Folk psychology: Science and morals

Folk Psychology Re-Assessed

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 157-173

  Knobe, Joshua ^a  

^a University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70449133380     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-5558-4_9     Document Type: Chapter

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