Responsible Belief and Our Social Institutions

Philosophy

Volumn 84, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 47-73

  Van Woudenberg, Ren ^a  

^a VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350007165     PISSN: 00318191     EISSN: 1469817X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0031819109000035     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. William P. Alston, Beyond Justification', Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005): 60
2. in Steven J, Wagner & Richard Warner (eds,), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal (Notre Dame: UNDP, 1993): 147-162
3. Cf. Mairi Levitt, R, Chadwick and D. Shickle (eds.) 1997. The Right to Know and the Right not to Know, (Avebury: Aldershot)
4. This paragraph is inspired by Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Obligation, Entitlement, and Rationality", in: Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005)
5. And let us suppose that the belief and the action are related in the appropriate way-whatever that may turn out to be. In the present context we can think, with Alvin Goldman, of ignorance as "The absence of true belief" (see his Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999: 5), Within this broad description of ignorance, however, falls a rather rich diversity of phenomena. See for this Rene van Woudenberg, "Excusing Conditions for False Beliefs: Ignorance and Force" (forthcoming in American Philosophical Quarterly). This objection was posed by a referee for this journal. Fred Dretske, "Epistemic Operators", Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970): 1003-1013