Education, corruption, and the distribution of income

Journal of Economic Growth

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 205-231

  Eicher, Theo ^a   García Pẽalosa, Cecilia ^b   Ypersele, Tanguy ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

Corruption; Economic development; Education; Inequality

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349874783     PISSN: 13814338     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10887-009-9043-0     Document Type: Article

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