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2
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25844508667
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Concepts
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E. Craig (ed.) London: Routledge
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G. Rev, 'Concepts', in E. Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998) Vol. 2, 505
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(1998)
The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
, vol.2
, pp. 505
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Rev, G.1
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3
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60349125357
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The ontology of concepts: Are concepts abstract objects or mental representations?
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S. Laurence and E. Margoiis, 'The Ontology of Concepts: Are Concepts Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?', Nous 41 (2007), 561
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(2007)
Nous
, vol.41
, pp. 561
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Laurence, S.1
Margoiis, E.2
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4
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60949288622
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Something else, surely
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7,05.2004
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Quoted in T. Crane, 'Something Else, Surely', Times Literary Supple,me,nt (7,05.2004), 4
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Times Literary Supple,me,nt
, pp. 4
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Crane, T.1
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8
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79957164678
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Der Gedanke
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Oxford: Blackwell
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see Grundlagen der Arithmetik; English translation The Foundations of Arithmetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), X; 'Der Gedanke', in M. Beaney (ed.), The Frege Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), original pagination 66-7
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(1997)
The Frege Reader
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Beaney, M.1
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9
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0002832820
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Uber Sinn und Bedeutung
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G. Frege, 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung', in Beaney, op, cit. note 11, original pagination 29-30
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Beaney
, pp. 29-30
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Frege, G.1
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11
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0001828291
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Concepts and Cognitive Science
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Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books/MIT Press l
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S. Laurence and E. Margolis, 'Concepts and Cognitive Science', in Concepts: Core Readings (Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books/MIT Press), 7, l Fodor, Concepts.op. cit. note 7, 28; my emphasis. Concepts.,.op. cit. note 7, 20-1. This passage disregards the fact that for Frege a concept is not the sense or mode of presentation expressed by a predicate. As mentioned above, this does not matter in the present context. The underlying question is whether whatever distinguishes co-extensional predicates and determines the contents of prepositional attitudes is 'ipso facto in the head' as Fodor contends (1998: 15). Prima facie more threatening to my reading of Fodor's passage is the fact that it identifies a concept not with an MOP simpliciter, but with 'an MOP together with a content'. Nevertheless the passage directly concerns the shareability of concepts. Contents are ipso facto shareable by Fodor's lights; his task is therefore to show against Frege that MOPs are as well, in spite of being mental rather than abstract
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Concepts: Core Readings
, pp. 7
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Laurence, S.1
Margolis, E.2
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14
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79957083188
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Propositions
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Cambridge, Mass.: MI Press
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Consistency cannot be restored by pleading that the first claim refers to concept-tokens and the second to concept-types. For sign-types are not the contents or meanings of sign-tokens. The token 'dog', for instance, does not mean or express the sign type 'dog', it instantiates that type. What could mean the sign type are signs like '"dog"' or 'the word "dog"'. Like many contemporaries, Fodor equates meaning and content, e.g. when he describes believing that/) as standing in a computational relation to a mental representation that 'means that' p. In my view, this equation is untenable. A proposition, prepositional content or thought is something that is or could be said or believed-a sayable or thinkable. It is something expressed or conveyed by the use of a sentence, not the meaning of a sentence. Unlike the meaning of a sentence, what is said (believed, etc.) can be true or false, implausible or exaggerated (R. Cartwright, 'Propositions', in his Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: MI Press, 1987), 33-53
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(1987)
Philosophical Essays
, pp. 33-53
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Cartwright, R.1
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15
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28144444504
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London: Macmillan
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A. White, Truth (London: Macmillan, 1970), 14
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(1970)
Truth
, pp. 14
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White, A.1
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16
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84921969585
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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W. Kiinne, Conceptions of Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 368-72). Furthermore, far from being identical with sentence-meanings, what is said on a particular occasion depends on sentence-meaning and context of utterance. In the present context, however, the difference can be ignored. The important point is that concepts are situated not at the level of signs but at the level of what signs mean or have as content when they are used. 'Concepts.op. cit. note 7, 29; see 7
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(2003)
Conceptions of Truth
, pp. 368-372
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Kiinne, W.1
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19
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84923552734
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Neural Representationalism
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Contrary to H-J, Glock, 'Neural Representationalism', Facta Philosophica 5 (2003), 105-29
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(2003)
Facta Philosophica
, vol.5
, pp. 105-129
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Glock, H.-J.1
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20
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79957420687
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Properties in Abundance
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P. F. Strawson and A. Chakrabarti (eds.) Aldershot: Ashgate
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At the same time, the Fregean position preserves a connection between concepts and representation. Concepts are neither symbols nor subjective representations of a different (e.g. iconic) kind, but they are 'modes of presentation', i.e. ways in which different subjects can think of something. This opens up the possibility of treating concepts both as things represented-namely things expressed by concept-words-and as representations- namely ways of presenting properties (see W. Kiinne, 'Properties in Abundance', in P. F. Strawson and A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Universah, Concepts and Qualities (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 263-6. My criticism of RTM does not rule out this option. Alas, it is difficult to spell out, especially if one seeks to avoid both the Scylla of subjectivism and the Charybdis of Platonist myths about a 'third realm'
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(2006)
Universah, Concepts and Qualities
, pp. 263-266
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Kiinne, W.1
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