Law, informal rules and economic performance: The case for common law

Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance: The Case for Common Law

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-178

  Pejovich, Svetozar ^a,b,c   Colombatto, Enrico ^d  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE   (Serbia)

^c UNIVERSITY OF DONJA GORICA   (Montenegro)

^d UNIVERSITY OF TURIN   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 74949089415     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781848442900     Document Type: Book

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