Thoughts on military history and the profession of arms

The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 78-92

  Murray, Williamson ^a  

^a INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350732463     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511818943.006     Document Type: Chapter

References (44)

1. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, vol. 3, The Second World War (London, 1988), p. 322.
2. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS, 1992), p. 37.
3. J. P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939 (Manchester, 1995)
4. Robert Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster, The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939 (Hamden, CT, 1985).
5. Holger Herwig, “Clio Deceived, Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War,” International Security, Fall 1987.
6. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won, Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, MA, 2000)
7. Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms, A Global History of the Second World War (Cambridge, 1994).
8. Polybius, Polybius on Roman Imperialism, trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, abridged, Alvin Bernstein (Lake Bluff, IL, 1987), p. 1.
9. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner (New York, 1954), p. 48.
10. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NL 1975), p. 141.
11. Bernard Knox, Backing into the Euture: The Classical Tradition and Its Renewal (New York, 1994), pp. 11-12.
12. James McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom, The Civil War Era (Oxford, 1988)
13. Fred Anderson’s Crucible of War, The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1954-1966 (New York, 2000)
14. Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two Wars (Oxford, 1980)
15. British military in The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939, The Path to Ruin (Princeton, NJ, 1984), chap. 2.
16. Michael Howard, “The Liddell Hart Memoirs,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, February 1966, p. 61.
17. Williamson Murray, “Clausewitz Out, Computers In, Military Culture and Technological Hubris,” The National Interest, Summer 1997
18. “Preparing to Lose the Next War,” Strategic Review, Spring 1998
19. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, p. 48.
20. Lewis Namier, In the Nazi Era (New York, 1952), p. 162.
21. Clausewitz, On War, p. 115.
22. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (Toronto, 1931), p. 6.
23. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, Erance, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY, 1984)
24. Williamson Murray, “Armored Warfare,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge, 1996).
25. Timothy Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine, The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War (Leavenworth, KS, 1981).
26. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS, 1992)
27. Jeffrey Gunsburg, Divided and Conquered, The French High Command and the Defeat in the West, 1940 (Westport, CT, 1979)
28. R. J. Young, In Command of France, French Foreign Policy and Military Planning (Cambridge, MA, 1978)
29. Martin Alexander, The Republic in Danger, General Maurice Gamelin and Politics of French Defence, 1933-1940 (Cambridge, 2003).
30. David Lloyd George, Memoirs, vol. 6 (London, 1936), p. 3497.
31. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 404-5.
32. MacGregor Knox, “What History Can Tell Us About the ‘New Strategic Environment,” in Williamson Murray, ed., Brassey’s American Defense Annual, The United States and the Emerging Strategic Environment (Washington, DC, 1995), p. 1.
33. Michael Howard, “The Uses and Abuses of Military History,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, February 1962.
34. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 87-8.
35. Clausewitz, On War, p. 80.
36. H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies They Told (New York, 2003).
37. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York, 1997), p. 364.
38. Colonel Andy Milani, “Pitfalls of Technology: A Case Study of the Battle on Takur Ghar Mountain, Afghanistan,” unpublished paper, U.S. Army War College, April 2003, p. 42.
39. Clauseweitz, On War, p. 113.
40. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security, Winter 1992/1993, p. 61.
41. Clausewitz, On War, p. 119.
42. Barry Watts, “Friction in Future War,” in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Brassey’s Mershon American Defense Annual, 1996-1997 (Washington, DC, 1997), p. 66.
43. Clausewitz, On War, p. 94.
44. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 592-3.