The motive of duty and the nature of emotions: Kantian reflections on moral worth

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 183-202

  Weber, Michael ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350271062     PISSN: 00455091     EISSN: 19110820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2003.10716540     Document Type: Review

References (21)

1. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, H.J. Paton, trans. (New York: Harper and Row 1964)
2. Barbara Herman, 'On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty,' in her The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1993), 1-22.
3. Noa Latham, 'Causally Irrelevant Reasons and Actions Solely from the Motive of Duty,' Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994) 599-618,
4. Nancy Sherman, 'The Place of Emotions in Kantian Morality,' in O. Flanagan and A. Rorty, eds., Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1993) 149-70;
5. Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995);
6. Allen Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999).
7. Paul Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 337-44,
8. Justin Oakley, 'A Critique of Kantian Arguments Against Emotions as Moral Motives,' History of Philosophy Quarterly 7 (1990) 441-59,
9. Samuel Scheffler, Human Morality (New York: Oxford University Press 1992)
10. David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987)
11. Gregory Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1986).
12. Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press 1992),
13. Michael Stocker, Valuing Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996),
14. Jonathan Bennett, 'The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn,' Philosophy 49 (1974) 123-43
15. (Doctrine of Virtue, 6:4570).
16. Daniel Jacobson, 'In Praise of Immoral Art,' Philosophical Topics 25 (1997) 155-99.
17. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, 'The Moralistic Fallacy: On the "Appropriateness" of Emotions,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000) 65-90.
18. Rudiger Bittner, 'Is it Reasonable to Regret Things One Did?' Journal of Philosophy 89 (1992) 262-73,
19. Susan Wolf, 'Moral Saints,' Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982) 419-39,
20. Holly Smith, 'Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit,' Ethics 101 (1991) 279-303
21. Kelly Sorensen, 'Kant's Taxonomy of the Emotions,' forthcoming in Kant Studies,