Vertical integration and incentives to innovate

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 457-488

  Brocas, Isabelle ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Incentives; R D; Switching costs; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

EID: 73849089821     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(02)00121-2     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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