(Self) Regulating war?: Voluntary regulation and the private security industry

Security Studies

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 479-516

  de Nevers, Renée ^a  

^a SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70449670668     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410903132854     Document Type: Article

References (269)

1. In February 2009 Blackwater was renamed Xe. I use the name Blackwater throughout the article.
2. Jonathan Finer, "Security Contractors in Iraq Under Scrutiny after Shootings," Washington Post, 10 September 2005
3. Sudarsan Raghavan and Josh White, "Blackwater Guards Fired at Fleeing Cars, Soldiers Say," Washington Post, 12 October 2007.
4. P. W. Singer, The Private Military Industry and Iraq: What have We Learned and Where to Next? (Geneva: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 2004), 14
5. For some discussions of regulatory options, see Michael N. Schmitt, "Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees," Chicago Journal of International Law 5, no. 2 (2004): 511-46
6. P. W. Singer, "War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 42, no. 2 (2004): 521-50
7. Deborah Avant, The Market For Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
8. Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies (Geneva: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces 2005)
9. Caroline Holmqvist, Private Security Companies: The Case for Regulation, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) policy paper no. 9, 2005
10. Sarah Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006)
11. Joanna Spear, Market Forces: The Political Economy of Private Military Companies, FAFO report no. 531, 2006
12. Kathleen M. Jennings, Armed Services: Regulating the Private Military Industry. FAFO report no. 532, 2006
13. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt, ed., From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
14. Andrew Bearpark and Sabrina Schulz, "The Future of the Market," in From Mercenaries to Market, eds., Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)
15. Doug Brooks, "In Search of Adequate Legal and Regulatory Frameworks," Journal of International Peace Operations 2, no. 5 (March/April 2007): 4.
16. P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 170; Avant, The Market for Force, 1-3
17. Anna Leander, "The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of Private Military Companies," Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (2005): 605-22.
18. For some discussions of private authority, see A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, ed., Private Authority and International Affairs (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999)
19. Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, ed., The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
20. Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994)
21. Neil Gunningham and Joseph V. Rees, "Industry SelfRegulation: An Institutional Perspective," Law and Policy 19, no. 4 (October 1997): 363-414
22. Jennifer Nash, "The Emergence of Trade Associations as Agents of Environmental Performance Improvement" (paper, presented at the Greening of Industry Network Conference, 1999)
23. Michael J. Lenox and Jennifer Nash, "Industry Self-Regulation and Adverse Selection: A Comparison Across Four Trade Association Programs," Business Strategy and the Environment 12, (2003), 343-56.
24. Many companies operate both in their home states and overseas. Regulatory problems have been most acute with regard to transnational operations, and this is what industry self-regulatory efforts have sought to address.
25. Singer, Corporate Warriors; Avant, The Market for Force; Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry
26. Fabien Mathieu and Nick Dearden, Corporate Mercenaries: The Threat of Private Military and Security Companies (London: War on Want, 2006)
27. Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: Nation Books, 2007).
28. Singer, Corporate Warriors, 8.
29. Christopher Kinsey, "Challenging International Law: A Dilemma of Private Security Companies," Conflict, Security, and Development 5, no. 3 (December 2005): 270.
30. Singer, Corporate Warriors, 44-48;
31. Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry, 14;
32. Brooks, "In Search of Adequate Legal Frameworks," 4.
33. Leander, "The Market for Force and Public Security," 608; Duncan Campbell, "Marketing the New 'Dogs of War,"' in Making a Killing: The Business of War (Center for Public Integrity, 2002) available at http://www.public-i.org/bow/. Spicer and his company, Sandline International, flaunted African arms embargos and inadvertently contributed to the overthrow of the government of Papua New Guinea in the 1990s. See Singer, Corporate Warriors, 115, 192-96. On the role of mercenaries in Africa, see Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. Kayode Fayemi, ed. Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma (London: Pluto Press, 2000).
34. The Private Security Phenomenon: Policy Implications and Issues (Brussels: Security and Defence Agenda Roundtable, 7 December 2006), 17; Serviam available at http://www.serviammagazine.com
35. For comprehensive discussions of the private security industry, see Singer, Corporate Warriors; and Avant, The Market for Force.
36. P. W. Singer, "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military and its Ramifications for International Security," International Security 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/02): 200-2
37. Avant, The Market for Force, 16-17.
38. Kevin O'Brian, "Private Military Companies and African Security," in Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma, eds., Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. Kayode Fayemi (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Singer, Corporate Warriors,101-18; and Spear, Market Forces.
39. Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry, 54.
40. Jeffrey Herbst, "The Regulation of Private Security Forces," in The Privatisation of Security in Africa, eds., Greg Mills and John Stremlau (Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1999):121-22
41. Leander, "The Market for Force and Public Security," 614.
42. Singer, Corporate Warriors, 180-82, 222-26.
43. Leander, "The Market for Force and Public Security," 614-15.
44. On PSCs' corporate structure, see Singer, Corporate Warriors, 73-78.
45. "Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Companies," Ofice of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 30 October 2008, available at http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/09-005-f.pdf
46. Avant, The Market for Force, 10-15; list of Private Military Corporations from Sourcewatch.org, available at http://sourcewatch.org/index.php? title=Private Military Corporations#List of PMCs, 12 November 2007.
47. Singer, "The Private Military Industry and Iraq"
48. Jennifer K. Elsea and Nina M. Serafino, Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 3
49. Lisa Rimli and Susanne Schmeidl, Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An Exploratory Study of Afghanistan and Angola, eds., Ulrike Jorad and Adrian Schuster (Bern: Swiss Peace, 2008), 73, available at http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user upload/pdf/PSC.pdf
50. Campbell, "Marketing the New 'Dogs of War."'
51. Elsea and Serafino, Private Security Contractors in Iraq.
52. The push to privatize military functions was a tangential goal in Rumsfeld's transformation of the military. On transformation, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Rumsfeld's Defense Vision," Survival 44, no. 2 (2002)
53. Stephen J. Cimbala, "Transformation in Concept and Policy," Joint Forces Quarterly 38 (2005): 28-33. On outsourcing, see Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
54. David S. C. Chu, Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2006-2011 (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2006).
55. It is worth noting that over one thousand contractors were killed between 2003 and mid-2007, and over 7,500 U.S. contractors have been injured. Jan Schakowsky, "Schakowsky Uncovers 1,001 Contractor Deaths in Iraq," available at http://www.house.gov/list/press/il09 schakowsky/pr contractordeaths 080607.shtml
56. Walter Pincus, "Contractors in Iraq Have Become U.S. Crutch," Washington Post, 20 August 2007. See also Iraq Coalition Casualties, http://icasualties.org/Iraq/Contractors.aspx.
57. Raghavan and White, "Blackwater Guards Fired at Fleeing Cars";
58. Sabrina Tavernise and James Glanz, "Iraqi Report Says Blackwater Guards Fired First," New York Times, 19 September 2007
59. Steve Fainaru and Carol Leonnig, "Grand Jury to Probe Shootings by Guards," Washington Post, 20 November 2007.
60. Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking of Women and Girls to Post Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002), 62-68.
61. Singer, "The Private Military Industry and Iraq," 13.
62. Quoted in Robert Young Pelton, Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006), 340.
63. Steve Fainaru, "Four Hired Guns in an Armored Truck, Bullets Flying, and a Pickup and Taxi Brought to a Halt: Who Did the Shooting and Why?" Washington Post, 15 April 2007;
64. Bill Sizemore, "Iraq Killing Tracked to Contractor Could Test Laws," Virginian-Pilot, 11 January 2007
65. Del Quentin Wilber, "Contractors Charged in'07 Deaths," Washington Post, 9 December 2008. One contractor was charged under the UCMJ for attacking another contractor.
66. Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Charges Contractor at Iraq Post in Stabbing," New York Times, 5 April 2008.
67. Fainaru, "Four Hired Guns in an Armored Truck."
68. Coalition Provisional Authority, Order Number 17 (Revised 2004), available at http://www.cpa- iraq.org/regulations/20040627 CPAORD 17 Status of Coalition Rev with Annex A.pdf
69. Finer, "Security Contractors in Iraq Under Scrutiny."
70. Army JAGs, discussion with Rene ́e de Nevers, 30 May 2007.
71. Laura A. Dickinson, "Public Law Values in a Privatized World," Yale Journal of International Law 31 (2006): 383-426
72. Deborah Avant and Lee Sigelman, "What Does Private Security in Iraq Mean for Democracy at Home?" UCLA International Institute, January 2008, 21-22, available at http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/PrivateSecurityandDemocracy.pdf. To be sure, governments could stipulate greater openness.
73. Holmqvist, Private Security Companies, 42
74. See note 3 above.
75. "Privatisation of War: the Outsourcing of Military Threats," International Committee of the Red Cross, available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/privatisation-war-230506
76. Emmanuela-Chiara Gillard, "Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security Companies and Inter- national Humanitarian Law," International Review of the Red Cross 38, no. 863 (2006): 531-36
77. Gilles Carbonnier, "Corporate Responsibility and Humanitarian Action," International Review of the Red Cross 83, no. 844 (2001): 947-67.
78. Sarah Percy, "Mercenaries: Strong Norm, Weak Law," International Organization 61 (2007): 367-97
79. Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 50-52;
80. Singer, "War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law," 527-32.
81. Holmqvist, Private Security Companies, 50;
82. Schreier and Caparini, Privatising Security, 104-16.
83. Singer, Corporate Warriors, 118;
84. Avant, The Market for Force, 161-63
85. Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry, 30-32.
86. Nathan Hodge, "Army for Hire," Slate, 31 August 2006; and Len Le Roux, "South African Mercenary Legislation Enacted," Institute for International Security Studies, 21 January 2008, available at http://www.issafrica.org/blog/2008/01/iss-today-south-african-mercenary.html.
87. Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry, 30-32;
88. Michael Peel and Alec Russell, "South Africa Mercenary Law Attacked," Financial Times, 29 May 2007.
89. Rimli and Schmeidl, Private Security Companies and Local Populations.
90. Karen De Young, "U.S. Moves to Replace Contractors in Iraq," Washington Post, 17 March 2009.
91. Christopher Kinsey, "Regulation and Control of Private Military Companies: The Legislative Dimension," Contemporary Security Policy 26, no. 1 (2005): 84-102.
92. Avant, The Market for Force, 149-51.
93. Singer, "War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law," 539; and Deborah Avant, "The Implications of Marketized Security for IR Theory," Perspective on Politics 4, no. 3 (2006): 512. The problems that have arisen from scanty oversight and the use of inappropriate contracts are beyond the scope of this paper. For some discussions, see Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry, 26-28
94. Eric Schmitt, "Panel Faults Army's Wartime Contracting," New York Times, 1 November 2007; and Dickinson, "Public Law Values in a Privatized World."
95. Doug Brooks, Testimony for the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, "Emerging Threats, and International Relations,"109th Cong., 2nd sess., 13 June 2006, 3-4. Alan Chvotkin, vice president of the Professional Services Council, interview by Rene ́e de Nevers, 16 July 2007.
96. Elsea and Serafino, Private Security Contractors in Iraq, 33-36.
97. National Defense Authorization Act of 2008, HR 1585, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 20 March 2007, available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-1585.
98. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, HR 4986, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 16 January 2008.
99. See amendments to the law made on 28 October 2004. Also see Jonathan Groner, "Untested Law Key in Iraqi Abuse Scandal," Legal Times, 11 May 2005
100. Glenn R. Schmitt, "Amending the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Rushing to Close an Unforeseen Loophole," Army Lawyer, June 2005.
101. Wilber, "Contractors Charged in'07 Iraq Deaths."
102. William Matthews, "Contractor Crackdown: Civilian Contract Employees Can Now be Prosecuted under the UCMJ," Armed Forces Journal, February 2007
103. Erica Razook, Testimony for Amnesty International, on 19 June 2007, To the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/June2007/Razook070619.pdf
104. Bill Sizemore, "Blackwater Supports Inquiry into Fatal Shooting," Virginian-Pilot, 25 July 2007.
105. Matthews, "Contractor Crackdown." The DOD estimates that it employs 7,300 PSC contractors. Peter Spiegel and Julian E. Barnes, "Gates Moves to Rein in Contractors in Iraq," Los Angeles Times, 27 September 2007.
106. Spiegel and Barnes, "Gates Moves to Rein in Contractors." See also http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/dss/docs/03-10-08dod-ucmj.pdf.
107. Richard J. Griffin, "Private Security Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan," statement before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2 October 2007
108. John M. Broder and David Johnston, "U.S. Military Will Supervise Security Firms," New York Times, 3 October 2007.
109. One of the key issues, of course, is what aspects of reputation matter to companies in this industry or to their clients. On this point see, among others, Spear, Market Forces, 43-44. 66 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 77
110. Deborah Avant, "The Emerging Market for Private Military Services and the Problems of Regulation," in From Mercenaries to Market, eds., Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 192.
111. Bearpark and Schulz, "The Regulation of the Private Security Industry," 247.
112. Virginia Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), 8.
113. Rob Baggott, "Regulatory Reform in Britain: the Changing Face of Self-Regulation," Public Administration 67 (1989): 437-38.
114. Halina Ward, Legal Issues in Corporate Citizenship (London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 2003), 1
115. Aseem Prakash, Greening the Firm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
116. Walter Mattli and Tim Buthe, "Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy of Power?" World Politics 56 (2003).
117. Edgar Gold, Maritime Transport (Lexington, KY: Lexington Books, 1981), 4-30.
118. "A New Legal Framework For Military Contractors?" Princeton Problem Solving Workshop Series in Law and Security, 2007, available at http://www.lapa.princeton.edu/newsdetail.php?ID=17, 118-21
119. Virginia Haufler, "Self-Regulation and Business Norms," in Private Authority and International Affairs, eds., A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler
120. Tony Porter (Albany, NY: State University Press of New York, 1999);
121. Robert E. Litan, "Economics: Global Finance," in Managing Global Issues, eds., P.J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (Washington DC: CEIP, 2001)
122. Vinod Aggarwal, "Economics: International Trade," in Managing Global Issues.
123. Ronnie D. Lipschutz and Cathleen Fogel, "Regulation for the Rest of Us?" in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, eds., Rodney Bruce Hall
124. Thomas Biersteker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 121.
125. Mattli and Buthe, "Setting International Standards."
126. Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector, 27-28.
127. Mattli and Buthe, "Setting International Standards"; Aseem Prakash, "A New-Institutionalist Perspective on ISO 14000 and Responsible Care," Business Strategy and the Environment 8, no. 6 (1999): 322-35.
128. Benjamin Cashore, Graeme Auld, and Deanna Newsom, Governing Through Markets (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 95-101.
129. Mattli and Buthe, "Setting International Standards."
130. Baggott, "Regulatory Reform in Britain," 436;
131. Mattli and Buthe, "Setting International Stan- dards."
132. Anthony Ogus, "Rethinking Self-Regulation," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15, no. 1 (1995): 97-108.
133. Cutler, Haufler, and Porter detail six different forms of cooperation: informal industry norms and practices, coordination services firms, production alliances and subcontractor relationships, cartels, business associations, and private regimes.
134. Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, Private Authority and International Affairs, 9-13.
135. Cutler, Haufler, and Porter detail six different forms of cooperation: informal industry norms and practices, coordination services firms, production alliances and subcontractor relationships, cartels, business associations, and private regimes.
136. Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, Private Authority and International Affairs, 9-13.
137. Nash, "The Emergence of Trade Associations," 3-5.
138. John Braithwaite and Brent Fisse, "Self-Regulation and the Control of Corporate Crime," in Private Policing, eds., Clifford Shearing and Philip C. Stenning (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1987), 243
139. Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, Private Authority, 12-13;
140. Andrew A. King and Michael W. Toffel, "Self-Regulatory Institutions for Solving Environmental Problems: Perspectives and Contributions from the Management Literature," HBS Technology and Operations Management Unit Research paper no. 07-089, 16 July 2007, available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=985619.
141. Codes of Corporate Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2001); and Ann Florini, The Coming Democracy (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2003).
142. Cashore, Auld, and Newsom, Governing Through Markets, 17.
143. One example is Fair Trade Coffee, a program in which sellers agree to sell coffee beans that are certified by members of Fair Labor Organizations International, which have been produced meeting economic, social, and environmental criteria. For a discussion of NSMD governance, see ibid.
144. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 2006, available at http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/.
145. The human rights NGOs who helped develop the principles have expressed concern with the implementation of the principles and guidelines for membership. "NGO Response to the Voluntary Principles Participation Criteria," Amnesty International, IOR 40/003/2006, 16 February 2006, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior400032006.
146. Cashore, Auld, and Newsom, Governing Through Markets, 100.
147. Peter Simmons and Brian Wynne, "Responsible Care: Trust, Credibility, and Environmental Management," in Environmental Strategies for Industry, eds., Kurt Fischer and Johan Schot (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1993), 218.
148. Ogus, "Rethinking Self-Regulation;" Prakash, "A New-Institutionalist Perspective on ISO 14000"; Ruth Pearson and Gayle Seyfang, "New Hope or False Dawn? Voluntary Codes of Conduct, Labour Regulation, and Social Policy in a Globalizing World," Global Social Policy 1 (2001)
149. Ann Florini, "Business and Global Governance," The Brookings Review 21 (2003), 6-8.
150. Baggott, "Regulatory Reform in Britain."
151. Cashore, Auld, and Newsom, Governing Through Markets, 8.
152. John Braithwaite, "Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control," Michigan Law Review 80, no. 7 (1982): 1467.
153. John Braithwaite.and Ogus, "Rethinking Self-Regulation," 97.
154. Ogus, "Rethinking Self-Regulation";
155. Cashore, Auld, and Newsom, Governing Through Markets 100 King and Toffel, "Self-Regulatory Institutions for Solving Environmental Problems."
156. Andrew A. King and Michael J. Lenox, "Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program," Academy of Management Journal 43, no. 4 (2000): 700; and Prakash, Greening the Firm.
157. Braithwaite, "Enforced Self-Regulation," 1,469
158. Ogus, "Rethinking Self-Regulation."
159. Ogus, "Rethinking Self-Regulation," 100.
160. Pearson and Seyfang, "New Hope or False Dawn?" 60; Florini, "Business and Global Governance," 7; and Behind the Mask: the Real Face of CSR (London: Christian Aid, 2004). For some evaluations of the content of different codes
161. Kathryn Gordon and Maiko Miyake, Deciphering Codes of Corporate Conduct: A Review of Their Contents (OECD, 2000)
162. Codes of Corporate Conduct; Muel Kaptein, "Business Codes of Multinational Firms: What Do They Say?" Journal of Business Ethics 50 (2004): 13-31.
163. Jennifer Howard, Jennifer Nash, and John Ehrenfeld, "Standard or Smokescreen?" California Management Review 42, no. 3 (2000): 64-65;
164. Jedrzej George Frynas, "The False Development Promise of CSR," International Affairs 81 (2005): 583;
165. Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector, 60.
166. Caux Round Table, available at http://www.cauxroundtable.org/principles.html; Kathryn Gordon, The OECD Guidelines and Other Corporate Responsibility Instruments: A Comparison (OECD, 2001),9; and Florini, "Business and Global Governance."
167. This is similar to what Braithwaite and Fisse refer to as "enforced self-regulation." Their model includes a government regulatory role, which is not necessarily present in all obligatory codes. Braithwaite and Fisse, "Self-Regulation and the Control of Corporate Crime," 223. Cashore, Auld
168. Newsom distinguish between codes and certification programs by state versus market involvement in enforcement. Cashore, Auld, and Newsom, Governing Through Markets, 92. My interest is in efforts by industry associations to establish credible self-regulatory mechanisms, so I include codes with a range of enforcement mechanisms in this category.
169. Enforcement mechanisms are evaluated by Rees, Hostages of Each Other; Gunningham and Rees, "Industry Self-Regulation"; King Lenox, "Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions"; Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector; and Lenox and Nash, "Industry Self-regulation and Adverse Selection."
170. The Responsible Care program was initially developed in Canada and then adopted by the U.S.chemical industry. It is now a global initiative setting voluntary guidelines for the chemical industry in fifty-two countries. Similarly, the nuclear industry's program was expanded globally after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and is governed internationally by the World Association of Nuclear Operators
171. John Braithwaite, "The New Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology," British Journal of Criminology 40 (2000): 228;
172. Prakash, Greening the Firm, 83-91; and Responsiblecare.org, available at http://www.responsiblecare.org/page.asp?p=6341&1=1.
173. Rees, Hostages of Each Other; Gunningham and Rees, "Industry Self-Regulation"
174. Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector; and Avant, The Market for Force.
175. King and Toffel, "Self-Regulatory Institutions";
176. Harry J. Van Buren and Karen D. W. Patterson, "Institutional Practices of and Complements to Industry Self-regulation with Regard to Labor Practices," paper presented at the 2nd Annual Conference on the Institutional Foundations of Industry Self-Regulation, Cambridge, MA, 2007; and Braithwaite and Fisse, "Self-Regulation and the Control of Corporate Crime."
177. King and Lenox, "Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions"; and Lenox and Nash, "Industry Self-Regulation and Adverse Selection."
178. Rees, Hostages to Each Other; and King and Lenox, "Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions."
179. Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector, 58-79. See also Florini, The Coming Democracy.
180. Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector, 27-27; and Nash, "The Emergence of Trade Associations."
181. Cashore, Auld, and Newsom, Governing Through Markets, 100.
182. Jennifer Nash, "Industry Codes of Practice: Emergence and Evolution," in New Tools for Environmental Protection, eds., T. Dietz and P. C. Stern (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002), 236-8
183. Andrew J. Hoffman and William Ocasio, "Not All Events are Attended Equally," Organization Science 12, no. 4 (2001): 414-34
184. Van Buren and Patterson, "Institutional Predictors," 13.
185. King and Toffel, "Self-Regulatory Institutions," 7.
186. Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector, 32-33.
187. King and Lenox, "Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions," 699.
188. Hoffman and Ocasio, "Not All Events are Attended Equally."
189. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach. On regulation and communities of fate, see among others, Braithwaite, "The New Regulatory State," 228
190. Nash, "Industry Codes of Practice," 239.
191. King and Toffel, "Self-Regulatory Institutions," 7. 125 Rees, Hostages to Each Other, 105.
192. Prakash, "A New-Institutionalist Perspective," 324.
193. Prakash; King and Lenox, "Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions," 700.
194. Pearson and Seyfang, "New Hope or False Dawn?" 56-60. On different codes of conduct that corporations can join, see European Corporate Governance Institute, available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/allcodes.php
195. United Nations Global Compact, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/index.html. While participation in these codes is notable, it remains quite small compared to the universe of corporations worldwide; roughly 2,900 corporations had signed on to the UN's Global Compact as of January 2007, for example.
196. Nash, "The Emergence of Trade Associations," 33
197. Rees, Hostages to Each Other, 1, 50.
198. Nash, "The Emergence of Trade Associations," 24. The CMA is now the American Chemistry Council.
199. American Forest and Paper Association, available at http://www.afandpa.org/template. cfm?section=About AFandPA.
200. Nash, "Industry Codes of Practice," 240; and Van Buren and Patterson, "Institutional Predictors."
201. Cashore, Auld, and Newsom, Governing Through Markets, 95.
202. King and Lenox found that companies might join industry associations with obligatory codes opportunistically, to gain reputational benefits in the short run. King and Lenox, "Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions," 702.
203. Participation was determined by examining corporate websites included in the list of 210 PSCs in Avant, The Market for Force, 10-15 websites of members of the IPOA and BAPSC. Some private regulation of employees exists in certification programs for individuals working in the private security industry; I do not discuss these here since they focus on employees rather than companies. For examples of certification programs, see ASIS, available at http://www.asisonline.org; and International Contractors Association (ICA), available at http://www.icaonline.us/news.php.
204. Membership criteria were agreed on in the fall of 2007, and All provisional members had to reapply for full membership. Sabrina Schulz, then BAPSC Director of Policy, correspondence with Renée de Nevers, Fall 2007.
205. "Code of Conduct," International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), available at http://www.ipoaworld.org/eng/codeofconductv12en.html.
206. Doug Brooks, interview by Renée de Nevers, 15 July 2007.
207. Brooks expressed surprise that only four complaints were lodged in the first year or so after the compliance mechanism was established. Ibid.
208. Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty, 6-9; and Singer, Corporate Warriors, 66-70.
209. New legislation on private contractors focused on expanding government oversight capacity. See previous discussion on regulation above in "Current Regulations Governing the Private Security Industry."
210. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation," The Green Paper (London: The Stationery Office, 2002).
211. Chvotkin, interview by Renée de Nevers, 16 July 2007.
212. Congressional staffers, discussions with Renée de Nevers, 17 July 2007
213. Brooks, "Testimony." On problems of oversight, see Elsea and Serafino, Private Security Contractors in Iraq, 28-30;
214. Jacques S. Gansler, Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, available at http://www.army.mil/docs/Gansler Commission Report Final 071031.pdf.
215. Scahill, Blackwater, 363-64; and Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry, 32.
216. Brooks, "In Search of Adequate Legal Frameworks," 4; Doug Brooks, testimony of the International Peace Operations Association, to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 25 April 2007, 7
217. James D. Schmitt, statement before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 27 February 2008.
218. "Frequently Asked Questions about the IPOA," http://www.ipoaonoline.org.
219. On such claims by both IPOA and BAPSC representatives, see "The Private Security Phenomenon."
220. Van Buren and Patterson, "Institutional Predictors," 15.
221. Herbst, "The Regulation of Private Security Forces," 119-121
222. Toni Pfanner, "Interview with Andrew Bearpark," International Review of the Red Cross 38 (2006): 456 Schmitt, "Statement," 4-5
223. Brooks, "Testimony."
224. James Glanz and David Rhode, "The Reach of War: U.S. Report Finds Dismal Training of Afghan Police," New York Times, 4 December 2006; "DynCorp International Awarded Extension of Iraq Police Training," DynCorp 2006, http://www.dyn-intl.com/news2006/news090506.aspx;
225. Jonathan Karp and Andy Pasztor, "US: Titan to Pay Fine and Plead Guilty in Bribery Probe," Wall Street Journal, 20 January 2005. DynCorp is a member of the IPOA.
226. "A Media Mystery: Private Security Companies in Iraq-A PEJ Study," Project for Excellence in Journalism, 21 June 2007, http://www.journalism.org/node/6153. See also Avant and Sigelman, "What Does Private Security in Iraq mean for Democracy at Home?" 23-28.
227. "A Media Mystery."
228. On the Fallujah incident and Blackwater's role, see David Barstow et al., "Security Companies: Shadow Soldiers in Iraq," New York Times, 19 April 2004; Pelton, Licensed to Kill, 118-42 Scahill, Blackwater, 95-115.
229. A Media Mystery."
230. A Lexis-Nexus search for "Blackwater" between 15 September and 7 November 2007 showed 965 references, while a search for "private military contractor" registered 998 results between 16 September and 7 November 2007, almost as many as it registered in the previous seven years: 1,000 references between August 2000 and 15 September 2007.
231. The Washington Post, for example, ran several stories in 2007 covering the shooting of Iraqi civilians by contractors, poor safety records and hiring practices among PSCs, and violations of U.S. military regulations governing PSCs, among other things. Fainaru, "Four Hired Guns in an Armored Truck"
232. Steve Fainaru, "Cutting Costs, Bending Rules, and a Trail of Broken Lives," Washington Post, 29 July 2007
233. Steve Fainaru, "For Abducted Guards, Iraq Wasn't Just About Money," Washington Post, 30 July 2007
234. Renae Merle, "Coming Under Fire: DynCorp Defends its Work in Training Foreign Policy Forces," Washington Post, 19 March 2007.
235. Joseph Neff, "DynCorp Boss Disses Blackwater," available at http://blogsarchive.newsobserver.com/blackwater/index.php?title=dyncorp boss disses blackwater&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1, 9 November 2007
236. P.W. Singer, Can't Win With'Em, Can't Go to War Without 'Em, Brookings Institution policy paper no. 4, September 2007
237. Steve Fainaru, "Guards in Iraq Cite Frequent Shootings," Washington Post, 3 October 2007.
238. Pelton, Licensed to Kill, 116; John M. Broder and David Risen, "Armed Guards in Iraq Occupy a Legal Limbo," New York Times, 19 September 2007
239. Steve Fainaru, "Where Military Rules Don't Apply," Washington Post, 20 September 2007.
240. It is important to note that the change of control in the U.S. House of Representatives following the November 2006 mid-term elections influenced Congress' willingness to investigate the Blackwater incident and promote new regulation of the industry. There were some efforts by members of Congress on each side of the aisle to politicize the issue of contractors, playing on the fact that Blackwater in particular had strong ties to the Republican Party. Since my concern is with the industry's capacity to self-regulate, I do not explore this issue further here.
241. Zachary Goldfarb, "A Tougher Line on Government Contracting: Blackwater Fallout May Ripple Through Industry," Washington Post, 8 October 2007.
242. Bill Sizemore, "Blackwater Quits Trade Group that was Reviewing Its Conduct," Virginian-Pilot, 14 October 2007.
243. Dana Hedgpeth, "State Department to Renew Deal with Blackwater for Iraq Security," Washington Post, 5 April 2008
244. Rod Nordland, "Ex-Blackwater Workers May Return to Iraq Jobs," New York Times, 4 April 2009.
245. Analyses of the Fallujah incident also criticized Blackwater's actions there. Sizemore, "Iraq Killing Tracked to Contractor"; and Scahill, Blackwater; and "A Media Mystery."
246. Author's interview with industry representative, July 2007; O'Brian, "Private Military Companies"; and Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry, 59.
247. David Phinney, "From Mercenaries to Peacemakers? Scandals Confront Military Security Industry," Corpwatch, 25 November 2005, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12829
248. Luke Baker, "British Firms Battle for Iraq Security Deals," Reuters, 2 October 2007
249. Alec Klein and Steve Fainaru, "Firms Protest Exclusion from Iraq Security Bid," Washington Post, 5 May 2007
250. Alec Klein and Steve Fainaru, "Judge Halts Award of Iraq Contract," Washington Post, 2 June 2007; Alec Klein, "U.S.
251. Army Awards Iraq Security Work to British Firm," Washington Post, 14 September 2007
252. Christopher Kinsey, "Examining the Organizational Structure of UK Private Security Companies," Defence Studies 5, no. 2 (2005): 188-212.
253. Brooks, "Testimony," 1-2.
254. For one list of associations related to the security industry, see Privatemilitary.org, available at http://www.privatemilitary.org/securityindustry.html.
255. Dues range from two thousand to eight thousand dollars, based on the firm's business and the type of membership it chooses. See http://ipoaworld.org/eng/membershiplevels.html
256. Andrew Bearpark, discussion with Renée de Nevers, 11 March 2009.
257. Rees, Hostages to Each Other; Nash, "The Emergence of Trade Associations"; and American Forest and Paper Association, available at http://www.afandpa.org.
258. Brooks, interview with Renée de Nevers, 15 July 2007.
259. "About US," BAPSC, available at http://www.bapsc.org.uk/aboutus.asp.
260. Previously, the British industry had not felt linked to British policy. Avant, The Market for Force,
261. Malcolm Nance, Director, Special Readiness Services International, discussion with Renée de Nevers, 29 June 2007.
262. Ward, "Legal Issues in Corporate Citizenship"; and Avant, The Market for Force, 53
263. Dickinson, "Public Law Values in a Privatized World."
264. Percy, Regulating the Private Security Industry, 49-52.
265. Laura A. Dickinson, Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 27 February 2008.
266. Rafael Enrique Valero, "Bush Targets Contract Oversight Provisions," Government Executive, available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0208/022208nj2.htm.
267. Notably, the oversight commission rejected by the George W. Bush administration was tasked with recommending distinctions between "inherently governmental" battlefield functions and security functions that could be privatized. Valero, "Bush Targets Contract Oversight Provisions."
268. "The Montreux Document," 17 September 2008, available at http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/intla/humlaw.Par.0056.File.tmp/Montreux%20Document.pdf
269. "A New Legal Framework For Military Contractors?" Princeton Problem Solving Workshop Series in Law and Security, 2007, available at http://www.lapa.princeton.edu/newsdetail.php?ID=17