The principal-agent approach to EU studies: Apply liberally but handle with care

Comparative European Politics

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 409-413

  Maher, Imelda ^a   Billiet, Stijn ^b   Hodson, Dermot ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

^b University of London ^*  (Belgium)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70449432854     PISSN: 14724790     EISSN: 1740388X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/cep.2008.43     Document Type: Editorial

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