Bargaining delays in the government formation process

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 3-32

  Golder, Sona N ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining delay; Government formation; Parliamentary democracies

Indexed keywords

EID: 70450250087     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414009341714     Document Type: Article

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