The relation between variance and information rent in auctions

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 127-130

  Katzman, Brett ^a   Reif, Julian ^b   Schwartz, Jesse A ^a  

^a KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Contract auctions; Dispersion; Information rent; Variance

Indexed keywords

UNOBSERVABLE; VALUE DISTRIBUTION;

DISPERSIONS;

COMMERCE;

EID: 74849101204     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.07.005     Document Type: Article

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