A systemic analysis of the Edge Hill railway accident

Accident Analysis and Prevention

Volumn 41, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 1133-1144

  Santos Reyes, Jaime ^a   Beard, Alan N ^b  

^a SEPI ESIME   (Mexico)

^b HERIOT WATT UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Accident; Causal factor; Communication; Failure; Systemic

Indexed keywords

A PLANTS; CAUSAL FACTOR; CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION; ENGLAND; FAILURE; MAINTENANCE WORK; SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS; STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION; SYSTEMIC; SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS; SYSTEMIC FAILURE;

LARGE SCALE SYSTEMS; RAILROADS;

RAILROAD ACCIDENTS;

ARTICLE; HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH; HUMAN; MANAGEMENT; OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENT; POLICY; RAILWAY; SAFETY;

ACCIDENTS, OCCUPATIONAL; HUMANS; MANAGEMENT AUDIT; ORGANIZATIONAL CASE STUDIES; ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY; RAILROADS; SAFETY MANAGEMENT;

EID: 70349766518     PISSN: 00014575     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.aap.2008.05.004     Document Type: Article

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