Estimation of competitive conduct when firms are efficiently colluding: Addressing the Corts critique

Applied Economics Letters

Volumn 16, Issue 15, 2009, Pages 1497-1500

  Puller, Steven L ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPETITIVENESS; ECONOMETRICS; ECONOMIC THEORY; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; ESTIMATION METHOD; INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION; MODEL; OLIGOPOLY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 70350140035     PISSN: 13504851     EISSN: 14664291     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13504850701578900     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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2. Clay, K. and Troesken, W. (1999) Further tests of static oligopoly models: whiskey, 1882-1888, Journal of Industrial Economics.
3. Genesove, D. and Mullin, W. P. (1998) Testing static oligopoly models: conduct and cost in the sugar industry, 1890-1914, RAND Journal of Economics.
4. Green, E. J. and Porter, R. H. (1984) Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information, Econometrica.
5. Haltiwanger, J. and Harrington, J. E. (1991) The Impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior, RAND Journal of Economics.
6. Kim, D. and Knittel, C. R. (2006) Biases in static oligopoly models?: evidence from the california electricity market, Journal of Industrial Economics.
7. Rotemberg, J. J. and Saloner, G. A. (1986) Supergame-theoretic model of price wars during booms, American Economic Review.
8. Staiger, R. W. and Wolak, F. A. (1992) Collusive pricing with capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty, RAND Journal of Economics.
9. Wolfram, C. D. (1999) Measuring duopoly power in the british electricity spot market, American Economic Review.