A better world . . . but don't get carried away: The foreign policy of George H. W. Bush twenty years on

Diplomatic History

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 25-46

  Engel, jeffrey A ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 74049139008     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: 14677709     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2009.00831.x     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. Research materials are increasingly available from the George Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas. As of May 2009, 18 percent of the nearly 8 million pages of documents have been declassified. The remainder is subject to review following Freedom of Information Act requests. Archivists are currently processing several large files of particular interest to readers of this journal, including the Brent Scowcroft Papers (which total 32 cubic feet); follow-up requests for the Desert Storm/Persian Gulf Files (20 cubic feet); and in 2009 they expect to add an additional 22 cubic feet of material on North and South Korea; 12.8 feet of Panama files; and 10 cubic feet on the Middle East Peace Process. Additional information on current holdings may be obtained at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/finding_aids (Information provided by Chief Archivist Robert Holzweiss, April 30, 2009, correspondence with author.) Readers should also note that the Bush Library offers generous bursaries, administered by Texas A&M University's Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, to fund research in these holdings, but have in recent years suffered from a paucity of applicants. For more information see http://bush.tamu.edu/scowcroft/grants/
2. Histories of the period and biographies of Bush abound. Special attention should be paid to the foreign policy memoirs coauthored by Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York, 1999), arguably the most insightful of all postpresidential memoirs. Useful primers on Bush's foreign policy include Ryan Barilleaux and Mark Rozell, Power and Prudence: The Presidency of George H.W. Bush (College Station, TX, 2004
3. Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston, 1993
4. Hal Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad: America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World (Lexington, KY, 2008
5. Colin Campbell and Bert Rockman, The Bush Presidency: First Appraisals (Chatham, NJ, 1991
6. Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York, 2008
7. Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, Marching in Place: The Status Quo Presidency of George Bush (New York, 1992
8. John Robert Greene, The Presidency of George Bush (Lawrence, KS, 2000
9. Christopher Maynard, Out of the Shadow: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War (College Station, TX, 2008
10. David Mervin, George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency (New York, 1996
11. Richard Rose, The Postmodern President: George Bush Meets the World (Chatham, NJ, 1991
12. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York, 1991).For Bush, a useful starting point is his (edited, but nonetheless revealing) All the Best (New York, 1999), a collection of letters and diary entries composed over a lifetime. For biographies, see Richard Ben Cramer, What It Takes (New York, 1993
13. Timothy Naftali, George H.W. Bush (New York, 2007
14. Herbert Parmet, George Bush: The Life of a Lone Star Yankee (New York, 1997
15. Tom Wicker, George Herbert Walker Bush (New York, 2004). A brief synopsis is Michael Beschloss, "George Bush, 1989-1993," in Robert A. Wilson, ed., Character Above All (New York, 1995). See also the first publication of Bush's diary, Jeffrey A. Engel, The China Diary of George H.W. Bush (Princeton, NJ, 2008).For discussion of NATO expansion, see Mary Sarotte, "Not One Inch Eastward?" in this Diplomatic History forum.
16. The literature on Reagan abounds, but for a recent summary - and pointed argument in favor of Reagan's influence - see James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War (New York, 2009). For a recent comprehensive look at Gorbachev's role, see William Taubman and Svetlana Savranskaya, "If a Wall Fell in Berlin and Moscow Hardly Noticed, Would it Still Make a Noise?" in Jeffrey A. Engel, The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989 (New York, 2009
17. For Bush's press conferences, see Maynard, Out of the Shadow, 1. See also Martin J. Medhurst, "Why Rhetoric Matters: George H.W. Bush in the White House," in Martin J. Medhurst, ed., The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush (College Station, TX, 2006), esp. Catherine L. Langford, "George Bush's Struggle with the 'Vision Thing'," in Medhurst, The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush, 35
18. For Fitzwater, see Roy Joseph, "The New World Order: President Bush and the Post-Cold War Era," in Medhurst, The Rhetorical Presidency of George H.W. Bush, 97. For "does not talk," see author interview with Brent Scowcroft, March 8, 2007.Conservative critics in particular attacked Bush's use of the term "new world order," even as candidate Bill Clinton made more of Bush's term "vision thing." As Clinton explained in 1992, "of all the things George Bush has ever said that I disagree with, perhaps the thing that bothers me most is how he derides the American tradition of seeing and seeking a better future. He mocks it as the 'vision thing'." Patrick Buchanan derided Bush in 1992 as too willing to forsake American interests for his internationalist vision. "He is a globalist and we are nationalists," Buchanan charged. "He believes in some Pax Univeralis; we believe in the Old Republic. He would put America's wealth and power at the service of some vague New World Order; we will put America first." Indeed, some on the extreme right considered Bush's talk of a "new world order" to be more than just a restructuring of traditional international relations. His lack of specificity, Pat Robertson preached, concealed nothing less than "a tightly knit cabal whose goal is nothing less than a new order for the human race under the domination of Lucifer and his followers." For Clinton, see "Acceptance Speech to the Democratic National Convention," July 16, 1992. For Robertson and Buchanan, see Joseph, "The New World Order," 97. For a discussion of Bush's religious principles, see Andrew Preston, "The Politics of Realism and Religion," in this Diplomatic History forum.
19. Bush is a man whose statements are not easily parsed. As with so many of his quotes, this statement is best read in its entirety: "Vision is an interesting word. I'm the President that the national press corps felt had no vision, and yet I worked for a more peaceful world. And we did something to say to a totalitarian dictator in Iraq, you're not going to take over your neighboring country. There's a vision there, which was peace. So, I'm a little defensive in the use of the word. Because I think the pundits had it down that I had no vision, but I did. You need a vision, you need a central core. You need to say, 'Here's what I'm going to try to do to make life better for others.' It doesn't have to be proclaimed in the fanciest prose. It doesn't have to be done with the most rhetorical flourish. It has to be your inner self. It's got to drive you." See Academy of Achievement Induction Interview, June 2, 1995, http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/printmember/bus0int-1 (accessed June 1, 2007).
20. George H. W. Bush, "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1989. A plethora of new historical studies commemorates the 20th anniversary of the events of 1989 and ensuing end of the Cold War. These include: Joshua Clover, 1989: Bob Dylan Didn't Have This to Sing About (Berkeley, 2009
21. Jeffrey A. Engel, The Fall of the Berlin Wall (New York, 2009
22. Stephen Kotkin, Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment (New York, 2009
23. Michael Meyer, The Year that Changed the World (New York, 2009
24. Mary Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton, NJ, 2009
25. Victor Sebestyen, Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire (New York, 2009
26. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York, 1993
27. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, 1996). Works on democratic peace theory abound. Useful primers include Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ, 2003
28. David R. Weart, Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another (New Haven, CT, 2001); and Michael Brown, ed., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA, 1996
29. Jesus Jones, "Right Here; Right Now," Doubt (SBK Records, 1991). The song reached #2 on the American charts, though ironically climbed only to #31 in the band's home.
30. George H. W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict," March 6, 1991, and "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit," September 11, 1990
31. George H. W. Bush, "Remarks Announcing a Conventional Arms Control Initiative and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Brussels," May 29, 1989, and "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Luncheon Hosted by the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, California," February 7, 1990. For discussion of Roosevelt's international vision, a valuable recent study is Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World (Cambridge, MA, 2007).Bush did not warm immediately to the suggestion that Roosevelt had been a strategic role model even as he conceded the paternal presence FDR offered to a young man who had never really known another President. "I literally cried when I heard he had died," Bush recalled, "because I thought of him primarily as my commander in chief." However, he continued, "He was hardly a popular man in my world growing up. Nobody in my neighborhood, nobody I really knew, voted for him" (Author Interview with George H. W. Bush, December 18, 2008
32. Bush declared the Gulf War had "kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all." James Baker, however, believed the earlier Panama invasion played just as crucial a role in exorcising the ghosts of that quagmire. "In breaking the mindset of the American people about the use of force in the post-Vietnam era, Panama established an emotional predicate that permitted us to build the public support so essential for the success of Operation Desert Storm some thirteen months later." See George H. W. Bush, "Remarks to the American Legislative Exchange Council," March 1, 1991, and James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York, 1995), 194. For discussion of Vietnam's strategic legacy for American policymakers and politicians, see Robert Schulzinger, A Time for Peace: The Legacy of the Vietnam War (New York, 2008). For "opportunity," see Maynard, Out of the Shadow, x.
33. For "historic vision, see George H. W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit," September 11, 1990.
34. Author interview with Brent Scowcroft, March 8, 2007. For a discussion of Scowcroft's influential role, see Bartholomew Sparrow, "Realism's Practitioner," in this Diplomatic History forum.Bush's vilification of "instability," might be one reason his own policies remain largely undefined in the public consciousness. Roosevelt and Churchill had their Hitler; Grant had Lee; Kennedy had Khruschev; Ali had Frazier. Bush removed his own enemies (Noriega and Saddam Hussein especially) in short order. If every hero needs an antihero upon which to define his own qualities, "instability" as an enemy, for all its wisdom, made for Bush a difficult rallying cry and foil. For "enlightened realism," see author interview with Brent Scowcroft, March 8, 2007. One should note not only the healthy skepticism at play in Scowcroft's idea, but also the conditional tense he places on the very notion that the world "could" be improved. It was possible to move forward, but progress was hardly preordained. The literature on realism is vast and dense. Readers who do not wish to begin with Thucydides may instead turn for a classic example to Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, 1979). Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions (Ithaca, NY, 2006) adeptly surveys this literature. For a discussion of Bush's advisers, in particular their own sense of realism developed under Scowcroft's tutelage, see
35. James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York, 2004
36. David Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power (New York, 2004) esp., 260-343
37. Jeffrey Record, "Retiring Hitler and 'Appeasement' from the National Security Debate," Parameters 38, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 92. For "day of dictator," see
38. George H. W. Bush, "Remarks to the Council of the Americas, May 2, 1989."
39. For "world's problem," see George H. W. Bush, "Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of Untied States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia," August 8, 1990. For "nothing of this importance," see Maynard, Out of the Shadow, 81. As James Baker later explained, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided an opportunity embedded within the structural crisis embedded within the end of the stable Cold War system. "The entire planet is in this madman's [Saddam Hussein's] debt. His brutal invasion of Kuwait provided the unexpected opportunity to write an end to fifty years of Cold War conflict with resounding finality" (Baker, Politics of Diplomacy).
40. The definitive account of the American response to Tiananmen, in English, remains to be written. Until then, see the essay by Randy Kluver, "Rhetorical Trajectories of Tiananmen Square," in this Diplomatic History forum, as well as James Mann, About Face: A History of America's Curious Relations with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New York, 2000); and James Mann, The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression (New York, 2007). See also Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 86-111 and passim; Warren Cohen, America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations (New York, 2000), pp. 195-242; James Lilley, China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia (New York, 2004), 297-342. Particularly useful for scholars are the document compilations of the National Security Archive, including the numerous electronic briefing books detailing Sino-American relations in the 1970s, as well as Michael Evans, "The U.S. Tiananmen Papers," June 4, 2001. For a further discussion of Bush's long-term experience with China, see also Engel, The China Diaryh, 458-63.Bush had in fact employed the term "cannons of rhetoric" while UN Ambassador, in reference to the newly seated Chinese delegation. After Qiao Guanhua delivered a blistering assault on the United States in the General Assembly, Bush chastised Qiao for his "intemperate language," noting that it was "disturbing" to see the Chinese "firing these empty cannons of rhetoric" ("Peking's Wordy Debut," Time, November 29, 1971). For Bush in 1984, see Jack Rosenthal, "George Bush's Daily Dilemma," New York Times, September 25, 1984, A26.
41. For Bush and Gorbachev, see Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 5.
42. For "desk officer," see Rothkopf, Running the World, 291 and Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 100
43. For "long run," see Bush and Scowcroft, Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 89
44. Charles Krauthammer, "Good Morning, Vietnam," Washington Post, April 19, 1991, A23. According to Bob Woodward, seemingly hesitant decisions made by the elder Bush while in office directly colored the very worldview of the younger Bush's most senior advisers, Vice President Dick Cheney in particular. Cheney, Defense Secretary under the first President Bush, "harbored a deep sense of unfinished business about Iraq," Woodward wrote, ensuring he would strike to stanch this pang whenever the opportunity arose (Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York, 2004), 9). George H. W. Bush, "Remarks and Question and Answer Session at a White House Session for Journalists," March 31, 1989
45. Several claim to have coined the phrase "you die, I fly." See Bush, All the Best, 321
46. Reagan has himself come under new historical scrutiny of late. See John Patrick Diggins, Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History (New York, 2007
47. Robert M. Collins, Transforming America: Politics and Culture During the Reagan Years (New York, 2006
48. John Arquila, The Reagan Imprint: Ideas in American Foreign Policy from the Collapse of Communism to the War on Terror (Chicago, 2007). Also useful are Kiron Skinner et al., eds., Reagan: A Life in Letters (New York, 2004
49. Douglas Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries (New York, 2007), mentioned above. For Reagan and Bush in historical context, see Michael Schaller, Right Turn: American Life in the Reagan-Bush Era (New York, 2007). For Powell and Baker, see Maynard, Out of the Shadow, 5.
50. Parmet, George Bush, 263. For "train wreck," see Michael Duffy, "Mr. Consensus," Time, August 21, 1989. For Baker and Ross, see Rothkopf, Running the World, 264-66, who further argues that the entire foreign policy structure of Bush's administration grew as a direct result of failures witnessed by its participants in previous administrations. "The Kissinger-Nixon obsession with secrecy, The Kissingerian-ubermensch-centric policy processes, the Vance-Brzezinksi and Shultz-Weinberger battles, the perils of 'operationalism' that led to Iran-Contra, the paranoia of Nixon, the micromanagement of Carter, and the disconnectedness of Reagan all were signposts indicating what paths not to take" (Rothkopf, Running the World, 269
51. For Cold War "not over," see David Hoffman, "Gorbachev Seen as Trying to Buy Time for Reform," Washington Post, January 23, 1989, A1. For "waiting for," see Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York, 1996), 496-97. For "undermine," see Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev (State College, PA, 2000), 215. For a discussion of the Bush Administration's "strategic pause," and its subsequent policy of "beyond containment," see Maynard, Out of the Shadow, 1-26. For "burned," see Hal Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad (LexingtonKY, 2008, 24
52. Kissinger is, as readers of this journal well know, the subject not only of a wealth of literature, but also the subject of a recent historiographical revival. While Kissinger's underlying psychological motivation for seeking complete control over American policy continues to puzzle historians, the existence of his manic desire for control is unquestioned. For discussion of the current literature, see Jeremi Suri, "Henry Kissinger, the American Dream, and the Jewish Immigrant Experience in the Cold War," Diplomatic History, 32, no. 5 (November 2008 719-47
53. For "brilliant," see Engel, The China Diary, 97; For "individual diplomacy," ibid, p. 75; for "difficult to define," see ibid., 57; "clearly," see ibid., entry for June 16, 1975
54. Author interview with Brent Scowcroft, March 8, 2007. One is reminded of the oft-heard political barb from the 1988 presidential campaign that Bush was "a man born on third base who thought he'd hit a triple." It is worth noting when considering Bush's uncritical faith in the American system that had served him, and to his mind the country, so well during his life, that a player standing on third rarely chooses that particular moment to question the rules of the game.
55. For "damn sure," see Bush, All the Best, 155-56
56. For "communicated," see author interview with Scowcroft, March 8, 2007. For Bush and Kissinger after the former's presidency, see, for example, Maureen Dowd, "Aux Barricades,"
57. New York Times, January 17, 2007; Maureen Dowd, "Don't Pass the Salted Peanuts, Henry," New York Times, Oct. 4, 2006, A31; Bob Woodward, State of Denial (New York, 2006), pp. 406-10. Engel, The China Diary entry for February 6, 1975. Bush mentioned the conversation with Kissinger, or similar ones to it (Ibid., 60). He does not record in the memoir its specific time or location. The full quote is instructive: "I believed that personal contact would be an important part of our approach to both diplomacy and leadership of the alliance and elsewhere. Some feel emphasis on personal relationships between leaders is unimportant or unnecessary. Henry Kissinger once argued to me that these are no substitutes for deep national interests. He pointed out that the leader of one country is not going to change a policy because he likes another leader. I suppose there is a danger that one can be naively lulled into complacency if one expects friendships will cause the other party to do things your way, but I thought that danger was remote. For me, personal diplomacy and leadership went hand in hand." Importantly, Bush notes that such relationships must be cultivated. "You can't develop or earn this mutual trust and respect [from foreign leaders] unless you deliberately work at it." Bush, All the Best, 60-61.For "energetic plans," see Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Winston Lord Files, box 375, China Sensitive Chronology: January-February 1975, From Habib and Lord to Kissinger, February 4, 1975, Record Group (RG) 59, lot 77D114, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, DC.
58. Author Interview with George H. W. Bush, July 8, 2005.
59. Ibid. For "he would call," see author interview with Scowcroft, March 8, 2007.
60. For Cheney, see Parmet, George Bush, 462. For "other guy's," see Maureen Dowd, "The Personal Means A lot these Days," New York Times, July 12, 1990, A14.
61. "Excerpts of Remarks for Vice President George Bush Announcement Speech," October 12, 1987, David Bates Files, Vice President George Bush Series, Bush Presidential Library.