Why ecology cannot be all things to all people: The "adaptive radiation" of scientific concepts

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 375-389

  Kirkman, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 7044229974     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics19971944     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-than-Human World(New York: Pantheon, 1996). See especially the chapter, "Philosophy on the Way to Ecology," pp. 31-72.
2. David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-than-Human World(New York: Pantheon, 1996). See especially the chapter, "Philosophy on the Way to Ecology," pp. 31-72.
3. Ibid., p. 65.
4. The speculative project is most prominent in the various forms of ecotheology and deep ecology (including, perhaps, the work of Abram), but can also be found in ecofeminism, social ecology, and environmental ethics. Regarding the last of these, see J. Baird Callicott, "The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology," Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 301-16; this article touched off a debate regarding the validity and pertinence of "metaphysical ecology" for environmental ethics. It should be noted that there are environmental philosophers who explicitly reject the speculative project. See, for example, Bryan G. Norton, "Why I am Not a Nonanthropocentrist: Callicott and the Failure of Monistic Inherentism," Environmental Ethics 17 (1995): 341-358; it is one of the latest salvos in the debate which followed from Callicott's paper above.
5. The speculative project is most prominent in the various forms of ecotheology and deep ecology (including, perhaps, the work of Abram), but can also be found in ecofeminism, social ecology, and environmental ethics. Regarding the last of these, see J. Baird Callicott, "The Metaphysical Implications of Ecology," Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 301-16; this article touched off a debate regarding the validity and pertinence of "metaphysical ecology" for environmental ethics. It should be noted that there are environmental philosophers who explicitly reject the speculative project. See, for example, Bryan G. Norton, "Why I am Not a Nonanthropocentrist: Callicott and the Failure of Monistic Inherentism," Environmental Ethics 17 (1995): 341-358; it is one of the latest salvos in the debate which followed from Callicott's paper above.
6. See Abram, "Merleau-Ponty and the Voice of the Earth," Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 106.
7. Donald Worster and Anna Bramwell both offer histories of "ecological ideas" along these lines. In Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Worster does distinguish between two traditions in "ecology," the arcadian and the imperial, but neither of them corresponds unambiguously or exclusively to the science called ecology; he seems to regard them as competing paradigms or ideologies of equal weight and merit. Likewise, in her otherwise excellent Ecology in the 20th Century: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), Bramwell recognizes the rootedness of ecologism in the science of ecology, but gives little or no attention to the later developments of the science. Philosophical examples of this reading of the ecology/ecologism connection are legion. See, for example: Carolyn Merchant, Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 814.
8. Donald Worster and Anna Bramwell both offer histories of "ecological ideas" along these lines. In Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Worster does distinguish between two traditions in "ecology," the arcadian and the imperial, but neither of them corresponds unambiguously or exclusively to the science called ecology; he seems to regard them as competing paradigms or ideologies of equal weight and merit. Likewise, in her otherwise excellent Ecology in the 20th Century: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), Bramwell recognizes the rootedness of ecologism in the science of ecology, but gives little or no attention to the later developments of the science. Philosophical examples of this reading of the ecology/ecologism connection are legion. See, for example: Carolyn Merchant, Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 814.
9. Donald Worster and Anna Bramwell both offer histories of "ecological ideas" along these lines. In Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), Worster does distinguish between two traditions in "ecology," the arcadian and the imperial, but neither of them corresponds unambiguously or exclusively to the science called ecology; he seems to regard them as competing paradigms or ideologies of equal weight and merit. Likewise, in her otherwise excellent Ecology in the 20th Century: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), Bramwell recognizes the rootedness of ecologism in the science of ecology, but gives little or no attention to the later developments of the science. Philosophical examples of this reading of the ecology/ecologism connection are legion. See, for example: Carolyn Merchant, Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 814.
10. This version has its strongest telling in the "universe story" tradition, and is even extended to include evolutionary theory and physics. See Brian Swimme, The Universe is a Green Dragon: A Cosmic Creation Story (Santa Fe: Bear and Company, 1984), and Thomas Berry, The Dream of the Earth (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1988).
11. This version has its strongest telling in the "universe story" tradition, and is even extended to include evolutionary theory and physics. See Brian Swimme, The Universe is a Green Dragon: A Cosmic Creation Story (Santa Fe: Bear and Company, 1984), and Thomas Berry, The Dream of the Earth (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1988).
12. Concerning the alleged degeneracy of ecology as a science, see, for example, Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary," Inquiry 16 (1973): 99; Neil Evernden, The Natural Alien: Humankind and Environment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), pp. 21, 23, and esp. 76.
13. Concerning the alleged degeneracy of ecology as a science, see, for example, Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary," Inquiry 16 (1973): 99; Neil Evernden, The Natural Alien: Humankind and Environment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), pp. 21, 23, and esp. 76.
14. This clarification serves to distinguish my project from others which might seem similar at first glance. For example, in "Fact and Value in Ecological Science," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 99-116, Mark Sagoff seems to be concerned primarily with dictating to ecologists the best way to practice their science, while I am more interested in the practices of environmental philosophers. K. S. Shrader-Frechette and E. D. McCoy, in Method in Ecology: Strategies for Conservation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), are likewise concerned with the proper way to do ecology, especially in relation to the solution of conservation and policy problems; the speculative concerns of environmental philosophers receive only a passing mention in the first chapter (p. 2).
15. This clarification serves to distinguish my project from others which might seem similar at first glance. For example, in "Fact and Value in Ecological Science," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 99-116, Mark Sagoff seems to be concerned primarily with dictating to ecologists the best way to practice their science, while I am more interested in the practices of environmental philosophers. K. S. Shrader-Frechette and E. D. McCoy, in Method in Ecology: Strategies for Conservation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), are likewise concerned with the proper way to do ecology, especially in relation to the solution of conservation and policy problems; the speculative concerns of environmental philosophers receive only a passing mention in the first chapter (p. 2).
16. Inspirations for this model come from a number of sources, not least among which are Gaston Bachelard, La formation de l'esprit scientifique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1993); Georges Canguilhem, Idéologie et rationalité dans l'histoire des sciences de la vie (Paris: J. Vrin, 1993); and the debate concerning Kuhn's theory of "paradigm shifts" recorded in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the exceedingly complex problem of how "testing against experience" is to be carried out - or even whether it is possible. While some understanding of the relationship of theory to experience is needed for any philosophy of science, it should be understood that the model I am proposing for the development of scientific concepts need not presuppose any particular version of confirmation or falsification. In particular, I insist that I should not be construed as defending any sort of naive empiricism against the speculation of some environmental thinkers.
17. Inspirations for this model come from a number of sources, not least among which are Gaston Bachelard, La formation de l'esprit scientifique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1993); Georges Canguilhem, Idéologie et rationalité dans l'histoire des sciences de la vie (Paris: J. Vrin, 1993); and the debate concerning Kuhn's theory of "paradigm shifts" recorded in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the exceedingly complex problem of how "testing against experience" is to be carried out - or even whether it is possible. While some understanding of the relationship of theory to experience is needed for any philosophy of science, it should be understood that the model I am proposing for the development of scientific concepts need not presuppose any particular version of confirmation or falsification. In particular, I insist that I should not be construed as defending any sort of naive empiricism against the speculation of some environmental thinkers.
18. Inspirations for this model come from a number of sources, not least among which are Gaston Bachelard, La formation de l'esprit scientifique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1993); Georges Canguilhem, Idéologie et rationalité dans l'histoire des sciences de la vie (Paris: J. Vrin, 1993); and the debate concerning Kuhn's theory of "paradigm shifts" recorded in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the exceedingly complex problem of how "testing against experience" is to be carried out - or even whether it is possible. While some understanding of the relationship of theory to experience is needed for any philosophy of science, it should be understood that the model I am proposing for the development of scientific concepts need not presuppose any particular version of confirmation or falsification. In particular, I insist that I should not be construed as defending any sort of naive empiricism against the speculation of some environmental thinkers.
19. This analogy is limited, however, in that concepts which are taken from one medium to another can remain viable, but only to the extent that they can be adapted to fit the new context. This involves the development of a new set of meanings which diverge from the old.
20. Regarding confusions over the concepts "community" and "stability" in ecology, see, Shrader-Frechette and McCoy, Method, pp. 11-67. For a broader discussion of metaphors in global ecology, see Daniel B. Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
21. Regarding confusions over the concepts "community" and "stability" in ecology, see, Shrader-Frechette and McCoy, Method, pp. 11-67. For a broader discussion of metaphors in global ecology, see Daniel B. Botkin, Discordant Harmonies: A New Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
22. See Jacques Roger, Les Sciences de la vie dans la pensée française au XVIIIe siècle, 3d ed. (Paris: Albin Michel, 1993), pp. 206-24, 731.
23. François Dagognet, Le vivant (Paris: Bordas, 1988), p. 99 (original translation).
24. Pascal Acot writes of the "secularization" of Linnaeus' concept of "the economy of nature" as a precondition for the emergence of ecology as a science. While Linnaeus offered a general cosmology rooted in natural theology, the first ecologists (e.g., Forbes) studied local systems (e.g., lakes) in the terms offered them by physiology. Histoire de l'écologie (Paris: PUF, 1988), pp. 14-16.
25. Frederick Clements, Research Methods in Ecology (Lincoln, Nebraska: University Publishing Company, 1905), p. 199.
26. Clements, Research Methods, pp. 12, 10.
27. Joel B. Hagen, An Entangled Bank: The Origins of Ecosystem Ecology (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. 23.
28. A. G. Tansley, "The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms," Ecology 16 (1935): 285.
29. H.A. Gleason, "The Individualistic Concept of the Plant Association," Bulletin of the Torrey Botanical Club 53 (1926): 8-9.
30. Hagen, Entangled Bank, p. 28.
31. Gleason, "Individualistic Concept," p. 114.
32. Tansley, "Use and Abuse," p. 285.
33. Ibid., p. 299.
34. See Hagen, Entangled Dank, p. 50.
35. Ibid., p. 144, and also Robert McIntosh, "Pluralism in Ecology," Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 18 (1987): 322.
36. Ibid., p. 144, and also Robert McIntosh, "Pluralism in Ecology," Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 18 (1987): 322.
37. Robert P. McIntosh, The Background of Ecology: Concept and Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 307.
38. Robert E. Park, "The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment," in Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, The City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925), p. I.
39. Roderick D. McKenzie, "The Ecological Approach to the Study of Human Community," in Park et al., The City, pp. 63-65.
40. Ibid., p. 68; see also note on p. 63.
41. Acot, Histoire, p. 174.
42. Abram, "Voice of the Earth," p. 114.
43. Abram, Spell, p. 268.
44. Ibid, pp. 84-85. Abram goes on to argue that alphabetic writing is an important culprit in environmental degradation, in that it stultifies the power of language to evoke the underlying interrelatedness between the speaker and the surrounding world.
45. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage, 1974), pp. 167-69.