A European legal method? On European private law and scientific method

European Law Journal

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 20-45

  Hesselink, Martijn ^a  

^a Faculty of Law   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70449572140     PISSN: 13515993     EISSN: 14680386     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2008.00449.x     Document Type: Article

References (110)

1. M. W. Hesselink, The New European Legal Culture (Kluwer, 2001), ch 1, with further references.
2. Of course, in J. P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (William S. Hein & Co, 1968), the phrase refers to judges.
3. R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Fontana, 1986), at 239.
4. cf J. B. M. Vranken, Exploring the Jurist's Frame of Mind (Kluwer, 2006), at 146.
5. K. Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (Springer Verlag, 5th edn, 1991), at 5.
6. Hans Kelsen's Reine Rechtslehre; Einleitung in die Rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik [1st edn, 1934] (Scientia Verlag, 1994) was not in the first place a pure theory of law but a theory of pure legal science; it was concerned with the definition of law as an object of scientific study . Specifically on the difference between legal science and legal sociology, see the debate between Kelsen and Ehrlich: H. Kelsen and E. Ehrlich, Rechtssoziologie und Rechtswissenschaft; Eine Kontroverse (Nomos, 2003).
7. P. Stein, Roman Law in European History (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
8. R. C. Van Caeneghem, Judges, Legislators and Professors; Chapters on European Legal History (Cambridge University Press, 1987), especially ch 2.
9. Among many examples, in Germany the 'Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften' has seven institutes in the research field of 'legal sciences' and in Finland the Centre of Excellence 'The Foundations of European Law and Polity' has a research plan which emphasises its 'scientific significance and innovativeness'.
10. N. Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press, 1995), ch 1.
11. C. J. J. M. Stolker, 'Ja, geléérd zijn jullie wel!; Over de status van de rechtswetenschap', (2003) Nederlands Juristen Blad 766.
12. Here there is not necessarily a contrast with the recognised sciences, especially in their theoretical branches (eg theoretical physics). There is even the received idea (or cliché) that physicists do their most important discoveries when they are young (think of the icon Albert Einstein), ie when they are not yet burdened by too much knowledge.
13. In their book La doctrine (Dalloz, 2004), Jamin and Jestaz demonstrate how, after having been abolished by Napoléon and threatened by social scientists with their scientific methods, legal scholars in France reinvented themselves in the second half of the nineteenth century as a third source of law, in addition to the Code and case-law ('la jurisprudence'), which was also invented by them as a second source of law.
14. R. A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press, 1993), at 69.
15. R. A. Posner, 'Foreword', in M. Faure and R. Van den Bergh (eds), Essays in Law and Economics (Maklu, 1989), at 5.
16. R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law and Economics (Addison-Wesley, 3rd edn, 2000), at 3.
17. K. Zweigert en Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 1998), at 4.
18. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said: 'The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law' (O. Wendell Holmes , ' The Path of the Law ', (1897)10 Harvard Law Review 457 .). Karl Llewellyn stated, no less famously: 'What officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself' (K. N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush; On Our Law and its Study (Oceana Publications, 1951)). Jerome Frank is still known today for the sound-bite that the law depends on what the judge had for breakfast. Specifically with regard to the work of scholars, Hermann Kantorowicz pointed to the fact that a given legal system, as it is presented in the various existing textbooks, may look as different as the personalities of their authors (G. Flavius (H. Kantorowicz), Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft (Heidelberg, 1906) (reprinted in T. Würtenberger (ed.), Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie; Ausgewählte Schriften zur Wissenschaftslehre von Hermann Kantorowicz (Karlsruhe, 1962), at 13, 27-28
19. D. Kennedy , ' Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication ', (1976) 89 arvard Law Review 1685
20. K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge Classics, 2002).
21. ibid , at 48
22. ibid , at 16.
23. For a very different Viennese thinker who was also irritated by the fashion of psychoanalysis at the time, see E. Canetti, Das Augenspiel; Lebensgeschichte 1931-1937 (Fischer, 13th edn, 2001
24. cf Popper, op cit n 20 supra , at 251: 'it is part of our definition of natural laws if we postulate that they are to be invariant with respect to space and time; and also if we postulate that they are to have no exceptions'. Of course, my assimilation of natural laws and laws studied by legal scholars is incongruous since natural laws are not the object but the product of science.
25. ibid , at 250.
26. And not only for legal scholarship. Definitions like Popper's, which consider only the empirical sciences to be scientific, exclude large parts of what is done at the university. Sciences (universitas scientiae , one could say) according to such a narrow definition would exclude most faculties which have long been recognised as part of the university (universitas studiorum), indeed much longer than the empirical sciences.
27. Such a claim is tautological in the same way as Darwin's evolutionary theory by which it was inspired. The struggle for life and the survival of the fittest: who survive? Only the fittest! Who are the fittest? Only those who survive.
28. Popper does not explicitly make this claim. He merely defines science as empirical science and calls the remainder metaphysical. However, who would like his discipline to be called metaphysical rather than scientific? (Parallel with Darwin: who would like to be called 'unfit'?)
29. P. Feyerabend, Against Method (Verso, 1993), at 1.
30. ibid , at 18-19.
31. R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth; Philosophical Papers , Vol I (Cambridge University Press, 1991), at 1. Rorty's rejection of the philosophy of science is based on his broader claim that epistemology is pointless. See Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Basil Blackwell, 1980) where he argues that we should stop asking ourselves how we can determine whether our representation of nature is correct (we should stop mirroring). Since the only thing we will ever have is the 'representation', let us focus on whether it works for the various purposes we have in mind.
32. S. Shapin, The Scientific Revolution (University of Chicago Press, 1996
33. Obviously there are clear parallels here with the way in which natural law became increasingly discredited. On this latter development, see J. Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Law (Clarendon Press, 1991
34. Gerrit De Geest, 'Hoe maken we van de rechtswetenschap een volwaardige wetenschap?', (2004) Nederlands Juristen Blad 58, who rejects legal scholarship as 'pre-scientific' because - in contrast to the economic analysis of law - it still uses essentially scholastic methods.
35. Shapin, op cit n 33 supra , at 162 (emphasis in original).
36. ibid , 95.
37. B. Latour, Science in Action (Harvard University Press, 1987
38. ibid , at 30.
39. ibid , at 31-33.
40. ibid , at 40-41
41. D. Heigham , ' Letter: Why Are Economists So Unscientific? ', (2007) 4 (2) The Economists' Voice Art 5, available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss2/art5 . The assumption that has been most tested recently is the one that individuals are (merely) rational maximisers of their own welfare; this behavioural research has led to the somewhat more modest (but no less ideologically biased) concept of 'bounded' rationality.
42. R. Dworkin , ' Is Wealth A Value? ', (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 191 , at 194
43. L. Kaplow and S. Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (Harvard University Press, 2002) even claim that social welfare is the only thing that matters
44. A striking example is the amicus curiae brief that was recently presented in a US Supreme Court case by 20 professors (including one Nobel Prize winner) who identify themselves as 'leading professors and scholars who teach and write on economic issues' (Supreme Court Amicus Brief Regarding Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v Public Utility District No 1 of Snohomish County, Washington , available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1034200). The reason for their intervention is that they 'are concerned about the economic effects that the decision will have on contract certainty in commodities markets . . . Amici have a particular interest in the role and importance of contract certainty in promoting the proper functioning of markets such as the electricity market'. The case concerns long-term contracts for the supply of electricity that were concluded during the 2001-2002 energy crisis in California and that were contested by the buyers when the prices had fallen sharply after the end of that crisis. The contracts had been upheld by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission but the Ninth Circuit overturned FERC's decision, holding that a contract price may be set aside if it falls beyond a 'zone of reasonableness'. In their brief the amici argue that this decision should be reversed by the Supreme Court. The reason is that 'certainty of contract is essential to a healthy economy'. Whatever its merit, this expert opinion necessarily relies on a number of assumptions including the following: the positive assumption (against which there is much empirical evidence) that contracting parties generally derive certainty from the formal notion that contracts will be upheld whatever the circumstances rather than from the more substantive notion that contracting parties rely on the fact that the law will uphold contracts except in cases where the outcome would lead to extreme hardship or would otherwise be extremely unfair, and the (essentially utilitarian) normative assumptions that it is an important aim of contract law to preserve a healthy economy (by providing incentives for efficient market transactions) and that this general macro-economic aim is generally (or at least in the present case) more important than a just and fair outcome of the dispute between the parties in the case at hand. The point here is not whether the expert argument (which, frankly, is presented in a rather scholastic fashion) is convincing but that it is presented, not only as a normative argument (the law is wrong) but as a legal argument (the Ninth Circuit has got the law wrong), and that the proposed better solution relies entirely on a number of positive and normative assumptions, just as much as any other normative argument based on a different conception of social justice.
45. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 3rd edn, 1996
46. It may constitute a claim that the law, as it stands, is wrong, ie a claim from the external perspective. And as such it may be very convincing.
47. The distinction was introduced into jurisprudence by H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 2nd edn, 1961), at 88. In the social sciences the internal/external distinction aligns with the interpretivism/positivism divide. Cf B. Z. Tamanaha, Realistic Socio-Legal Theory: Pragmatism and a Social Theory of Law (Clarendon Press, 1997), ch 3. (Note that 'legal positivism' resembles the internal (not the external) view and interpretivism (not positivism) in the social sciences.)
48. See M. W. Hesselink, The New European Legal Culture (Kluwer, 2001)
49. Germany, C.-W. Canaris, 'Die richtlinienkonforme Auslegung und Rechtsfortbildung im System der juristischen Methodenlehre', in H. Koziol and P. Rummel (eds), Im Dienste der Gerechtigkeit (Festschrift Franz Bydlinski) (Springer, 2002), at 9 introduced the concept of 'Rechtsgewinningsquellen' (which must be distinguished from 'Rechtsgeltungsquellen' and 'Rechtserkenntnisquellen'): in contrast to statutes ('Rechtsgeltungsquellen'), case-law and legal scholarly writing ('Rechtserkenntnisquellen') the 'Rechtsgewinningsquellen' do not provide answers to legal questions on account of being a formally recognised source, but their influence depends merely on whether they are convincing in substance. However, note that my argument goes further: I argue that these different sources cannot (or can no longer) be distinguished. My argument also goes further than Hart's argument, that 'detached normative statements' (made by someone who does not accept an existing norm) constitute a third kind of statement in addition to the internal and external statement (H. L. A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1983), at 14-15), and Tamanaha's idea that we should distinguish two internal/external axes, with regard to the observed (interpretative/positivist) and the observers (participant/non-participant)
50. B. Z. Tamanaha , ' A Socio-Legal Methodology for the Internal/External Distinction: Jurisprudential Implications ', (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1255 . I am arguing (here and below in section V, B) that in Europe it is becoming increasingly difficult (even for Dworkin's Hercules!) to figure out, and accordingly it is less meaningful, whether a statement is detached or not, interpretative or positivist and participant or non-participant because it is unclear where the relevant system, community and practice begins. Are only judges participants? Not so, according to German legal scholars. Is only Community law part of the system of European law? Not so, according to those who regard the whole of the law that applies in Europe as one multi-level system. Is French law or an observation by an American legal economist external to Dutch law? Not for those who believe in the Europe-friendly interpretation of national law and those who believe that the law should be interpreted in such a way that the outcome leads to the greatest possible social welfare.
51. See below, section IV, A.
52. cf B. H. Bix, 'Law as an Autonomous Discipline', in P. Cane and M. Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, 2003), at 975.
53. In favour of methodological eclecticism is D. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication {fin de siècle} (Harvard University Press, 1997), at 15. See also M. W. Hesselink, Contractenrecht in Perspectief (Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2004), 7
54. For the theory of the efficiency of the common law, see R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Aspen, 5th edn, 1998), s 8.1. Contrast E. A. Posner , ' Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure? ', 112 Yale Law Journal 829 , who argues, with regard to contract law, that welfare economics might be able to provide persuasive reasons for the superiority of a free market to a planned economy, and that a free market requires the making of binding promises: 'But there are many ways that promises can be made binding . . . And there are many different rules of contract law that will be equally good at enabling people to make binding promises. Specific performance is about the same as damages; literalistic interpretation is about the same as purposive interpretation'.
55. A more dangerous version of the same idea is the so-called 'Washington consensus' that advocates privatisation, deregulation, lower public spending, etc. One does not have to be a radical antiglobalist to realise that people, societies and their economies differ and that one size does not in fact fit all. It is therefore definitely unscientific (and immoral, for that matter) to try to impose the Washington consensus, in the name of economic science, without distinction on any country in the world whatever its social, political and economic condition. See J. E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontent (Penguin Press, 2002), at 78. See on the 'technical' economic advice by Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman and his Chicago boys to Pinochet, Deng Xiaoping and other brutal regimes: N. Klein, Shock Therapy; The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Metropolitan Books, 2007
56. G. Teubner , ' Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences ', (1998) The Modern Law Review 11 .
57. P. Caroni, 'Der Schiffbruch der Geschichtlichkeit; Anmerkungen zum Neo-Pandektismus', (1994) Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte 85 says of the neopandectists: 'Stark übertreibend, und auch nur im Sinne einer ebenso gutmütigen wie zusammenfassende Provokation könnte man sagen: Die meisten von ihnen . . . befassen sich mit einer fiktiven Vergangenheit zur Beeinflussung einer ungewissen Zukunft'.
58. R. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (Penguin, 1999), 96
59. In this sense, see A. H. Hol, 'Pleidooi voor een Jurisprudentia - Over recht en wetenschap', in J. W. L. Broeksteeg and E. F. Stamhuis (eds), Rechtswetenschappelijk onderzoek. Over object en methode (Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2003, at 5.
60. Kennedy, op cit n 52 supra , at 92. Cf Dworkin, op cit n 3 supra , at 274, with regard to 'global internal scepticism': 'Nothing is easier or more pointless than demonstrating that a flawed and contradictory account fits as well as a smother and more attractive one. The internal sceptic must show that the flawed and contradictory account is the only one available'.
61. In fact, by Popper's standard it is not a science at all as it is not empirical.
62. T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (The University of Chicago Press, 3rd edn, 1996
63. M. Foucault, Les mots et les choses; une archéologie des sciences humaines (Gallimard, 1966
64. Conjectures and Refutations (Routledge Classics, 2005) is dedicated to him.
65. The theory of falsification is very similar to Darwin's theory of natural selection. Popper more than once explicitly adopts Darwin's terminology. See, e.g. Popper, op cit n 20 supra , at 91: 'We choose the theory which best holds its own in competition with other theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves itself the fittest to survive'.
66. ibid , ch 5.
67. This seems to be much more useful than the methodological guidelines that some want to borrow from other sciences (formulating falsifiable hypotheses, etc). See, e.g. R. A. J. van Gestel and J. B. M. Vranken, 'Rechtswetenschappelijke artikelen. Naar criteria voor methodologische verantwoording', (2007) Nederlands Juristen Blad 1448.
68. K.-P. Berger , ' Auf dem Wege zu einem europäischen Gemeinrecht der Methode ', (2001) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 4 ; A. Flessner , ' Juristische Methode und Europäisches Privatrecht ', (2002) Juristen Zeitung 14 ; S. Vogenauer , ' Eine gemeineuropäische Methodenlehre des Rechts - Plädoyer und Programm ', (2005) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 234 , and the contributions to K. Riesenhuber (ed.), Europäische Methodenlehre; Grundfragen der Methoden des Europäischen Privatrechts (De Gruyter, 2006
69. Switzerland E. A. Kramer, 'Konvergenz und Internationalisierung der juristischen Methode', in C. J. Meier-Schatz (ed.), Die Zukunft des Rechts (Helbing and Lichtenhahn, 1999), at 71. In favour of a European theory of legal sources ('europäische Rechtsquellenlehre'): J. Köndgen, 'Die Rechtsquellen des Europäischen Privatrechts', in K. Riesenhuber (ed.), Europäische Methodenlehre; Handbuch für Ausbildung und Praxis (De Gruyter, 2006, at 133 and 158.
70. The full title is Titre préliminaire: De la publication, des effets et de l'application des lois en général . It contains rules such as: Art 5: 'Il est défendu aux juges de prononcer par voie de disposition générale et réglementaire sur les causes qui leur sont soumises'. See also Arts 6-8 of the Austrian ABGB and the famous Art 1 of the Swiss Civil Code (which, in para 3, refers to legal doctrine and case-law).
71. Canaris, op cit n 49 supra , at 47, rightly points out that in this context the concept of 'interpretation' as it is used by the ECJ must be understood as including both interpretation in a strict sense (which remains within the possible meaning of the words in the law) and the further development of the law (he speaks of 'richtlinienkomforme Rechtsfortbildung') in case it contains gaps (interpretation contra legem is forbidden), as they are usually distinguished in Germany and some other Member States.
72. Larenz, op cit n 5 supra , at 429, drew a conceptual distinction between sources that produce law ('Rechtsgeltungsquellen') and sources that merely say what the law is ('Rechtserkenntnisquellen'). The latter category includes, in particular, case-law and scholarly writings. Contrast Canaris (ibid , at 256) who recognises case-law as a Rechtsgeltungsquelle .
73. Rodolfo Sacco's theory of comparative law is based on the idea that, with regard to the same legal question, different 'legal formants' in one legal system can point in different directions (R. Sacco , ' Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law ', (1991) 39 American Journal of Criminal Law 1 , at 1 and 43).
74. Again, we see some Baron von Münchhausen traits.
75. Canaris warns of 'die Verzwergung der Rechtswissenschaft zur Rechtsprechungskunde' (C.-W. Canaris, Karl Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts , Vol II (Beck, 13th edn, 1994), part 2, p vi.
76. Contrast Tamanaha, op cit n 47 supra , at 1270, according to whom judges and legal scholars 'are involved in completely separate and very different practices'.
77. Even though those claims of universality may be very abstract since in practice the findings of, e.g. vulcanologists only really apply to places where there are volcanoes. In the same terms one could even construe a claim with regard to Dutch law as a universal claim, valid for all places having the current Dutch legal system.
78. In the same sense see, e.g. Kramer, op cit n 67 supra , at 71 ('Es gibt bekanntlich, wenn man dies rechtsvergleichend betrachtet, keine universal "gültige", einheitliche juristische methode'). On the link between the method of interpretation and a given legal culture (in time and place), see S. Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England und auf dem Kontinent (Mohr Siebeck, 2001), especially his fourth conclusion: no legal method is a priori superior to another.
79. See Kramer, ibid ; passim O. Lando , ' Some Features of the Law of Contract in the Third Millennium ', (2000) 40 Scandinavian Studies in Law 343 , at 361 .
80. See Larenz, op cit n 5 supra , at 141. This canon goes back to F. K. von Savigny, Juristische Methodenlehre (Köhler Verlag, 1951, at 19.
81. See, e.g. Vogenauer, op cit n 67 supra ; K. Riesenhuber, 'Europäische Methodenlehre - Begriff, Inhalte und Bedeutung', in K. Riesenhuber (ed.), Europäische Methodenlehre; Grundfragen der Methoden des Europäischen Privatrechts (De Gruyter, 2006), at 1.
82. Vogenauer, op cit n 67 supra . The best example of überschießende Umsetzung is the recent reform of the law of obligations in Germany. This Schuldrechtreform was triggered by the obligation to transpose a number of directives concerning consumer protection but extended many of its rules beyond consumer contracts.
83. n the same sense, it seems, E. H. Hondius, Nieuwe methoden van privaatrechtelijke rechtsvinding en rechtsvorming in een Verenigd Europa (KNAW, 2001), who reserves the European legal method ('communautaire rechtsvinding') for Community law-related cases, and probably also Canaris, op cit n 49 supra , who, however, seems to have a less rigid conception of the borderline between the two, eg where he considers a radiating effect ('Ausstrahlungswirkung') of Community law, beyond harmonious interpretation, into the law that is beyond the scope of the directives.
84. On this growing tension, see further M. W. Hesselink , ' The Ideal of Codification and the Dynamics of Europeanisation: The Dutch Experience ', (2006) 12 European Law Journal 279 .
85. Case C-453/99, Courage v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297; Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi [2006] ECR I-6619.
86. C. Von Bar et al (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law; Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR); Interim Outline Edition (Sellier, 2008
87. A More Coherent European Contract Law; An Action Plan , 12 February 2003, COM (2003) 68 final; European Contract Law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward , COM (2004) 651 final.
88. See, e.g. Commissioner Kyprianou's opening address at the conference European Contract Law: Better Lawmaking to the Common Frame of Reference (first European Discussion Forum) (London, 26 September 2005); 'Action Plan', at 80; 'The Way Forward', at 6.
89. Poland, for example, used the concept of good customs. See Art 385(1) of the Polish civil code.
90. Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores [2000] ECR I-4941.
91. Case C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co KG v Ludger Hofstetter and Ulrike Hofstetter [2004] ECR I-3403.
92. Or even as part of a (pluralist) global system. Cf G. Teubner, '"Global Bukowina": Legal Pluralism in the Wold Society', in G. Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth, 1997, at 3
93. J. Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays (Suhrkamp, 1998
94. Contrast Canaris, op cit n 49 supra , at 53, who argues that the Stufenbau theory merely needs to be adapted and that the idea of a pyramid of laws must be further developed into that of a 'double building'.
95. Vogenauer, op cit n 67 supra
96. By the same token, it would be legitimate to propose a globalisation-hostile or -friendly method.
97. C. Joerges , ' The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutional Perspective ', (1997) 3 European Law Journal 378
98. See above
99. See Green Paper on the review of the Consumer Acquis , 08 February 2007, COM(2006) 744.
100. See 'Action Plan' and 'The Way Forward', op cit n 86 supra
101. On the problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz , see J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe; 'Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?' and Other Essays on European Integration (Cambridge University Press, 1999), esp ch 9.
102. And what does this mean? What is the character of Europe's internal market? See, e.g. M. Poiares Maduro, 'Striking the Elusive Balance Between Economic Freedom and Social Rights in the EU', in P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1999), at 449. See also the concept of Europe's 'social market economy' that was introduced by Art 3(3) of the Treaty of Lisbon 2007.
103. See Art 6.
104. Von Bar, op cit n 84 supra , at 15-36
105. C. von Bar, Gemeineuropäisches Deliktsrecht , Vol 1 (Beck, 1996), at 406; Kramer, op cit n 67 supra , at 81 and Hondius, op cit n 81 supra , at 43. Cf also N. Jansen, 'Dogmatik, Erkenntnis und Theorie im europäischen Privatrecht', (2005) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 750, who, however, is more concerned with the development of common European legal concepts and legal doctrines than with the mere convergence of outcomes.
106. Hoge Raad 18 June 1982; Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1983, at 723, note C. J. H. Brunner , (1983) 32 Ars Aequi 758 , note P. Van Schilfgaarde (Plas/Valburg).
107. J. Cartwright and M. W. Hesselink (eds), Precontractual Liability in European Private Law (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
108. Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128.
109. The best example of this method of interpretation is White v Jones [1995] 2 WLR 187, where the House of Lords (Lord Goff of Chieveley) drew on the experience of a number of European jurisdictions, including German and Dutch law, when it had to decide a case concerning third party rights.