Market-based grid resource co-allocation and reservation for applications with hard deadlines

Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience

Volumn 21, Issue 18, 2009, Pages 2270-2297

  Vanmechelen, Kurt ^a   Depoorter, Wim ^a   Broeckhove, Jan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ANTWERP   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Co allocation; Grid economics; Reservation; Resource management; Scheduling

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT; QUALITY OF SERVICE; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SCHEDULING;

CO-ALLOCATION; DECENTRALIZED ALGORITHMS; GRID COMPUTING TECHNOLOGY; GRID ECONOMICS; MARKET-BASED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARIES; RESERVATION; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;

GRID COMPUTING;

EID: 73349117791     PISSN: 15320626     EISSN: 15320634     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/cpe.1419     Document Type: Article

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