Out of the shadows: Preventive detention, suspected terrorists, and war

California Law Review

Volumn 97, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 693-750

  Cole, David ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER   (United States)

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EID: 70349568383     PISSN: 00081221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (313)

1. 1For reviews of other nations' preventive-detention regimes, see, for example, law Library of Congress, Directorate of Legal Research, LL File No. 2005-01606, Preventive Detention: Australia, France, Germany, India, Israel, and the United Kingdom (2005);
2. Preventive Detention and Security Law (Andrew Harding and John Hatcherd eds., 1993);
3. John Ip, Comparative Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist Suspects, 16 Transnat'l L. and Contemp. Probs. 773 (2007) (comparing the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand).
4. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith and Neal Katyal, The Terrorists' Court, N. Y. Times, July 11, 2007, at A19;
5. Stephanie Cooper Blum, Preventive Detention in the War on Terror: A Comparison of How the United States, Britain, and Israel Detain and Incapacitate Terrorist Suspects, 4 Homeland Security Aff., Oct. 2008, at 13 (stating that the United States "attest[s it] need[s] preventive detention when evidence is classified or inadmissible-or when [it does] not want to compromise methods and sources"), http://www.hsaj.org/?fulIarticle=4.3.1;
6. cf. Ben Wittes, Law and the Long War 151-82 (2008) (arguing that Congress should authorize preventive detention of al Qaeda terrorists); Stuart Taylor Jr., Opening Argument: Terrorism Suspects and the Law, Nat'l I., May 12, 2007, available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj-20070512-4.php;
7. Stuart Taylor Jr., Al Qaeda Detainees: Don't Prosecute, Don't Release, Atlantic, Apr. 30, 2002, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/ taylor2002-04-30.htm;
8. Michael Chertoff, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec, The Battle for Our Future: Remarks by Secretary Chertoff at Westminster College, (Oct. 17, 2007) (discussing the difficulty of dealing with suspected terrorists under current laws), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp-1193063865526.shtm.
9. See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, After Guantanamo, Huffington Post, May 5, 2008 (arguing that preventive detention would be a "massive loophole to our basic due process rights⋯ worse than the Guantanamo problem"), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/05/05/usint18752-txt.htm.
10. See, e.g., Nepal: Terror Law Likely to Boost 'Disappearances', Hum. Rts. News, Oct. 26, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/10/26/nepal9562.htm;
11. see also Ip, supra note 1, at 773 (discussing preventive-detention regimes and reactions to them in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand).
12. For an account of these detentions, see David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism 22-46, 88-128 (2005).
13. See id. at xx-xxiii, 25-26.
14. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 § 312, 8 U. S. C. § 1226a (a) (2006).
15. See Cole, supra note 5.
16. See Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as CriminalJustice, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1429 (2001).
17. I am indebted to Alec Walen for this insight.
18. See Alec D. Walen, Crossing a Moral Line: Long-Term Preventive Detention in the War on Terror, 28 Phil. and Pub. Pol'y Q. 15 (2008).
19. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 529 (2004) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739 (1987)).
20. Robert K. Goldman and Brian D. Tittemore, Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, ASIL Task Force on Terrorism Papers (Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law) Task Force on Terrorism, Dec. 2002, at 2, available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman. pdf.
21. Hamdi, 542 U. S. at 51719.
22. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (addressing whether enemy-combatant authority extended to a foreign national lawfully residing in the United States, who allegedly was associated with al Qaeda and had come to the United States to commit terrorist acts), vacated as moot, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 2009 WL 564940 (Mar. 6, 2009).
23. See Cole, supra note 5, at xx-xxiii, 25-26.
24. Hamdi, 542 U. S. at 517-19.
25. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71, 84-88 (1992).
26. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. § 3142 (d) (2) (2006).
27. See 8 C. F. R. § 236 (2008).
28. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678 (2001) (holding that foreign nationals ordered deported who cannot in fact be removed must be released from custody).
29. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739 (1987) (upholding preventive detention pending criminal trial where government shows by "clear and convincing evidence" that defendant poses a danger to the community if released).
30. See 18 U. S. C. § 3144 (2006).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346 (1997);
34. Vamer v. Monohan, 460 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2006);
35. see also David J. Gottlieb, Essay, Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders, 50 Kan. L. Rev. 1031 (2002);
36. Meagan Kelly, Note, Lock Them Up-And Throw Away the Key: The Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders in the United States and Germany, 39 Geo. J. Int'l L. 551 (2008).
37. See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U. S. 407 (2002).
38. Id. at 357.
39. 542 U. S. 507, 517 (2004).
40. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U. S. T. 3316, 75 U. N. T. S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
41. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Military Tribunals and Presidential Power (2005).
42. 50 U. S. C.§21 (2000).
43. Id.
44. 8 U. S. C. § 1226a (a) (2006).
45. Id.
46. Id. The INA's antiterrorism provisions include persons who are mere members of designated "terrorist organizations, " persons who have supported only the lawful activities of such organizations, and persons who have used, or threatened to use, any weapon with intent to endanger person or property, regardless of whether the activity has any connection to terrorism as it is generally understood. See 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a) (3) (B) (i) (V), (iii) (V) (b) (2006).
47. 8 U. S. C. § 1226a (a) (2006).
48. U. S. Const, art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
49. See, e.g., David Cole, Terror Financing, Guilt by Association and the Paradigm oj Prevention in the 'War on Terror', in Counterterrorism: Democracy's Challenge (Andrea Bianchi and Alexis Keller eds., 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfin? abstract-id=1262792;
50. Michael E. Deutsch and Erica Thompson, Secrets and Lies: The Persecution of Muhammad Salah (Parti), 37 J. Palestine Stud. 38, 41 (2008).
51. See Robert M. Chesney, Federal Prosecution of Terrorism-Related Offenses: Conviction and Sentencing Data in Light of the "Soft-Sentence" and "Data-Reliability" Critiques, 11 Lewis and Clark L. Rev. 851, 855 (2007) (observing that "the statute does not require any showing of personal dangerousness on the part of the defendant; in the paradigmatic case, the defendant provides money, equipment, or services to other individuals");
52. see also 18 U. S. C § 2339a (b) (l) (2006) (broadly defining material support to mean "any property, tangible or intangible, or service").
53. See Cole, supra note 5, at 25-26.
54. See U. S. Dep't of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., The September ii Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September i i Attacks (2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/detainees.pdf[hereinafter OIG Report].
55. See id. at 78-80.
56. See Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-2307 (JG), 2006 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 39170 (E. D. N. Y. June 14, 2006) (describing extended INS detention of Arab and Muslim foreign nationals to whom judges had granted "voluntary departure").
57. See OIG Report, supra note 41, at 78-80.
58. See David Cole and Jules Lobel, Are We Safer?, L. A. Times, Nov. 18, 2007, at M4;
59. see also Cole, supra note 5, at xx-xxiii, 25-26.
60. Human Rights Watch, Witness to Abuse 1 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0605/.
61. Id. at 2.
62. See 18 U. S. C § 3144 (2006).
63. See United States v. Al-Hussayen, No. CR03-048-C-EJL, 2004 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 29793 (D. Idaho Apr. 7, 2004).
64. See Gretel C. Kovach, Five Convicted in Terror Financing Trial, N. Y. Times, Nov. 24, 2008, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.eom/2008/l l/25/us/25charity.html?hp. A previous trial had concluded in acquittal of one man and hung jury on all other counts.
65. See David Cole, Anti-Terrorism on Trial, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 2007, at A19, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/ 23/AR2007102301805.html.
66. See United States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N. D. 111. 2005).
67. 18 U. S. C. § 2339B (2006);
68. see David Cole and Jules Lobel, Less Safe, Less Free 109-16 (2007).
69. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2007), amended by 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that material-support statute violates due process because it fails to require proof of specific intent to further a group's illegal activities).
70. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 221 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing the government's argument that either the AUMF or the President's inherent constitutional powers permit detention), vacated as moot, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 2009 WL 564940 (Mar. 6, 2009).
71. See Forsaken at Guantanamo, N. Y. Times, Mar. 12, 2003, at A24, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C02E1DF153EF931 A25750C0A9659C8B63&S cp=1.
72. See Philippe Sands, Torture Team (2008) (recounting coercive interrogation policy implemented at Guantanamo);
73. Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo, N. Y. Times, Nov. 30, 2004, at Al, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html? res=9C03ElDE113EF933A05752ClA9629C8B63;
74. Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U. S. Official, Wash. Post, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1 (reporting that Susan Crawford, top administration official in charge of Guantanamo war-crimes prosecutions, concluded that a Guantánamo detainee, Mohammed al-Qahtani had been tortured), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR2009011303372. html? hpid=topnews.
75. Ken Ballen and Peter Bergen, The Worst of the Worst?, Foreign Pol'y, Oct. 2008, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story-id=4535 (quoting Donald Rumsfeld).
76. See Office of Assistant Sec'y of Def., U. S. Dep't of Def., News Release No. 1017-08, Detainee Transfer Announced (2008) (reporting that 525 detainees had been transferred or released), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ releases/release.aspx? releaseid= 12449;
77. David Bowker and David Kaye, Guantanamo by the Numbers, N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2007, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/l 1/10/opinion/10kayeintro.html.
78. See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., RELEASED GUANTANAMO DETAINEES AND THE Department Of Defense: Propaganda by the Numbers? 2, 9-15 (2009), available at http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/propagandajiumbers-1 1509.pdf (showing vast inconsistencies in numbers Pentagon has reported as having returned to battle upon release from custody);
79. David Morgan, Pentagon: 61 Ex-Guantdnamo Inmates Return to Terrorism, REUTERS, Jan. 13, 2009;
80. see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Later Terror Link Cited for 1 in 7 Freed Detainees, N. Y. TIMES, May 21, 2009, at A1 (reporting on an undisclosed Pentagon report indicating that 74 released Guantánamo detainees had engaged in terrorist or militant activities, but noting that the report declines to identify most of the detainees, alleges only associations with respect to others, and that most of its allegations could not be independently verified);
81. cf. Shayana Kadidal, The Myth of Return to the Battlefield from Guantanamo, HUFFINGTON POST, May 21, 2009, available at http://www. huffingtonpost.com/shayana-kadidal/the-mth-of-return-to-the-b-206603.html (critiquing Bumiller's report).
82. 145 Cong. Rec. 924 (1999) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
83. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 690 (2001).
84. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 301 (2001) ("At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest." (footnote omitted));
85. *297 (citations and footnote omitted).
86. Zadvydas, 533 U. S. at 690.
87. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 755 (1987) (finding the Bail Reform Act constitutional because it authorizes pretrial detention based on danger to the community and acknowledging bail's traditional use against flight);
88. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 541 (1952) (holding executive could detain violent immigrants pending the outcome of deportation proceedings).
89. Zadvydas, 533 U. S. at 690;
90. see, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U. S. 407, 411 (2002);
91. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 358 (1997).
92. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 518 (2004);
93. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 (1948).
94. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 920 (1982) (civil liability for group membership requires a showing of an individual intent to further illegal aims of the group);
95. United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 264-65 (1967) (finding unconstitutional a statute because it: "quite literally establishes guilt by association alone, without any need to establish that an individual's association poses the threat feared by the Government in proscribing it");
96. Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 224-25 (1961) (due process requires showing of individual culpability for criminal sanction).
97. United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739 (1987).
98. Id. at 741.
99. Id.; see also id. at 750-52.
100. Id. at 747. A detention may be deemed impermissibly punitive not only if it has a punitive motive, but also if, even if properly motivated, it is excessive in character. Id.
101. Id. at 752.
102. United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 751-52 (1987).
103. Id. at 752.
104. Id. at 751-52.
105. Analogous reasoning supports preventive detention of foreign nationals charged with deportation pending the outcome of their proceedings, provided they pose a risk of flight or a danger to the community. See David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 Emory L. J. 1003, 1029 (2002);
106. see, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 690-91 (2001).
107. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U. S. 407, 411 (2002)
108. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U. S. 346, 358 (1997)).
109. Id. at 412 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U. S. at 372-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). To the same effect, the Crane Court stated that this requirement was designed "to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case." Id. at 413. Similarly, in Hendricks, the Court explained that the requirement of a harm-threatening mental illness "serve[s] to limit involuntary civil commitment to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control." Hendricks, 521 U. S. at 358.
110. 504 U. S. 71, 83 (1992).
111. The Bush administration made just that argument to justify detention of asylum seekers arriving from Haiti, contending not that any particular individual had to be detained to guard against the risk of flight or danger to the community, but that the detention of all Haitian asylum seekers would deter Haitians from coming to the United States to seek asylum. D-J-, Resp't, 23 I. and N. Dec. 572, 577 (Att'y Gen 2003) (interim decision). 81. Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code), U. S. War Dep't General Orders No. ioo, § 3, art. 57 (1863) ("So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier's oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or offenses."), available at http://www.icrc.0rg/ihl.nsf/FULL/l 10?OpenDocument.
112. 542 U. S. 507, 510-13 (2004).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 527-28.
115. See id. at 519.
116. Id. at 529-37.
117. Id. at 533.
118. See id. at 523.
119. U. S. Const, amend. IV;
120. see. e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925).
121. The Court has upheld searches and seizures without probable cause or a warrant where the search or seizure scheme serves special needs above and beyond ordinary law enforcement, and the scheme is otherwise reasonable. See, e.g., Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U. S. 444 (1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoint on highway where it served special need of highway safety, was applied across the board, and involved only a minimally intrusive, brief stop). In assessing reasonableness, the Court balances a number of factors, including the intrusiveness of the search, the extent to which it is standardized or discretionary, and its effectiveness. Id.
122. 18 U. S. C.§ 3144 (2006).
123. The Court permits warrantless arrests where there is probable cause and an arrest takes place in public, or where there are exigent circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 417 (1976).
124. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 56 (1991).
125. Id. at 57.
126. Any substantial restriction on an individual's freedom of movement is a seizure, and requires reasonable suspicion, if it amounts to only a brief investigative stop, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 27 (1968), or probable cause if it amounts to a custodial arrest. United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 709-10 5 (1983) (seizure of luggage for ninety minutes was not a brief stop, and required probable cause);
127. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 499 (1983) (stop of airline passenger rose to level of custodial arrest, and therefore required probable cause).
128. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, observed that: "Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than⋯ after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most pressing. A criminal conviction in the usual course occurs after a judicial hearing before a tribunal disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures designed to ensure its own independence. These dynamics are not inherent in executive detention orders or executive review procedures. In this context the need for habeas corpus is more urgent." Id. at 2269.
129. Id.
130. 323 U. S. 214, 219 (1944).
131. See id. at 223-24.
132. See id. at 218-19.
133. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 953, 993 1n. 165 (2002) (citing various cases);
134. see, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 535 (2004) (O'Connor, J.) (citing dissent in Korematsu, 323 U. S. at 233-34 (Murphy, J. dissenting)); Id. at 608 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
135. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (acknowledging "fundamental injustice" of internment and ordering restitution for all persons ordered to leave their homes).
136. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417 (N. D. Cal. 1984);
137. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1987).
138. See, e.g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 (1948);
139. U. S. C. § 21 (2000).
140. 335 U. S. 160, 173 (1948).
141. Id. at 171 (footnote omitted).
142. 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). When the Court decided Ludecke, the Enemy Aliens Act had been on the books for a much longer time than the statute invalidated in Marbury had been when that case was decided. However, because the Enemy Alien Act is triggered only by formally declared wars or invasion, it was only sporadically in force, and the Supreme Court had not previously reviewed or applied it. See 50 U. S. C. § 21.
143. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
144. Ludecke, 335 U. S. at 163-64.
145. United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 748 (1987).
146. See 50 U. S. C. §21.
147. See Ludecke, 335 U. S. at 163.
148. See 50 U. S. C. §21.
149. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 524 U. S. 507, 533 (2004) (requiring that American citizen detained as "enemy combatant" be afforded notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond before a neutral decision maker).
150. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763, 772 (1950).
151. Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 531 (2003).
152. Id. at 521.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 531 -32 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
156. Great Britain's Law Lords, by contrast, ruled a post-9/11 law invalid precisely because it imposed indefinite preventive detention without charges on foreign nationals suspected of terrorist ties and not on British citizens. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, H 73, [2005] 2 A. C. 68, 127 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U. K.). It found no difference in the threats British and foreign nationals posed, and no difference in their respective interests in being free of confinement. Id. The Lords declared the statute incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, as incorporated in British law by the Human Rights Act of 1998, because the statute discriminated unlawfully between British citizens and foreign nationals. Id. The European Court of Human Rights subsequently reached the same result, and awarded damages to the detainees. A and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/499d4alb2.html.
157. Cole, supra note 5, at 6-35.
158. 8 U. S. C. § 1226 (2006);
159. C. F. R. § 236.1 (2008).
160. See supra notes 40-45.
161. 8 C. F. R. § 287.3 (d) (2008).
162. Amnesty International, United States of America: Amnesty International's Concerns Regarding Post September ii Detentions in the USA 10-11 (2002), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/044/2002;
163. Human Rights Watch, Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post-September i i Detainees 50 (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/ reports/2002/us911/.
164. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975) (requiring prompt judicial hearing of probable cause, presumptively within forty-eight hours, where individuals are arrested without warrant).
165. See OIG Report, supra note 41, at 76-80.
166. See id. at 77;
167. Cole, supra note 5, at 26-35;
168. Constitution Project, The Use and Abuse of Immigration Authority as a Counterterrorism Tool 6 (2008), available at wwwxonstimtionproject.org/ pdfyimmigration-Authority-As-A-Counterterrorism-Tool.pdf.
169. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 295, 349 (2007) (finding, in 247 immigration asylum hearings from 2000 until 2004, asylum seekers who received legal assistance were more likely to be granted asylum than those who lacked assistance).
170. See ACLU, Immigrant's Rights: Detention, Conditions of Confinement in Immigration Detention Facilities (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/ immigrants/detention/30261pub20070627.html.
171. See 8 C. F. R. § 1003.19 (i) (2) (2008).
172. Id.
173. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.
174. See Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662, 669 (D. N. J. 2003);
175. Uritsky v. Ridge, 286 F. Supp. 2d 842, 846-47 (E. D. Mich. 2003);
176. Bezmen v. Ashcroft, 245 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (D. Conn. 2003);
177. Almonte-Vargas v. Elwood, No. 02-CV-2666, 2002 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 12387 (E. D. Pa. June 28, 2002).
178. OIG Report, supra note 41, at 37-38.
179. See, e.g.. Cole, supra note 5, at 33-34 (discussing Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-2307 (JG), 2006 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 39170 (E. D. N. Y. June 14, 2006)).
180. Id.
181. *31. The Turkmen decision is pending on appeal before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. (Disclosure: I am co-counsel for plaintiffs in Turkmen v. Ashcroft).
182. 18 U. S. C. §3144 (2006).
183. See id. ("No material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice.").
184. Phillip K. Dick, The Minority Report, in 4 The Collected Stories of Philip K. Dick: The Days of Perky Pat 71 (1987).
185. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U. S. C. § 1701 (2006), has also provided the basis for penalizing "material support." It t has been invoked to designate certain individuals and groups as "terrorist" without even applying the statutory criteria Congress set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 2339B (2006) and 8 U. S. C. § 1189 (2006), and to criminalize all transactions with such persons or groups.
186. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13, 224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49, 079 (Sept. 23, 2001);
187. Al Haramain Islamic Found, v. U. S. Dep't of Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (D. Or. 2008).
188. Cole and Lobel, supra note 52, at 49;
189. see also U. S. Dep't of Justice, Counterterrorism White Paper 10-14 (2006), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/ terrorism.whitepaper.pdf (listing the Justice Department's major terrorism prosecutions, most of which are under the "material support" statute).
190. 18 U. S. C. §2339B.
191. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2007), as amended by 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009);
192. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, (9th Cir. 2000).
193. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122 (holding these provisions unconstitutional but rejecting arguments that the statute as a whole violates the Fifth Amendment by failing to honor the principle of individual culpability);
194. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (holding prohibitions on "personnel" and "training" were unconstitutionally vague, but rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the statute for imposing guilt by association).
195. See, e.g.. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 204 F.3d at 1133 (finding that "[t]he statute does not prohibit being a member of one of the designated groups or vigorously promoting and supporting the political goals of the group");
196. United States v. Warsame, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (D. Minn. 2008).
197. See Cole, supra note 38, at 234.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967);
199. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966);
200. Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961).
201. Scales, 367 U. S. at 209-10.
202. President George W. Bush, Speech on Terrorism at the White House (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.nytirnes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush- transcript.htrnl. The military has detained approximately 775 persons at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, of whom about 245 remained as of March 2009. Andy Worthington, The GuANTáNAMO Files: The Stories of the 774 Detainees in America's Illegal Prison (2007);
203. Press Release, U. S. Dep't of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12449. In addition, as of March 2009, about 600 persons were detained as "enemy combatants" at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan. Helene Cooper and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Ponders Outreach to Elements of the Taliban, N. Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2009, at Al (reporting that there are approximately 600 prisoners held at Bagram). An undisclosed number of others were detained in CIA secret prisons, or "black sites, " but President Obama closed those facilities on his second day in office. Exec. Order No. 13, 492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4, 897 (Jan. 22, 2009) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ ClosureOfGuantanamoDetention Facilities.
204. Al Qaeda Arrests Worldwide, FoxNews.com, Nov. 22, 2002, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,64199,00.html.
205. Tim Golden, Defying U. S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan, N. Y. Times, Jan. 7, 2008, at A1.
206. Id.
207. Exec. Order No. 13, 492, supra note 152;
208. Craig Whitlock, U. S. Faces Scrutiny Over Secret Prisons, Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 2005, at A20.
209. Mark Denbeaux et al., Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 57 Detainees Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data 9 (2006), available at http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo-report-final-2-08-06.pdf.
210. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, A Prison of Shame, and It's Ours, N. Y. Times, May 4, 2008, at WK13.
211. Douglas Jehl, The Conflict in Iraq: Prisoners; U. S. Action Bars Right of Some Captured in Iraq, N. Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2004, at Al;
212. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Announcement of President Bush's Determination re Legal Status of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/38727.htm.
213. Lord Steyn, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 27th F. A. Mann Lecture (Nov. 25, 2003);
214. William Glaberson, U. S. Asks Court to Limit Lawyers at Guantanamo, N. Y. Times, Apr. 26, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/26/ washington/26gitmo.html.
215. Sands, supra note 56 (discussing development and implementation of order authorizing coercive interrogation tactics at Guantinamo);
216. Eric Lichtblau and Scott Shane, Report Details Dissent on Guantanamo Tactics, N. Y. Times, May 21, 2008, at A21.
217. See Exec. Order No. 13, 492, supra note 152.
218. In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U. S. 466 (2004)
219. and Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), the Court held that detainees at Guantanamo were entitled to habeas corpus review of the legality of their detentions.
220. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557 (2006), the Court held that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to the conflict with al Qaeda
221. and in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507 (2004), the Court held that a U. S. citizen detained as an enemy combatant was constitutionally entitled to a fair hearing on whether he was an enemy combatant.
222. See, e.g., Jameel Jaffer and Ben Wizner, Don't Replace the Old Guantanamo with a New One, Salon. com, Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.salon. com/opinion/feature/2008/12/09/guantanarno/print.html;
223. Michael Ratner and Jules Lobel, Don't Repackage Gitmol, Nation, Nov. 25, 2008 (President and Vice-President of Center for Constitutional Rights advocating "try or release" approach), http://www.thenation. com/doc/20081215/ratner-lobel?rel=hp-currently.
224. Goldsmith and Katyal, supra note 2.
225. Hamdi, 542 U. S. at 518.
226. See generally Richard B. Zabel and James J. Benjamin, Jr., Human Rights First, In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts (2008).
227. 18 U. S. C. § 2339B (2006) (criminalizing as a terrorist crime the provision of material support to designated "terrorist organizations") .
228. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182, 1189 (2006) (defining terrorist activity for immigration purposes and for purposes of designating "terrorist organizations").
229. See Hamdi, 542 U. S. 507;
230. see generally Oeremy C. Kamens, International Legal Limits on the Government's Power to Detain "Enemy Combatants", in Enemy Combatants, Terrorism, and Armed Conflict Law 107, 107-20 (David K. Linnan ed., 2008).
231. Hamdi. 542 U. S. at 519.
232. Excerpts from 2001 Memo About Al Qaeda Given to Rice, N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2005, at A10 (stating that "in 1998, Osama bin Laden publicly declared war on the United States").
233. S. C. Res. 1386, pmbl., U. N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001); S. C. Res. 1373, pmbl., U. N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001);
234. see generally Steven R. Ratner, Note, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 905, 909-10 (2002);
235. Press Release, NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), reprinted in 40 ILM 1267, 1267 (2001).
236. President George W. Bush, The Coal. Info. Ctrs., The White House, The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days 7-9 (2001) (listing U. S. diplomatic successes).
237. See Helene Cooper and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, supra note 152 (reporting that President Obama admitted that the United States was not winning the war in Afghanistan).
238. See Geneva Convention, supra note 29;
239. Lieber, supra note 81;
240. see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
241. and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 43.2, June 8, 1977, 1125 U. N. T. S. 23.
242. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557, 629-30 (2006)
243. Zabel and Benjamin, supra note 167.
244. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 303-12 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (cataloguing problems with employing the criminal justice system to try terrorists during wartime), vacated as moot, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 2009 WL 564940 (Mar. 6, 2009).
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 3, § 9491 (c), 120 Stat. 2600, 2616 (2006);
247. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 794-95 (1952) (criminal conviction requires state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
248. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 518 (2004).
249. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 450 (D. D. C. 2005) (quoting definition of "enemy combatant" contained in Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz's July 7, 2004 order creating Combatant Status Review Tribunal).
250. See Respondent's Memo Regarding the Gov't's Det. Auth. Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-442 (TFH) (D. D. C. Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/ documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf. The brief maintained that this definition was tentative because President Obama's comprehensive review of detention policies had not yet been completed. See id. at 10-11.
251. Id. at 1 (stating that "[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules governing international armed conflicts, therefore, must inform the interpretation of the detention authority Congress has authorized for the current armed conflict").
252. *34 (D. D. C. May 19, 2009).
253. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 217-53 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concurring).
254. 317 U. S. 1, 19-20 (1942).
255. Al-Marri, 534F.3d at219.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 220
258. Id. at 216.
259. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (Dec. 5, 2008);
260. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, AH Al-Marri Indicted for Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda (Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ opa/pr/2009/February/09-ag-177.html.
261. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 325 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
262. Id. at 323.
263. Id. at 324.
264. See CrimA 6659/06 A v. State of Israel, [2008] IsrSC 1, translation available at http://elyonl.court.gov. il/files-eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04. pdf.
265. Id. at 9 (quoting Section 2 of Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law).
266. Id. at 15.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 20.
269. Id. at 44.
270. Id, at 43-44.
271. This is likely to affect only marginal cases, because where the evidence is very strong at the outset, it is unlikely to be weakened by the passage of time, and as long as the showing was strong to begin with, it will ordinarily suffice to justify an extended detention.
272. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 324 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
273. Thanassis Cambanis, Lebanese Presidential Selection Delayed by Deadlock, N. Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2007, at A8.
274. Civilians who actively participate in hostilities lose their status as protected civilians under the Geneva Conventions. Geneva Convention, supra note 29, at art. 3 (1);
275. Claude Pilloud et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 618 (1987).
276. *36 (D. D. C. May 19, 2009). The court concluded that the laws of war permit detention of persons who are "part of enemy forces, but not of persons who have financed or supported enemy forces. Id.;
277. *122 (D. D. C. April 22, 2009) (holding that detention authority based on "substantial support" was limited to persons "who were members of the enemy organization's armed forces").
278. Establishing that an individual is actually a combatant will often be more difficult when he is not captured on the battlefield, but assuming he meets the appropriate definition, the location of capture should not preclude military detention.
279. To be clear, I do not mean this explanation of why terrorists choose terrorist tactics as a justification of those tactics in any way. In my view, terrorist tactics are unjustifiable, period.
280. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 533 (2004).
281. The threshold constitutional question of the extent to which constitutional protections extend to foreign nationals beyond U. S. borders is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of that topic, see generally Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution (1996);
282. David Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantdnamo Bay, 2007-2008 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 47. However, whether or not due process is deemed to apply abroad, the competing interests in liberty and security are simply not affected by citizenship status, so that Congress should as a matter of fairness require the same procedures for foreign nationals and U. S. citizens.
283. Hamdi, 542 U. S. at 529 (applying due process balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976)).
284. Cf. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, ¶ 73, [2005] 2 A. C. 68, 127 (appeal taken from England) (U. K.) (law authorizing preventive detention of foreign suspected terrorists but not British suspected terrorists violated equality guarantee of the European Convention on Human Rights).
285. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 253 (4th Cir. 2008) (Traxler, J., concurring).
286. Hamdi, 542 U. S. at 533-34.
287. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 256.
288. Id. at 265. 219. Hamdi, 542 U. S. at 533-34. 220. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 219. 221. Id. at 268 (Traxler, J., concurring) (quoting Hamdi, 542 U. S. at 534). 222. Id. at 268-70.
289. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976).
290. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 846-47 (D. C. Cir. 2008).
291. Id.
292. 18 U. S. C. § 3142 (f) (2006) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to deny bail);
293. Woodby v. INS, 385 U. S. 276 (1966) (requiring clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence to support deportation).
294. Advocates dispute whether the Supreme Court decided this issue in Hamdi, but it remains unsettled. See Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 272-73 (Traxler, J., concurring) (citing the Hamdi and Boumediene decisions as leaving evidentiary standards and right to counsel issues to the discretion of trial courts within the framework of "the general rule⋯ that al-Marri would be entitled to the normal due process protections⋯.") -
295. 18 U. S. C. app. §§ 1-16 (2006). The statute permits the use of unclassified summaries rather than classified information, but only if will provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified information. § 6 (c) (1). The European Court of Human Rights recently ruled somewhat analogously that in order to provide a person subject to a "control order" with a fair hearing, he must be provided with sufficiently detailed allegations to allow him to instruct his attorney on how to make a meaningful response. A and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, (February 19 2009), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/499d4alb2.html. A similar standard should govern here.
296. Cole, supra note 5, at 41-42.
297. Adam Liptak, Tribunal System, Newly Righted, Stumbles Again, N. Y. Times, June 5, 2007, at A21.
298. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Q. 2229, 2269-70 (2008).
299. Linda Greenhouse, Legal Battle Resuming on Guantdnamo Detainees, N. Y. Times, Sept. 2, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/washington/ 02scotus.html.
300. Mark Denbeaux and Joshua W. Denbeaux, No-Hearing Hearings: CSRT: The Modem Habeas Corpus? (Dec. 2006) (unpublished manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=951245).
301. In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 469-70 (D. D. C. 2005) (quoting an exchange in which a detainee is unable to respond to secret evidence used against him), vacated on other grounds, Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D. C. Cir. 2007), rev 'd, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
302. In re Guantdnamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 469-70.
303. Brief of United States at 10, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (No. 06-1195).
304. Id.
305. See Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Police and Human Rights (Eleventh Report) : 42 Days and Public Emergencies, 2007-2008, H. C. 635, available at http://www.publications.parliament. Uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/ jtrights/l 16/116.pdf. Clare Feikert, U. S. library of Cong., United Kingdom: pre-Charge Detention for Terrorist Suspects (2008), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/ uk-pre-charge-detention. php.
306. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975) held that where police make an arrest without a warrant, they must bring the arrestee before a court for a prompt probable cause hearing. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44 (1991), the Supreme Court interpreted Gerstein's "promptness" requirement to mandate a hearing within forty-eight hours of arrest unless the government can establish an emergency or extraordinary circumstance justifying a delay.
307. Gerstein, 430 U. S. at 124 n. 25.
308. 18 U. S. C. §3142 (f) (2006).
309. 18 U. S. C. § 3142 (e) (2006);
310. see generally Zabel and Benjamin, supra note 167, at 65-75 (arguing that existing federal law permits preventive detention of defendants pending criminal trial without disclosing confidential information).
311. See 18 U. S. C. §3161 (2006).
312. See 117 Cong. Rec. H31551-52 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1971) (remarks of Rep. Railsback), cited in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 719-20 (2d Or. 2003)
313. rev'd on other grounds, 542 U. S. 426 (2004).