An optimal mechanism for sponsored search auctions on the web and comparison with other mechanisms

IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 641-657

  Garg, Dinesh ^a   Narahari, Y ^b  

^a IBM INDIA RESEARCH LAB   (India)

^b INDIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (India)

Author keywords

Bayesian incentive compatibility; Dominant strategy incentive compatibility; Generalized second price (GSP) mechanism; Individual rationality; Mechanism design; Optimal mechanism; Revenue equivalence theorem; Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanism

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; DOMINANT STRATEGY INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; GENERALIZED SECOND PRICE (GSP) MECHANISM; INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY; MECHANISM DESIGN; OPTIMAL MECHANISM; REVENUE EQUIVALENCE THEOREM; VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES (VCG) MECHANISM;

BAYESIAN NETWORKS; COMMERCE; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; INFORMATION RETRIEVAL; OPTIMIZATION; SEARCH ENGINES; WORLD WIDE WEB;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 70350031144     PISSN: 15455955     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TASE.2009.2021975     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. C. Seda, Search Engine Advertising: Buying Your Way to the Top to Increase Sale (Voices That Matter). New York: New Riders Press, Feb. 2004.
2. D. L. Hoffman and T. P. Novak, , B. Kahin and H. R. Varian, Eds., "Advertising pricing models for the world wide web, " in Internet Publishing and Beyond: The Economics of Digital Information and Intellectual Property. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000.
3. R. Adams, Advertising and Marketing on the World Wide Web (Design Directories). New York: Watson-Guptill Publications, Mar. 2003. [Online]. Available: www.Advertising
4. R. L. Zeff, Advertising on the Internet.. New York: Wiley, Aug. 1999.
5. B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwarz, "Internet advertising and the generalized second price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords., " American Economic Review 2007.
6. S. Lahaie, "An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search, " in Proc. 7th ACM Conf. Electron. Commerce (EC'06), Ann Arbor, MI, Jun. 11-15, 2006, pp. 218-1217
7. J. Feng, "Optimal mechanism for selling a set of commonly ranked objects, " Marketing Science, 2007, to appear.
8. J. Feng, Z. Shen, and R. Zhan, "Ranked items auctions and online advertisement, " Production and Operations Manage., vol.16, no.4, pp. 510-522, 2007.
9. J. Feng, H. Bhargava, and D. Pennock, "Comparison of allocation rules for paid placement advertising in search engines, " in Proc. 5th Int. Conf. Electron. Commerce (ICEC'03), Pittsburgh, PA, 2003.
10. J. Feng, H. Bhargava, and D. Pennock, "Implementing sponsored search in web search engines: Computational evaluation of alternative mechanisms, " INFORMS J. Computing, pp. 137-148, Winter 2007.
11. H. R. Varian, "Position auctions, " Int. J. Industrial Organization, 2007, to appear.
12. L. Shapley and M. Shubik, "The assignment game I: The core, " Int. J. Game Theory, vol.1, pp. 111-130, 1972.
13. G. Demange, G. D., and M. Sotomayor, "Multi-item auctions, " J. Political Economy, vol.94, no.4, pp. 863-872, 1986.
14. A. Roth and M. Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching.. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990.
15. G. Aggarwal, A. Goel, and R. Motwani, "Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords, " in Proc. 7th ACM Conf. Electron. Commerce (EC'06), Ann Arbor, MI, Jun. 2006, pp. 1-7.
16. H. K. Bhargava and J. Feng, "Paid placement strategies for internet search engines, " in Proc. 11th Int. Conf. World Wide Web, 2002, pp. 117-123.
17. C. Borgs, J. Chayes, N. Immorlica, M. Mahdian, and A. Saberi, "Multi- unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders, " in Proc. 6th ACM Conf. Electron. Commerce (EC'05), 2005, pp. 44-51.
18. G. Aggarwal and J. D. Hartline, "Knapsack auctions, " in Proc. ACM Symp. Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2006), 2006, pp. 1083-1092.
19. A. Mehta, A. Saberi, and V. V. Vazirani, "Adwords and generalized online matching, " in Proc. 46th Annu. IEEE Symp. Foundations of Comput. Sci. (FOCS'05), Pittsburgh, PA, 2005, pp. 264-273.
20. M. F. Balcan, A. Blum, J. D. Hartline, and Y. Mansour, "Sponsored search auction design via machine learning, " in Proc. 1st Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions in Conjunction With the ACM Conf. Electron. Commerce (EC'05), Vancouver, BC, Canada, 2005.
21. R. B.Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict.. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997.
22. N. Immorlica, K. Jain, M. Mahdian, and K. Talwar, "Click fraud resistant methods for learning click-through rates, " in Proc. 1st Int. Workshop on Internet and Network Econom. (WINE'05), Hong Kong, Dec. 2005.
23. A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green, Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995.
24. D. Garg, Y. Narahari, and S. Gujar, "Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial, " Sadhana, 2008, to appear.
25. R. B. Myerson, "Optimal auction design, " Math. Operations Res., vol.6, no.1, pp. 58-73, Feb. 1981.
26. P. R. McAfee and J. McMillan, "Auctions and bidding, " J. Econom. Literature, vol.25, no.2, pp. 699-738, Jun. 1987.
27. P. R. Milgrom and R. R. Weber, "A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, " Econometrica, vol.50, no.5, pp. 1089-1122, Sep. 1982.