The place of self-respect in a theory of justice

Inquiry

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 127-154

  Doppelt, Gerald ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 70449700124     PISSN: 0020174X     EISSN: 15023923     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00201740902790219     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), pp. 440-42 - hereafter referred to as TJ
2. (1993) Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 106 - hereafter referred to as PL
3. Kelly, E. (Ed.) (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge and London: Belkna Press of Harvard University Press), p. 59 - hereafter referred to as JF.
4. JF, pp. 58-59.
5. TJ, pp. 107, 340, 440.
6. PL, pp. 318-19.
7. TJ, Chapter 67.
8. TJ, Chapter 67.
9. TJ, Chapter 67.
10. TJ, pp. 544-46.
11. PL, pp. 318-19.
12. JF, pp. 130-32.
13. TJ, pp. 177, 453-54.
14. PL, pp. 35-40.
15. JF, pp. 5, 8, 14.
16. TJ, pp. 180-82.
17. JF, pp. 115, 124-30.
18. TJ, pp. 58-60, 454.
19. PL, pp. 18-19, 29-35.
20. PL, pp. 11-15, 22-35.
21. PL, pp. 212-31.
22. TJ, pp. 60-65.
23. Dillon & Robin S. (Ed.) (1995) Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect (New York: Routledge) - hereafter DCS. See Dillon's "Introduction", DCS, pp. 1-53
24. S. Darwall's "Two Kinds of Respect", DCS, pp. 181-98.
25. DCS, pp. 27-28.
26. Rawls, J. (1999) "Preface for the Revised Edition", A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, xii-xiii (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
27. TJ, Chapter 67.
28. TJ, p. 454.
29. TJ, pp. 58-60.
30. TJ, p. 440.
31. For summaries of relevant research, see Argyle, M. (1972) The Social Psychology of Work (Middlesex, England: Penguin)
32. HEW (1972) Work in America: Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
33. Jenkins, D. (1973) Job Power (Baltimore: Penguin)
34. Tiffany, Cowan and Tiffany (1970) The Unemployed: A Social-Psychological Portrait. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.).
35. Sennett and Cobb (1973) The Hidden Injuries of Class (New York: Alfred A. Knopf).
36. Sennett and Cobb (1973) The Hidden Injuries of Class (New York: Alfred A. Knopf).
37. TJ, pp. 530-41.
38. TJ, pp. 224-27.
39. TJ, p. 545.
40. TJ, p. 546.
41. See Doppelt, G. (1981) "Rawls' system of justice: a critique from the Left", Nous, Vol. 15, No. 3, September, pp. 259-309.
42. TJ, p. 546.
43. TJ, p. 546.
44. TJ, p. 546.
45. See Cite: 3.
46. Massey, S.J., "Is self-respect a moral or psychological concept?", DCS, 198-218.
47. Scanlon, T.M. (2003) "Rawls on justification" in: Freeman, S. (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, pp. 139-68 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
48. Ibid, pp. 159-162.
49. Freeman, S. "Introduction: John Rawls - an overview", in: The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, op. Cit, pp. 41-44.
50. PL, p. 14.
51. In the essay cited in note 37, Freeman observes that "libertarianism would not be among the reasonable political conceptions according to Rawls' criteria" because "The ideal of the person that underlies libertarianism is not that of free and equal citizens cooperating on the basis of reciprocity but free individuals who are absolute owners of themselves and their external assets and whose cooperative interactions are based in private contracts." Freeman goes on to observe that this ideal is incompatible with Rawls' political conception because it excludes equality of opportunity, a social minimum and the assignment of individual rights to persons, independently of their market position.
52. While Freeman is correct about the libertarian ideal, I do not read our tradition of market morality to rest on this libertarian ideal, but rather on what I characterize more flexibly as a Lockean ideal. Furthermore, as I argue, the Lockean ideal admits "more and less democratic and egalitarian interpretations". This allows the possibility of a normative synthesis of Rawls' political ideal of free and equal persons, and the Lockean ideal of free and equal economic agents. Thus, I reject the view assumed by many Rawlsians that the democratic ideal and the Lockean one are irremediably opposed and contradictory.
53. Okin, S. (1989) Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books).
54. Rawls, J. (2002) "The idea of public reason revisited," The Law of Peoples, pp. 156-64 (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press).
55. Cohen, G.A. (1997) "Where the action is: on the site of distributive justice," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol 26, No. 1 (Winter, 1997), pp. 3-30.
56. Ibid, p. 22.
57. Ehrenreich, B. (1983) The Hearts of Men (New York: Anchor Books).