Justice for the disabled: A contractualist approach

Journal of Social Philosophy

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 17-36

  Hartley, Christie ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 70349599055     PISSN: 00472786     EISSN: 14679833     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2009.01436.x     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Beyond the Social Contract: Toward Global Justice," in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 24, ed. Grethe B. Peterson (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2004), 413-507;
2. Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006);
3. Eva Feder Kittay, Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency (NewYork: Routledge, 1999);
4. Eva Feder Kittay, "When Caring Is Just and Justice Is Caring: Justice and Mental Retardation," Public Culture 13 (2001): 557-79.
5. John Rawls's works will be abbreviated: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) (hereinafter JF);
6. "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," The Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 515-72 (hereinafter KC);
7. Political Liberalism, paperback ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) (hereinafter PL);
8. and A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) (hereinafter TJ).
9. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 22.
10. On the distinction between contractualism and contractarianism, see Stephen Darwall's introduction to Contractarianism/Contractualism, ed. Stephen Darwall (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 1-8;
11. and Ann Cudd, "Contractarianism," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2007 ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta .
12. Often what agents can bring to the initial bargaining position is subject to the Lockean proviso. On Gauthier's interpretation, "the proviso prohibits bettering one's situation through interaction that worsens the situation of another." See David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 205.
13. Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals," in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, intro. Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Ak. 433.
14. T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 194.
15. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 54, 57-62, 103. In her critique of social contract theory, Nussbaum's main targets are contractarians. She stresses that her criticisms of social contract theory do not apply to Scanlon's contractualism (ibid., 13, 67-68). And, she says that it is possible that a contractualist theory of justice similar to Scanlon's ethical theory or Barry's political theory may be acceptable, if a conception of the person can be developed that does not make human dignity depend on Kantian rationality (ibid., 145-54).
16. Compare with Nussbaum's view, "justice makes sense wherever human beings are around. Human beings want to live together, and they want to live together well, which they understand to include living in accordance with justice. They do not have to be similarly situated in order for such issues to arise ⋯" (Frontiers of Justice, 86).
17. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992);
18. Kittay, Love's Labor.
19. Norman Daniels, "Democratic Equality: Rawls's Complex Egalitarianism," in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 241-76;
20. Norman Daniels, Justice and Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 210-18;
21. and Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 42-49.
22. Daniels, "Rawls's Complex Egalitarianism," 257.
23. Thomas Pogge, "Can the Capability Approach Be Justified?" Philosophical Topics 30 (2002): 167-228, at 182.
24. There are numerous essays on the proper metric of justice; some more recent works include Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns, eds., Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming);
25. Eric Nelson, "From Primary Goods to Capabilities: Distributive Justice and the Problem of Neutrality," Political Theory 36 (2008): 93-122;
26. and Ingrid Robeyns, "Justice as Fairness and the Capability Approach," in Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen, Volume I: Ethics, Welfare and Measurement, ed. Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
27. Anita Silvers, "Formal Justice," in Disability, Difference, Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in Bioethics and Public Policy, ed. Anita Silvers, David Wasserman, and Mary Mahowald (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998): 13-145.
28. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 requires that certain employers make reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities unless the accommodations would be an "undue hardship" on the business. The text of The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 is available at http://www.ada.gov/pubs/ada.htm (accessed September 14, 2008).
29. Cynthia Stark, "How to Include the Severely Disabled in a Contractarian Theory of Justice," Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2007): 127-45, at 141.
30. I more fully develop this argument in "An Inclusive Contractualism: Obligations to the Mentally Disabled," in Disability and Disadvantage: Re-examining Topics in Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. Kimberley Brownlee and Adam Cureton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
31. Anita Silvers and Leslie Pickering Francis, "Justice through Trust: Disability and the 'Outlier Problem' in Social Contract Theory," Ethics 116 (2005): 40-76, at 69.
32. See Stephen Darwall's discussion of recognition respect in his The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 119-47.
33. Sophia Wong, "The Moral Personhood of Individuals Labeled 'Mentally Retarded': A Rawlsian Response to Nussbaum," Social Theory and Practice 33 (2007): 579-94.
34. Stark, "How to Include the Severely Disabled," 131.
35. Henry S. Richardson, "Rawlsian Social-Contract Theory and the Severely Disabled," The Journal of Ethics 10 (2006): 419-62.