Levelling down, levelling up, and governing across: Three responses to hybridization in international law

European Journal of International Law

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 647-674

  Heyvaert, Veerle ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 74749086968     PISSN: 09385428     EISSN: 14643596     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ejil/chp037     Document Type: Article

References (151)

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11. See S. Cassesse, B. Carotti, L. Casini, M. Macchia, E. MacDonald, and M. Savino (eds), Global Administrative Law. Cases, Materials, Issues (2008), at 29-50.
12. Abbott and Snidal, 'Hard and Soft Law in International Governance', 54 Int'l Org (2000) 421
13. Rome (Italy), 4 Nov. 1950, available at: www.echr.coe.int/.
14. See supra note 3
15. Rotterdam (The Netherlands), 10 Sept. 1998 (entered into force 24 Feb. 2004), available at: www.pic.int/en/ConventionText/ONU-GB.pdf. See Langlet, 'Prior Informed Consent for Hazardous Chemicals Trade - Implementation in EC Law', 12 European Environmental L Rev (2003) 292, at 293-295.
16. Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 5 June 1992 (entered into force 29 Dec. 1993), 31 ILM (1992) 818. See Tully, 'The Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resource and Benefit Sharing', 12 RECIEL (2003) 84.
17. E.g., De Minico, 'A Hard Look at Self-Regulation in the UK', (2006) 17 European Business L Rev (2006) 183.
18. Cf. De Bellis, 'Global Private Standards and Public Law: the EU Approach to Accounting Harmonization', in Cassesse et al., supra note 4, at 15-19
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20. Stockholm (Sweden), 22 May 2001 (entered into effect 17 May 2004). The Convention text and supporting documents are available at: www.pops.int.
21. L. Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (2006), at 108
22. von Moltke, 'On Clustering International Environmental Agreements', in G. Winter (ed.), Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change (2006), at 415.
23. The list includes the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 10; the Convention to Combat Desertification, Paris (France), 17 June 1994 (entered into effect 26 Dec. 1996), available at: www.unccd.int; and the Kyoto Protocol, Kyoto (Japan), 10 Dec. 1997 (entered into effect 16 Feb. 2005), 37 ILM (1998) 22.
24. See, e.g., 'China Proposes Climate Technology Transfer Plan', E NDS Europe Daily, 7 Nov. 2008.
25. Cf. Stone, 'Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law', 98 AJIL (2004) 276, at 277, 285.
26. Raustiala, 'The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmenal Networks and the Future of International Law', 43 Virginia J Int'l L (2002) 1
27. Rajamani, supra note 13, at 1.
28. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, O ur Common Future (Brundtland Report), available at: www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm, at 43; French, 'Developing States and International Environmental Law: The Importance of Differentiated Responsibilities', 49 Int'l & Comp LQ (2000) 35, at 36. See J. Holder and M. Lee, Environmental Protection, Law and Policy (2007), at 217-264.
29. The needs of the present should be met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. See Brundtland report, supra note 19, and E.B. Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (1989).
30. Weiss, supra note 2, at 369
31. A. Hurrell and B. Kingsbury (eds), The International Politics of the Environment (1992), at 39. The USA produces about 25% of global carbon dioxide emissions. Information available from the US Energy Information Administration, available at: www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapter1.html.
32. M.A. Olsen, Analysis of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2003), at 6-8.
33. Ibid., at 64.
34. See Chowdhury, 'Common But Differentiated Responsibility in International Environmental Law: From Stockholm (1972) to Rio (1992)', in K. Ginther, E. Denters, and P. de Waart, Sustainable Development and Good Governance (1995), at 333.
35. Yoder, 'Lessons From Stockholm: Evaluating the Global Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants', 10 Indiana J Global Legal Studies (2003) 113, at 120
36. Hough, 'Poisons in the System: The Global Regulation of Hazardous Pesticides', 3(2) Global Environmental Politics (2003) 11, at 20
37. See developing countries 'National Implementation Plans at http://chm.pops.int/Programmes/NIPs/Status/tabid/161/language/en-US/Defa ult.aspx.
38. Cf. French, supra note 19, at 57
39. Cullet, 'Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-State Relations', 10 EJIL (1999) 549, at 570
40. Stone, supra note 16, at 281
41. See Vice, 'Implementation of Biodiversity Treaties: Monitoring, Fact-finding and Dispute Resolution', 29 NYU J Int'l L & Politics (1997) 577, at 631
42. Cf. E. Louka, International Environmental Law. Fairness, Effectiveness, and World Order (2006), at 29-30.
43. Olsen, supra note 23, at 3
44. 'Toxic Traces Found in Arctic mothers-to-be', ENDS Europe Daily, 21 June 2005. See Hillman, 'International Control of Persistent Organic Pollutants: the UN Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, and Beyond', 8 Rev European Community and Int'l Environmental L (1999) 105.
45. Cf. Yoder, supra note 26, at 146- 147. See generally Najam, 'The View from the South: Developing Countries in Global Environmental Politics', in R.S. Axelrod, D.L. Downie, and N.J. Vig, The Global Environment. Institutions, Law and Policy (2005), at 225, 232-233.
46. Yoder, supra note 26, at 146- 147
47. For a list of international instruments and the varieties of CBDRs they contain see Rajamani, supra note 13, at 119-121
48. Stone, supra note 16, at 279
49. Ibid.; Biniaz, 'Remarks', 96 A SIL Proc (2002) 359.
50. Ramanjani, supra note 13; French, supra note 19; Weisslitz, 'Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility: Differential Versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution in the Global Climate Change Context', 13 Colorado J Int'l Envt'l L & Pol'y (2002) 473
51. Harris, 'Common but Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and United States Policy', 7 NYU Envt'l LJ (1999) 27
52. Cf. Stone, supra note 16, at 277. See UNEP/POPs/CONF/INF/1/Rev.3, listing, i nter alia, Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Iran, Madagascar, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe among exemption-seeking countries.
53. Magraw, 'Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual and Absolute Norms', 1 Colorado J Int'l Envt'l L & Pol'y (1990) 69, at 74-76
54. See POPs Convention, supra note 12, Art. 12(1): '[t]he Parties recognize that rendering of timely and appropriate technical assistance in response to requests from developing country Parties and Parties with economies in transition is essential to the successful implementation of this Convention'; and Art. 13(4): 'the extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under this Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under this Convention relating to financial resources, technical assistance and technology transfer'.
55. Ibid., Art. 13(2).
56. The POPs Secretariat has received nominations for 11 centres covering the 5 regions, which will be reviewed and decided upon at the 2009 COP. See www.pops.int/scrc/nomination/default.htm.
57. Terms of Reference for Regional and Subregional Centres for Capacity Building and Transfer of Technology, Annex I to Decision SC2-2/9 in Doc. UNEP/POPS/COP.2/30.
58. Annex II to Decision SC2-2/9 in Doc. UNEP/POPS/COP.2/30.
59. Guidance on technical assistance and transfer of environmentally sound technologies, Annex to Decision SC-1/15 in UNEP/POPS/COP.1/31.
60. Supra note 8
61. Basel (Switzerland), 22 Mar. 1989 (entered into force 5 May 1992), available at: www.basel.int/.
62. Montreal (Canada), 16 Sept. 1987 (entered into force 1 Jan. 1989), available at: www.unep.org/ozone/pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf.
63. Terms of Reference for RSCs, Annex I to Decision SC-2/9 in UNEP/POPS/COP.2/30.
64. Terms of Reference for the Selection of RSCs, Annex to Decision SC-3/12 in UNEP/POPS/COP.3/30.
65. Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 4 June 1992 (entered into force 21 Mar. 1994), 31 ILM (1992) 849.
66. Supra note 9
67. The details fall outside the confines of this article, but see Boisson de Chazournes, 'The Global Environment Facility (GEF): A Unique and Crucial Institution', 14 RECIEL (2005) 193
68. Z. Young, A New Green Order. The World Bank and the Politics of the Global Environment Facility (2002).
69. The GEF currently operates on its fourth replenishment fund
70. Soroos, 'Global Institutions and the Environment: An Evolutionary Perspective', in Axelrod et al., supra note 34, at 38.
71. Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 56, at 198
72. COP Guidance to the Financial Mechanism, Annex to Decision SC-1/9 in UNEP/POPS/COP.1/31.
73. Summary report of the Stockholm Convention Meeting of the Bureau, 19 and 20 May 2008, available at: http://chm.pops.int/.
74. Terms of Reference for the Review of the Financial Mechanism, Annex to Decision SC-1/10 in Doc UNEP/POPS/COP.1/31.
75. See [Non-Compliance] [Compliance] Procedures under Art. 17 of the Stockholm Convention, Annex to Decision SC-3/20 in Doc UNEP/POPS/COP.3.30.
76. Supra note 51
77. Cf. Victor, 'The Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's Non compliance Procedure', in D. Victor, K. Raustiala, and E.B. Skolnikoff, The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments (1998), at 138
78. Yoshida, 'Soft Enforcement of Treaties: The Montreal Protocol's oncompliance Procedure and the Functions of Internal International Institutions, 10 Colorado J Int'l Envt'l L & Pol'y (1999) 95, at 106. Yoshida points out that the legal text of the Montreal Protocol is silent on the matter, but that there is no evidence of multilateral fund operations ever being reviewed under the non-compliance mechanism.
79. Supra note 50
80. Cf. Clémençon, 'Funding for Global Environment Facility Continues to Decline', 16 J Environment and Development (2007) 5.
81. Victor, supra note 69, at 145
82. Compare Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 56, at 193 and Miles, 'Innovative Financing: Filling the Gaps on the Road to Sustainable Environmental Funding', 14 Rev EC and Int'l Environment'l L (2005) 202, at 202-203
83. Between 2001 and 2004, the GEF funded more than US$141 million worth of POPs projects, with co-financing of US$91 million. Information available at: www.gefweb.org/. Funding under the fourth replenishment cycle amounts to US$300 million: see Report of POPs COP-3, UNEP/POPS/COP.3/30.
84. Similar conditions characterize the GEF's relationship with its donor countries. The GEF Council obviously does not have the authority to determine minimum contribution levels for each country and, more importantly, has very limited means to police failure to transmit pledged funds. See Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility (Mar. 2008), at 28-35, available at: www.gefweb.org/uploadedFiles/GEF_Instrument_March08.pdf.
85. Cf. I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (1992).
86. 'Deal on POPs Treaty Enforcement Rules Elusive', ENDS Europe Daily, 7 May 2007
87. Guzman, 'The Design of International Agreements', 16 EJIL (2005) 579
88. O. Young, The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change. Fit, Interplay, and Scale (2002), at 38
89. Haas, 'Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations and Comparative Politics', in Shelton, supra note 3, at 58
90. A. and A. Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty. Compliance With International Regulatory Agreements (1998).
91. See M. Pallemaerts, International and European Regulation of Toxic Substances as Legal Symbolism (2003) on compliance with international law governing trade in toxic substances, pesticides, and toxic waste
92. E.B. Weiss and H.K. Jacobson, Engaging Countries. Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords (1998), at 511-554 on biodiversity protection; also reported in Vogel, 'Trading Up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance and Environmental Protection', 4 JEPP (1997) 567
93. Perkins and Neumayer, 'Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of EU Directives', 7(3) Global Environmental Politics (2007) 13, on compliance with EU environmental law
94. See Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 'The Emergence of Global Administrative Law', 68 L & Contemporary Problems (2005) 15, at 37-42
95. Esty, 'Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law', 115 Yale LJl (2006) 1490, at 1530-1534
96. European White Paper on Governance, COM(2001)428 final, 25 July 2001
97. Cf. Guzman, supra note 78.
98. Art. 17 of the Convention on non-compliance is sufficiently generic not require amendment to accommodate differentiated expectations of compliance.
99. See Abott and Snidal, supra note 5, at 424
100. Cf. Whalley and Zissimos, 'What Could a World Environmental Organization Do?', 1 Global Environmental Politics (2001) 29, at 30, who discuss the prospect of a World Environment Organization conceived as a bargaining context where deals can be struck between parties with interests in particular aspects of the global environment on both the 'custody' and 'demand' sides.
101. Cf. French, supra note 19, at 38, 48-49; Hurrell and Kingsbury, supra note 22, at 39.
102. Similar developments characterize the non-compliance assessments under the Montreal Protocol, supra note 51. See Yoshida, supra note 69, at 130.
103. Cf. French, supra note 19, at 45.
104. Cf. Stone, supra note 16, at 281.
105. Unless these commitments are confirmed in specific implementation projects funded through technical and financial assistance; see sect. 7A above.
106. Supra note 54
107. Bodansky, 'The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary', 18 Y ale J Int'l L (1993) 451, at 526
108. Does a state subsidy to upgrade the technology used in domestic pulp and paper mills, aimed to increase the efficiency and production output of the sector as well as reduce dioxin emissions, constitute an incremental cost of Treaty compliance?
109. Cf. Stone, supra note 16, at 285-288.
110. Ibid.,.
111. Cf. French, supra note 19, at 48.
112. See GEF Instrument, supra note 75; and Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 56
113. Revised terms of reference for work on the assessment of funding needs for Parties which are developing countries or countries with economies in transition to implement the Convention over the 2010-2014 period, Annex to Decision SC-3/15 in UNEP/POPS/COP.3/15.
114. Ibid. Additional sources of information include, i nter alia, the country reports submitted in compliance with the reporting duties set out in Art. 15 of the Convention; information supplied by the GEF and alternative funding mechanisms; data from NGOs and other stakeholders; and information issued by the Secretariats of other MEAs.
115. Supra note 63
116. Cf. Esty, supra note 81, at 1511- 1514.
117. POPs Convention, supra note 12, Arts 7 and 15
118. Several states confine themselves to reporting the overall sum of contributions pledged to the GEF. See, e.g., NIPs submitted by Australia, France, and Germany. The Japanese NIP is altogether silent on technical and financial assistance. See http://chm.pops.int/Programmes/NIPs/Status/tabid/161/language/en-US/Defa ult.aspx.
119. It would be tempting to assume that, as long as the resources the GEF dedicates to the POPs focal area match the agreed incremental costs for the corresponding period, the contributing states have fulfilled their financial assistance commitments. However, this is a flawed assumption since, on the one hand, some GEF donors have not ratified the POPs Convention and, on the other, developed states party to the POPs Convention have the option of committing resources via alternative financing mechanisms.
120. See the GEF Instrument, supra note 75
121. Supra note 51
122. Bodansky, supra note 92, at 526
123. Bove, 'A Study of the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer', 9 The Environmental Lawyer (2002-2003) 399
124. Ibid., at 407. Negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol and under the EU emissions trading regime have further familiarized governments with the task of negotiating country-by-country targets for carbon emission reductions. See Berk and den Elzen, 'Options for Differentiation of Future Commitments in Climate Policy: How to Realise Timely Participation to Meet Stringent Climate Goals?', 1 Climate Policy (2001) 465
125. Grubb, Betz, and Neuhoff (eds), 'National Allocation Plans in the EU Emissions Trading Regime', 6 Climate Policy (Special Issue, 2006)
126. Bove, supra note 110, at 440
127. Cf. Craik, 'Deliberation and Legitimacy in Transnational Environmental Governance', Institute for International Law and Justice 2006/10 (Working Paper Series).
128. See Cassesse et al, supra note 4; Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 81
129. Krisch and Kingsbury, 'Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order', 17 EJIL (2006, Special Issue) 1; Esty, supra note 81
130. Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, supra note 81, at 25
131. See GEF Instrument, supra note 75
132. See information on monitoring, evaluation, and conflict resolution at www.gefweb.org.
133. Grant and Keohane, 'Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics', 99 American Political Science Rev (2005) 29, at 30-33
134. Cf. Krisch, 'The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law', 17 EJIL (2006) 247, at 253-256.
135. Grant and Keohane note that strong reliance on delegated accountability within a transnational organization can, in fact, deepen its representative accountability deficit: Grant and Keohane, supra note 120. Cf. Chayes and Chayes, supra note 79, at 22.
136. Supra note 61
137. Cf. Esty, supra note 81, at 1536.
138. Ibid., at 1529.
139. M. Blagescu and R. Lloyd, 2006 Global Accountability Report: Holding Power to Account (2006).
140. Cf. Lake, 'Finance for the Global Environment: the Effectiveness of the GEF as the Financial Mechanism to the Convention on Biological Diversity', 7 RECIEL (1998) 68, at 70.
141. Cf. M. Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians: Judicial Control of Administration (1988).
142. The GEF is entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism under the Biodiversity Convention, supra note 9, and the Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC), supra note 54. Rajamani, supra note 13, at 109-110, gives an overview of financial mechanisms operating outside the GEF.
143. Cf. Grant and Keohane, supra note 119, at 31.
144. It is interesting to note that the multilateral fund under the Montreal Protocol, which scores fairly low on a number of global administrative standards such as representation and inclusiveness, but is stronger on state accountability, is by and large considered a successful, well-functioning and credible mechanism. Cf. Bove, supra note 110, at 411-419.