Poaching and the misappropriation of information: Transaction risks of information exchange

Journal of Management Information Systems

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 87-107

  Clemons, Eric K ^a   Hitt, Lorin M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Economic analysis of information; Incomplete contracts; Information sharing; Intellectual property; Managing risks; Transaction cost theory

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; COSTS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; RISKS;

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; INFORMATION SHARING; MANAGING RISKS; POACHING; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS; TRANSACTION COST THEORY;

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY;

EID: 7444252882     PISSN: 07421222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07421222.2004.11045802     Document Type: Article

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