Does trigger point mechanism create monopoly power for Hong Kong container terminals?

Maritime Policy and Management

Volumn 36, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 325-336

  Fung, Michael K ^a  

^a HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CARGO HANDLING; CONTAINER TERMINAL; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; MONOPOLY; PORT; PORT DEVELOPMENT;

CHINA; GUANGDONG; HONG KONG; SHENZHEN;

EID: 74849137618     PISSN: 03088839     EISSN: 14645254     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/03088830903056959     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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