Privacy-enhancing auctions using rational cryptography

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5677 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 541-558

  Miltersen, Peter Bro ^a   Nielsen, Jesper Buus ^a   Triandopoulos, Nikos ^b  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

^b BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTHENTICATED CHANNEL; CRYPTOGRAPHIC ASSUMPTIONS; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS; EXPECTED UTILITY; LARGE CLASS; MULTI-ITEM; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; PRIVACY CONCERNS; UTILITY MODEL;

COMMERCE;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 70350342512     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_32     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (21)

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