Why panpsychism doesn't help us explain consciousness

Dialectica

Volumn 63, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 289-311

  Goff, Philip ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349553797     PISSN: 00122017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01196.x     Document Type: Review

References (36)

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