Separating equilibria in public auctions

B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2009, Pages

  Gavious, Arieh ^a  

^a BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

Author keywords

Auctions; Private information; Selling mechanisms; Separating equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350578922     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19351682     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2183     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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