Thinking about the needy: A Reprise

Journal of Ethics

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 409-458

  Temkin, Larry S ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agent neutral reasons; Agent relative reasons; Comparative justice; Egalitarianism; Equality; Foreign aid; Guilt; Ideals; Injustice; Internalism; Intuitions; Irrationality; Jan narveson; Justice; Leveling down objection; Libertarianism; Meta ethics; Moral motivation; Moral reasons; Mutual advantage; Pareto principle; Personal ideals; Rationality; Reasons; Relativism; Skepticism; Social convention theory; The needy

Indexed keywords

EID: 72449131733     PISSN: 13824554     EISSN: 15728609     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10892-004-4897-z     Document Type: Article

References (127)

1. Henceforth, "TN" (this issue, pp. 349-395).
2. Henceforth, "Welfare and Wealth" (this issue, pp. 305-348).
3. Henceforth, "WP" (this issue, pp. 397-408).
4. Temkin, "TN," p. 355.
5. See, for example, Larry Temkin, Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), Chapter 10; "Egalitarianism: A Complex, Individualistic, and Comparative Notion," in Ernie Sosa and Enriquea Villanueva (eds.), Philosophical Issues 11, (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 327-352
6. "Equality and the Human Condition," Theoria (South Africa) 92 (1998), pp. 15-45.
7. Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8. Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), p. 232.
9. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 329.
10. Narveson, "WP," p. 400.
11. Narveson, "WP," p. 405.
12. Unger, Living High and Letting Die, p. 3.
13. Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," p. 229.
14. Narveson, "WP," p. 407.
15. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 307.
16. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 317.
17. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 323.
18. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 341.
19. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 343.
20. Narveson, "WP," p. 405.
21. Narveson, "WP," p. 408.
22. Narveson, "WP," p. 398.
23. Temkin, "TN," p. 383.
24. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 319.
25. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 343.
26. Narveson, "WP," p. 402.
27. Narveson, "WP," p. 405.
28. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 338.
29. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 340.
30. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 344.
31. Here, I avoid a difficult and important question that may be underlying some of Narveson's thinking. Perhaps our real choice is not between aiding a sick child today through Oxfam, and more effectively aiding her through economic development, but between aiding a hungry child today through Oxfam, or more effectively aiding other hungry children in the future through economic development. If we are simply consequentialists, we should do whatever will produce the most good, overall. But much of common-sense morality supports addressing urgent claims, even when this is not the most efficient use of our resources. So, for example, we spend hundreds of thousands of dollars saving a small child trapped in a well, miners trapped underground, or people lost at sea, when no doubt we could produce greater total good by using the money in other ways, such as funding vaccination programs, or funding safety measures that would prevent similar occurrences in the future. As a pluralist, I do not believe that the mere fact that we could produce the most good by investing in economic development settles the issue of whether we should do that rather than address the pressing concerns of today's needy. But as I have been stressing, whatever the correct response to this important issue is, it is mainly relevant to how we should aid the needy, not whether we ought to do so. Naturally, what would be best is if we could easily and effectively address both issues - taking care of the pressing concerns of today's needy, perhaps through organizations like Oxfam, and preventing similar problems from arising in the future, perhaps through social and economic development of the sort Narveson favors. Incidentally, if we could promote more good through investing $200 in companies that build factories in developing countries, rather than sending the money to Oxfam, presumably it would be even better if we continued to reinvest the profits of that investment in such companies, rather than spending them on expensive meals!
32. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 347.
33. Narveson, "WP," p. 397.
34. Narveson, "WP," p. 406.
35. Narveson, "WP," pp. 406-407.
36. Temkin, "TN," p. 352.
37. Narveson, "WP," p. 399.
38. Narveson, "WP," p. 399.
39. Narveson, "WP," pp. 399-400.
40. Narveson, "WP," p. 401.
41. Narveson, "WP," p. 402.
42. Narveson, "WP," pp. 402-403.
43. These cases are developments of ones presented in Larry Temkin, "Egalitarianism Defended," Ethics 113 (2003), pp. 772-773.
44. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
45. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 320.
46. Classic contributions to the "equality of what?" debate include Richard Arneson, "Equality and Equality of Opportunity for Welfare," Philosophical Studies 56 (1989), pp. 77-93;
47. G.A. Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice," Ethics, 99 (1989), pp. 906-944;
48. Ronald Dworkin's "What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare" and "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981), pp. 185-246, 283-385;
49. Amartya Sen, "Equality of What?," in S. McMurrin (ed.), Tanner Lectures on Human Value (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980);
50. Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
51. See the readings cited in note 45, as well as Temkin, Inequality, and Temkin, "Egalitarianism Defended."
52. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 322.
53. To be sure, some egalitarians deny the possibility of free will, and correspondingly deny the category of moral responsibility. Such egalitarians might always favor promoting equality "no matter what," but this would not be because they were insensitive to the category of prior wrongs, but rather because they reject that category. Presumably, even such egalitarians would agree that if, contrary to fact, criminals were fully and freely responsible for their heinous actions, the inequality between imprisoned criminals and law abiding citizens would not be unfair or otherwise morally objectionable.
54. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 320.
55. Derek Parfit introduces the terminology of "telic" and "deontic" egalitarianism in Derek Parfit, "Equality or Priority?," The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, 1991, copyright 1995 by Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas; reprinted in Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality (London: MacMillan Press, 2000), pp. 81-125.
56. Corresponding notions are also introduced in Temkin, Inequality, p. 11.
57. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 323.
58. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 321.
59. See, for example, Temkin, Inequality, Chapter Nine; Larry Temkin, "Egalitarianism Defended"; and Temkin, "Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection," in Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd, 2000), pp. 126-161.
60. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 319.
61. Emphasis provided.
62. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 316.
63. Emphasis provided.
64. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 307.
65. An excellent discussion of this topic is Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
66. See Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," Section 5.5.
67. See Temkin, Inequality, Chapter Nine;
68. "Egalitarianism Defended," and, especially, Larry Temkin, "Personal Versus Impersonal Principles: Reconsidering the Slogan," Theoria 69 (2003), pp. 20-30.
69. See Parfit, "Equality or Priority?" Temkin, Inequality;
70. and Temkin, "Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection."
71. See John Broome, Weighing Goods (London: Basil Blackwell, 1991).
72. Parfit, "Equality or Priority?"
73. Temkin, "Egalitarianism Defended,"
74. Temkin "Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection,"
75. and Temkin, "Personal versus Impersonal Principles: Reconsidering the Slogan."
76. See Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law, trans. W. Hastie (London: T.T. Clark, 1887), pp. 194-198.
77. reproduced in Gertrude Ezorsky (ed.), Punishment (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1972), p. 102. Emphasis provided.
78. I owe this particular example to Frances Kamm. Though she is not a perfectionist, she has given this example, and endorsed the view in question, on several occasions in discussion.
79. Narveson might insist that however heartfelt my convictions on this topic may be, they must be either irrational or a "matter of personal taste" that I want to impose on others (presumably, matters of personal taste are not themselves irrational). Obviously, I do not agree.
80. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.
81. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," pp. 307-308.
82. See Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 307;
83. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959);
84. and R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952).
85. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 308.
86. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 307.
87. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000);
88. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 101-113;
89. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
90. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 308.
91. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 309.
92. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 310. Emphasis provided.
93. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 319. Emphasis provided.
94. See David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986);
95. Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977);
96. and John Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977).
97. Narveson, "WP," p. 398.
98. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 311.
99. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 316. Emphasis provided.
100. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 345. Emphasis provided.
101. See Gilbert Harman, "Moral Relativism Defended," The Philosophical Review 84 (1975), pp. 3-22.
102. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 311.
103. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 319. Emphasis provided.
104. Emphasis provided.
105. Narveson, "WP," p. 398.
106. Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. xiii.
107. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 313.
108. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 313.
109. This is not to deny that one's feelings or interests might be relevant to the reasons one has for doing something. Similarly, I am not advocating an outmoded Aristotelian view that sees a sharp distinction between appetites, passions, desires, or interests on the one hand, and reason on the other. These need not be mutually exclusive categories. However, I deny that all reasons must ultimately be grounded in appetites, passions, desires, or interests.
110. Though, as Narveson is keen to point out, he does not make the mistake of understanding self-interest in narrow selfish terms. On his view, which is surely right, it can be in my interest, because it is an interest of mine, to make sacrifices for the sake of my children, or any "other-regarding goal" that I happen to care about.
111. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," pp. 317-318.
112. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," pp. 317-319.
113. Henry Sidgwick's methodology is wonderfully detailed, and exemplified, in Sidgwick, Method of Ethics, 7th edition (London: Macmillan, 1907). Contemporary followers of Sidgwick's method include, among others, Derek Parfit, John Rawls, Frances Kamm, Shelly Kagan, Thomas Hurka, and Jeff McMahan.
114. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 324.
115. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 344.
116. Nagel, Mortal Questions, p. 8.
117. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 317.
118. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 319.
119. Temkin, "TN," p. 365.
120. Temkin, "TN," p. 365.
121. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 319.
122. Narveson, "WP," pp. 397-398.
123. Narveson, "WP," p. 399.
124. Narveson, "WP," p. 408.
125. Narveson, "WP," p. 399.
126. Narveson, "Welfare and Wealth," p. 343.
127. Narveson, "WP," p. 408.