From war to peace: The nepalese maoists's strategic and ideological thinking

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 32, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 420-438

  Gobyn, Winne ^a  

^a GHENT UNIVERSITY   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70450214743     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10576100902831578     Document Type: Article

References (101)

1. D. Thapa, A Kingdom Under Siege, Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004 (London & New York: Zed Books, 2004), p. 42.
2. S. D. Muni, Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The Challenge and the Response (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2004), p. 4.
3. Thapa,A Kingdom Under Siege, p. 37.
4. Ibid., pp.68-70.
5. The UPFN had, however, in December 1991 already decided in principle to establish a people's war (See Thapa, A Kingdom Under Siege).
6. "One Year of People's War in Nepal: A Review," The Worker, 3 (February 1997).
7. "Strategy and Tactics of Armed Struggle in Nepal," The Worker, 3 (February 1997). The Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPN-M adopted this document in March 1995.
8. " Theoretical Premises for the Historic Initiation of the People's War," The Worker, 2 (June 1996). The Central Committee of the CPN-M adopted this document in September 1995.
9. Muni, Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, p. 41.
10. Author interview, Nepali Congress Central CommitteeMember and Member of Parliament, Kathmandu, 27 November 2006.
11. see also: K. Hachhethu, "The Nepali State and the Maoist insurgency, 1996-2001," in M. Hutt, ed., Himalayan 'People's War', Nepal's Maoist Rebellion (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), p. 61.
12. A. Karki and D. Seddon, eds., The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspectives (New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2003), pp. 23-25.
13. Thapa A Kingdom Under Siege, pp. 106-109.
14. S. B. Deuba, Nepal Prime Minister's Address to the Nation, 28 November 2001.
15. S. B. Deuba, Speech Delivered at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 8 May 2002.
16. HRW, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Civilians Struggle to Survive in Nepal's Civil War, October 2004, pp. 89-90.
17. Ibid., p. 84.
18. R. Sudha, "Nepal: A New Nest for al-Qaeda?" Asia Times, 6 May 2004.
19. "Nepal-US Sign Anti-Terror Aid Agreement," The Kathmandu Post, 26 April 2003.
20. "US List 36 Organisations as Terrorist," The Kathmandu Post, 2 May 2003.
21. HRW, Between a Rock and a Hard Place, p. 79.
22. "US Envoy Blasts Maoists," The Kathmandu Post, 26 February 2002.
23. "Maoists Eye Multiparty Democracy," The Washington Times, 30 July 2005.
24. ICG Asia Report No. 132, Nepal's Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?, 18 May 2007, pp. 2-3.
25. Author interview, news editor of The Kathmandu Post, Kathmandu, 1 December 2006.
26. ICG Asia Report No. 132, Nepal's Maoists, p. 3.
27. Maoist Information Bulletin, No. 4, September 2003
28. Prachanda, "Present Situation and Our Historical Task," The Worker, 9 (February 2004).
29. See, for example, L. Onesto, "Red Flag Flying on the Roof of the World. Inside the Revolution in Nepal: Interview with Comrade Prachanda," Revolutionary Worker, 20 February 2000.
30. author interview, CPN-M Central Committee Member and Member of Parliament, Kathmandu, 9 June 2007.
31. Author interview, CPN-M Central Committee Member, Kathmandu, 28 November 2006.
32. Author interview, CPN-M District Committee Member of Sindhupalchok, Kathmandu, 24 April 2007.
33. author interview, CPN-M student leader, Kathmandu, 2 December 2006.
34. "Rebel and Rival on Same Side-No Difference with Chairman: Bhattarai," The Telegraph, 8 August 2005.
35. In an interview with The Kathmandu Post on 7 February 2006, Prachanda stated that: "we had thought the army would lose faster than the police, maybe within a year or two."
36. D. Seddon, Armed Violence and Poverty in Nepal, A Case Study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative, Centre for International Cooperation and Security, March 2005, p. 17.
37. Author interview, CPN-M district in charge of Ilam, Ilam, 29 March 2007.
38. Prachanda, "Present Situation and Our Historical Task."
39. Author interview, former platoon commander of the PLA, Kathmandu, 27 April 2007.
40. "Prachanda Interview: Full Transcript," BBC, 2 February 2006.
41. Author interview, CPN-M district-level leader in Dolakha, Charikot, 21 April 2007.
42. author interview, CPN-M Central Committee Member and Member Parliament, Kathmandu, 9 June 2007.
43. author interview, CPN-M district in charge of Lamjung, Besisahar, 28 April 2007.
44. ICG Asia Report No. 104, Nepal's Maoists, Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, 27 October 2005, pp. 23-24.
45. Author interview, Central CommitteeMember of the CPN-M-affiliated "All Nepal Teachers Organisation," Kathmandu, 4 April 2007.
46. Author interview, CPN-M Central Committee Member and Member of Parliament, Kathmandu, 9 June 2007.
47. Author interview, CPN-M district in charge of Lamjung, Besisahar, 28 April 2007.
48. author interview, coordinator of the CPN-M-affiliated "Youth Communist League" in Lamjung, Besisahar, 28 April 2007.
49. "Maoists Eye Multiparty Democracy," The Washington Times, 30 July 2005.
50. Author interview, CPN-M district-level leader in Dolakha, Charikot, 21 April 2007.
51. "Exclusive Interview with Prachanda, Maoist Leader," The Hindu, 9-10 February 2006.
52. ICG Asia Report No. 132, Nepal's Maoists, p. 3.
53. "We are Trying to Crush Feudal Autocracy," Time, 18 April 2005.
54. ICG Asia Report No. 132, Nepal's Maoists, p. 1.
55. Thapa, A Kingdom Under Siege, pp. 113-114, 169.
56. Author interview, CPN-M District Committee Member of Sindhupalchok, Kathmandu, 27 April 2007.
57. author interview, news editor of The Kathmandu Post, Kathmandu, 1 December 2006.
58. "Exclusive: Rebel Leader on Nepal's 'Last War,'" CNN, 14 November 2002.
59. "Maoists Seek a Democratic Nepal," The Washington Times, 14 December 2002.
60. For the Maoists, a new constitution was central because it provided the key to solve their other demands. "Since the question of state power or the political question is key to all other problems, the main agenda of the negotiation must be political and all the focus has to be placed on this."
61. "Maoists Plumb for Open Market Policy," The Kathmandu Post, 16 April 2003.
62. Prachanda, "Present Situation And Our Historical Task."
63. "Dr. Bhattarai Calls on EU Envoy," The Kathmandu Post, 11 April 2003. In contrast to the representative of the EU and several European embassies, the U.S. embassy declined the Maoists's request for a meeting.
64. "US Support for Nepal to Continue: Rocca," The Kathmandu Post, 28 March 2003.
65. ICG Asia Report No. 50, Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire-Soft Landing or Strategic Pause?, 10 April 2003, p. 23.
66. "US Lists 36 Organisations as Terrorists," The Kathmandu Post, 2 May 2003.
67. Bhattarai Baburam, Open Letter to the US Ambassador (Michael E. Malinowski), 24 September 2003.
68. Maoist Information Bulletin, Interview with Chairman Prachanda, No. 4, 15 September 2003.
69. Onesto, "Red Flag Flying on the Roof of the World."
70. Prachanda, Press Statement, 31August 2004.
71. The decision to confront Indian expansionism, coupled with the introduction of a new leadership structure, centralizing control over the armed forces and the parallel government structures in the hands of Chairman Prachanda, triggered fierce clashes within the party. Baburam Bhattarai strongly disagreed with this new course and was subsequently suspended from all his party posts.
72. For more details on this, see: ICG Asia Report No. 132, Nepal's Maoists, pp. 4-5.
73. ICG Asia Report No. 106, Nepal's New Alliance, The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, 28 November 2005, p. 8.
74. Prachanda, Press Statement, 16 December 2004.
75. Prachanda, Appeal of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 16 March 2004.
76. Royal Palace, Proclamation to the Nation from his Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev, 1 February 2005.
77. The United States and India have repeatedly expressed their concern about the coup and urged the king to restore civil liberties and work together with the political parties to find a solution for the political crisis. In the course of July 2005, both countries relaxed their policy and partially resumed the delivery of so-called non-lethal military aid to the RNA. It has, however, been reported that, in order to prevent the RNA from running out of ammunition, bullets forM-16 and INSAF riffles were supplied through Israel.
78. See ekatipur.com, RNA Brings Ammunition from Israel, 25 August 2005.
79. USINFO, United States Concerned by Dismissal of Nepali Government, 2 February 2005.
80. ICG Asia Report No. 132, Nepal's Maoists, p. 5.
81. Although the rehabilitation of Bhatarai and the new direction toward a multiparty system was supported by most of the top leadership in the Central Committee, some within the Maoist movement were deeply troubled. Early in 2006, two prominent Maoist leaders even called unsuccessfully for a rebellion against Prachanda and Bhattarai. As ICG observed, this revolt "undermined the suggestion that the Maoists' new line was just a cosmetic gesture [.]. The party's leaders were engaged in a real debate over the course of their movement and were willing to face down internal opposition" (Ibid., pp. 5-6).
82. Press Statement, Maoist Apologizes for Bombing, 7 June 2005.
83. "Maoists Eye Multiparty Democracy," The Washington Times, 30 July 2005.
84. Prachanda Press Release: Maoists Declare Ceasefire, 3 September 2005.
85. Author interview, executive director of the local radio station Butwal-FM, Butwal, 19 March 2007.
86. ICG Asia Report No. 106, Nepal's New Alliance, p. i.
87. "Nepalis Shun Polls Amid Violence," BBC, 8 February 2006.
88. The Nepali Congress party holds 85 seats in parliament whereas the CPN-UML and the CPN-M each have 83 seats. The remaining 79 seats are divided among the five other parties belonging to the "Seven-Party-Alliance." The Maoists obtained the following ministries: Information and Communications; Physical Planning and Works; Rural Development; Women, Children and Social Welfare; and Forest and Soil-Conservation. On 18 September 2007, the Maoist ministers left the government, citing disagreements with the other political parties about the Constituent Assembly Elections.
89. Author interview, Maoist leader, Kathmandu, 2 December 2006.
90. "Prachanda Interview: Full Transcript," BBC, 13 February 2006.
91. Prachanda stated that by waging war, the CPN-M had achieved almost 60 percent of its goals. "The remaining 40 percent will be achieved with the election of the Constituent Assembly" ("Prachanda: Our Revolution Won," L'espresso, November 2006).
92. "Bhattarai Prescribes Pragmatism," The Himalayan, 4 December 2006.
93. Author interview, Maoist leader, Kathmandu, 2 December 2006. After their recent election victory, Prachanda declared that the new Maoist-led government would bring an economic revolution to Nepal by promoting a capitalist economy. He emphasized that the private sector would lead this revolution. The government would only facilitate the process by creating "an atmosphere friendly to investment" ("Maoists for Capitalism, Economic Miracle," The Kathmandu Post, 17 April 2008).
94. B. Bhattarai, "Epochal Ten Years of Application and Development of Revolutionary Ideas," The Worker, 10 (May 2006).
95. Prachanda, Press Communiqué, 2007, cited in S. Giri, "Taking the Bait: Maoist and the Democratic Lure in Nepal," Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38(2) (May 2008), p. 288.
96. Prachanda, Press Communiqúe Circulated to the Press Conference, 12 August 2007.
97. ICG Asia Report No. 132, Nepal's Maoists, p. 23.
98. Ibid., p. 14.
99. "PLA Presses Party to Quit Govt, Launch Revolt," The Kathmandu Post, 7 August 2007.
100. ICG Asia Briefing No. 72, Nepal: Peace Postponed, 18 December 2007, p. 3.
101. "US Official Meets Prachanda," The Kathmandu Post, 28 May 2008.