceives the relationship between the whole and the parts of virtue
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H.B. Miller suggested these particular examples to help us make our point regarding the relationship between a general discipline and its various applications. One should not assume, however, that he agrees with our interpretation of how Socrates' conceives the relationship between the whole and the parts of virtue.
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39
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75849127134
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Note
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Paul Woodruff argues that all of the virtues have the same definition and thus that what individuates the virtues are accidental features (Woodruff, pp. 106-116). IfWoodruff were correct, either Socrates thinks that all of the individual virtues share the same " or he thinks that specifying the "' of a virtue is not essential to answering the "What is X?" question regarding that virtue. We find the former consequence highly dubitable (see our arguments against the equivalence view), and from the way Socrates refutes Euthyphro's final attempt to define piety, we are convinced that the latter consequence cannot be correct either
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40
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75849144874
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Note
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We are not suggesting that this expresses Socrates settled opinion about the proper definition of courage. What is important for our purposes is that Socrates himself suggests at the end of the Protagoras that courage is wisdom, though it is wisdom directed at a specific "
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41
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75849147244
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It should be clear in what sense we agree with Devereux's position and in what way we disagree. We agree that in the Laches Socrates defends the notion that courage is a proper part of virtue and that in the Laches each of the different individual virtues (that is, those other than wisdom) have different definitions and, thus, that none of the individual virtues can be defined by the simple formula "the knowledge of good and evil." However, we disagree with Devereux about whether Socrates' endorsement of the unity thesis in the Protagoras commits him to the view that each of the virtues has the same definition. If we are right, then, there is no reason to think (as Devereux does) that the Protagoras and the Laches express irreconcilable accounts of the ways the virtues are related, one essentially Socratic and one essentially Platonic
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It should be clear in what sense we agree with Devereux's position and in what way we disagree. We agree that in the Laches Socrates defends the notion that courage is a proper part of virtue and that in the Laches each of the different individual virtues (that is, those other than wisdom) have different definitions and, thus, that none of the individual virtues can be defined by the simple formula "the knowledge of good and evil." However, we disagree with Devereux about whether Socrates' endorsement of the unity thesis in the Protagoras commits him to the view that each of the virtues has the same definition. If we are right, then, there is no reason to think (as Devereux does) that the Protagoras and the Laches express irreconcilable accounts of the ways the virtues are related, one essentially Socratic and one essentially Platonic.
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