Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions

Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-192

  Saul, Jennifer M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Belief reports; Co referential terms; Pragmatic; Semantic; Substitution failure

Indexed keywords

EID: 71449088879     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219155.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (86)

1. Ammeson, J. (2002). 'The Lens of Time'. World Traveller, January, pp. 37-43.
2. Anderson, J. (1977). 'Memory for Information About Individuals'. Memory & Cognition, 5(4): 430-42.
3. Anderson, J. and R. Hastie (1974). 'Individuation and Reference in Memory: Proper Names and Definite Descriptions'. Cognitive Psychology, 6: 495-514.
4. Bach, K. (1994). 'Conversational Impliciture'. Mind and Language, 9: 124-62.
5. Bach, K. (1999). 'The Myth of Conventional Implicature'. Linguistics & Philosophy, 22(4): 327-66.
6. Bach, K. (2001). 'You Don't Say?' Synthese, 128: 15-44.
7. Bach, K. (2002). 'Seemingly Semantic Intuitions', in J. K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke, and D. Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. New York: Seven Bridges Press.
8. Bach, K. (2004). 'Pragmatics and the Philosophy of Language', in L. Horn and G. Ward (eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell.
9. Barber, A. (2000). 'A Pragmatic Treatment of Simple Sentences'. Analysis, 60: 300-8.
10. Braun, D. (1998). 'Understanding Belief Reports'. Philosophical Review, 107: 555-95.
11. Braun, D. (2000). 'Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations'. Nous, pp. 203-36.
12. Braun, D. (2002). 'Cognitive Significance, Attitude Ascriptions, and Ways of Believing Propositions'. Philosophical Studies, 108: (65-81).
13. Braun, D. (2003). 'Review of Scott Soames's Beyond Rigidity', Linguistics and Philosophy, 26:365-78.
14. Braun, D. and J. Saul (2002). 'Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Mistaken Evaluations'. Philosophical Studies: 1-41.
15. Braun, D. and T. Sider. (Forthcoming). 'Kripke's Revenge'. Philosophical Studies.
16. Carston, R. (1991). 'Implicature, Explicature, and Truth-Theoretic Semantics', in S. Davis (ed.), Pragmatics. New York: Oxford University Press.
17. Carston, R. (2002). Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication. Oxford: Blackwell.
18. Cole, P. (1978). Syntax and Semantics Vol. 9: Pragmatics. London: Academic Press.
19. Crimmins, M. (1992). Talk About Beliefs. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
20. Crimmins, M. and J. Perry. (1989). 'The Prince and the Phone Booth'. The Journal of Philosophy, 86: 685-711.
21. Davis, W. (1998). Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22. Erickson, T. D. and M. E. Mattson (1981). 'From Words to Meaning: A Semantic Illusion'. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20: 540-51.
23. Evans, J. St. B. T., S. E. Newstead, and R. M. J. Byrne (1993). Human Reasoning: The Psychology of Deduction. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum.
24. Forbes, G. (1990). 'The Indispensability of Sinn'. The Philosophical Review, 99: 535-63.
25. Forbes, G. (1993). 'Reply to Marks'. Philosophical Studies, 69: 281-95.
26. Forbes, G. (1997). 'How Much Substitutivity?'. Analysis, 57: 109-13.
27. Forbes, G. (1999). 'Enlightened Semantics for Simple Sentences'. Analysis, 59: 86-91.
28. Forbes, G. (2002). 'Intensionality'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementartry Volume, 76: 75-99.
29. Forbes, G. (2006). Attitude Problems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
30. Frege, G. ([1892] 1970). 'On Sense and Reference', in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 2nd edition. Oxford:Blackwell.
31. Green, M. (1998). 'Direct Reference and Implicature'. Philosophical Studies, 91: 61-90.
32. Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
33. Hannon, B. and M. Daneman (2001). 'Susceptibility to Semantic Illusions: An Individual-Differences Perspective'. Memory & Cognition, 29: 449-61.
34. Horn, L. (1992). 'The Said and the Unsaid'. Working Papers in Linguistics, pp. 193-92.
35. Kamas, E. N., L. M. Reder, and M. S. Ayers (1996). 'Partial Matching in the Moses Illusion: Response Bias Not Sensitivity'. Memory & Cognition, 24: 687-99.
36. Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
37. Kripke, S. (1988). 'A Puzzle About Belief', in N. Salmon and S. Soames (eds.), Propositions and Attitudes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 102-48.
38. Levinson, S. C. (1983). Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
39. Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
40. Moore, J. (1999). 'Saving Substitutivity in Simple Sentences'. Analysis, pp. 91-105.
41. Moore, J. (2000). 'Did Clinton Lie?' Analysis, 60: 250-4.
42. Moos, J. (1997). 'It's a bird! It's a plane! It's a costume change!'. Available at:
43. Neale, S. (1990). Descriptions. Cambridge: MIT University Press.
44. Neale, S. (1992). 'Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language'. Linguistics and Philosophy, 15:509-59.
45. Neale, S. (2002). 'Pragmatism and Binding', '69n Z. Szabo (ed.), Semantics versus Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 165-285.
46. Oakhill, J., P. N. Johnson-Laird, and A. Garnham (1989). 'Believability and Syllogistic Reasoning'. Cognition, 31(2): 117-40.
47. Pitt, D. (2001). 'Alter Egos and Their Names'. Journal of Philosophy, 98: 531-52.
48. Predelli, S. (1999). 'Saul, Salmon, and Superman'. Analysis, 59(2): 113-16.
49. Predelli, S. (2001). 'Art, Bart, and Superman'. Analysis, 61(4): 310-13.
50. Predelli, S. (2004). 'Superheroes and their Names'. American Philosophical Quarterly, 41(2).
51. Recanati, F. (1991). 'The Pragmatics of What is Said', in S. Davis (ed.), Pragmatics: A Reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
52. Recanati, F. (1993). Direct Reference: From Language to Thought. Oxford: Blackwell.
53. Recanati, F. (2001). 'What is Said'. Synthese, 128: 75-91.
54. Reder, L. M. and G. Kusbit (1991). 'Locus of the Moses Illusion: Imperfect Encoding, Retrieval, or Match?' Journal of Memory and Language, 30: 385-406.
55. Reimer, M. (1991). 'Demonstratives, Demonstrations, and Demonstrata'. Philosophical Studies, 63: 187-202.
56. Richard, M. (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
57. Richard, M. (1993). 'Sense, Necessity and Belief', Philosophical Studies, 69: 243-63.
58. Sadock. J. (1978). 'On Testing for Conversational Implicature', in P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics Vol. 9: Pragmatics. London: Academic Press.
59. Salmon, N. (1981). Reference and Essence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
60. Salmon, N. (1986). Frege's Puzzle. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
61. Salmon, N. (1989). 'Illogical Belief', Philosophical Perspectives 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, 243-85.
62. Salmon, N. (2003). 'Naming, Necessity, and Beyond', Mind, 112: 447-92.
63. Saul, J. (1992). 'Still an Attitude Problem'. Linguistics and Philosophy, 16.
64. Saul, J. (1997a). 'Substitution and Simple Sentences'. Analysis, 57: 102-8.
65. Saul, J. (1997b). 'Reply to Forbes'. Analysis, 57: 114-18.
66. Saul, J. (1998). 'The Pragmatics of Attitude Ascription'. Philosophical Studies, 92: 363-98.
67. Saul, J. (1999a). 'The Best of Intentions: Ignorance, Idiosyncrasy, and Belief Reporting'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19: 29-48.
68. Saul, J. (1999b). 'The Road to Hell: Intentions and Propositional Attitude Ascription'. Mind & Language, 14: 356-75.
69. Saul, J. (1999c). 'Substitution, Simple Sentences, and Sex Scandals'. Analysis, 59: 106-12.
70. Saul, J. (2000). 'Did Clinton Say Something False?' Analysis, 60: 255-7.
71. Saul, J. (2001). 'Critical Study of Davis'. Conversational Implicature. Noûs, 35: 630-41.
72. Saul, J. (2002a). 'Speaker Meaning, What is Said, and What is Implicated' Nous, 36(2): 228-48.
73. Saul, J. (2002b). 'What is Said and Psychological Reality: Grice's Project and Relevance Theorists' Criticisms'. Linguistics and Philosophy, 25: 347-72.
74. Schiffer, S. (1987). 'The "Fido"-Fido theory of Belief', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 1: Metaphysics. Atascadero: Ridgeview, pp. 455-80.
75. Schiffer, S. (1992). 'Belief Ascription'. Journal of Philosophy LXXXIX, pp. 499-521.
76. Sider, T. (1995). 'Three Problems for Richard's Theory of Belief Ascription'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 25: 487-514.
77. Soames, S. (1988). 'Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content', in N. Salmon and S. Soames (eds.), Propositions and Attitudes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 197-239.
78. Soames, S. (1995). 'Beyond Singular Propositions?' Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 25: 515-50.
79. Soames, S. (2002). Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Neccessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
80. Sperber, D. and D. Wilson (1986). Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
81. Sperber, D. and D. Wilson (1995). Relevance: Communication and Cognition, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell.
82. Thau, M. (2002). Consciousness and Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
83. Wason, P. (1966). 'Reasoning', in B. M. Foss (ed.), New Horizons in Psychology. Harmondsworth: Pelican, pp. 135-51.
84. Wettstein, H. (1984). 'How to Bridge the Gap Between Meaning and Reference'. Synthese, 58: 63-84.
85. Wilson, D. and Sperber, D. (1981). 'On Grice's Theory of Conversation', in P. Werth (ed.), Conversation and Discourse. London: Croom Helm.
86. Zimmerman, T. E. (2005). 'What's in Two Names?' Journal of Semantics, 23: 53-96.