A world without the West? Empirical patterns and theoretical implications

Chinese Journal of International Politics

Volumn 2, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 577-596

  Barma, Naazneen ^a   Chiozza, Giacomo ^b   Ratner, Ely ^c   Weber, Steven ^d  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c RAND CORPORATION   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349509187     PISSN: 17508916     EISSN: 17508924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/cjip/pop013     Document Type: Article

References (78)

1. Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).
2. See, for example, Dani Rodrik, 'How Far Will Economic Integration Go?' Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2000, pp. 177-86.
3. For competing viewpoints on how globalization will affect nation-states and the political-economic relationships among them, two oft-cited works are Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001)
4. and Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
5. Naazneen Barma et al., 'A World Without the West', The National Interest, No. 90, 2007, pp. 23-30.
6. See T. V. Paul and John A. Hall, eds. International Order and the Future of World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999) for a seminal collection of papers on theories of international order and contemporary challenges associated with its evolution.
7. Jonathan DiCicco and Jack Levy, 'Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 6, 1999, pp. 684-5.
8. Note that this view of international order identifies the global hegemon and its preferences as the central components of Hedley Bull's classical definition of international order: 'a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society'. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 8.
9. On power transition theory see A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958)
10. A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980)
11. and Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, Parity and War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
12. On hegemonic war theory see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
13. On theory of long cycles see George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987).
14. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, pp. 313-6, 325-30.
15. Jonathan DiCicco and Jack Levy, 'Power Shifts and Problem Shifts', p. 681.
16. On the notion of 'dissatisfied' powers see A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, chapter 12
17. A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, pp. 19-23
18. Steve Chan, 'Can't Get No Satisfaction? The Recognition of Revisionist States', International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2004, pp. 207-38
19. Douglas Lemke and William Reed, 'Power is Not Satisfaction: A Comment on de Soysa, Oneal and Park', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 4, 1996, pp. 511-6.
20. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics
21. George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics.
22. Steven Chan, China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 32.
23. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Building of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
24. The in-play countries include Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
25. James E. Anderson, 'A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation', American Economic Review, Vol. 69, No. 1, 1979, pp. 106-16.
26. The gravity model has been employed to study several aspects of the international political economy including migration, FDI flows and equity flows. See John F. Helliwell, 'National Borders, Trade and Migration', NBER Working Paper 6027, 1997
27. Bruce A. Blonigen, 'A Review of the Empirical Literature on FDI Determinants', Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2005, pp. 383-403
28. Richard Portes and Hélène Rey, 'The Determinants of Cross-Border Equity Flows', Journal of International Economics, Vol. 65, No. 2, 2005, pp. 269-96.
29. Our empirical strategy resembles the one employed by Rose to measure the effect of WTO membership on bilateral trade. Andrew K. Rose, 'Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?' American Economic Review Vol. 94, No. 1, 2004, pp. 98-114.
30. Jeffrey H. Bergstrand, 'The Gravity Equation in International Trade: Some Microeconomic Foundations and Empirical Evidence', Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 67, No. 3, 1985, pp. 474-81.
31. Bruce M. Russett and Harry Bliss, 'Democratic Trading Partners: The Liberal Connection, 1962-1989', Journal of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 4, pp. 1126-47.
32. Jonathan DiCicco and Jack Levy, 'Power Shifts and Problem Shifts', pp. 690-1.
33. Woosang Kim and James Morrow, 'When Do Power Shifts Lead to War', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1992, p. 912.
34. See Woosang Kim, 'Alliance Transitions and Great Power War', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1991, pp. 833-50
35. and Woosang Kim, 'Power transitions and great power war from Westphalia to Waterloo', World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1992, pp. 153-72.
36. Most regimes in the developing world have few, if any, formal military alliances. This makes the alliance data not useful as a measure of foreign policy similarity outside of the great powers and the West. Ely Ratner, 'Reaping What You Sow: Democratic Transitions and Foreign Policy Realignment', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 3, 2009, p. 403.
37. United Nations General Assembly votes are commonly used to measure states' foreign policy preferences. See Bruce E. Moon, 'Consensus of Compliance? Foreign-Policy Change and External Dependence', International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 2, 1985, pp. 297-329
38. Erik Gartzke, 'Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1998, pp. 1-27
39. and Ely Ratner, 'Reaping What You Sow'.
40. Steven Chan, China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory, p. 34.
41. Erik Gartzke, 'Kant We All Just Get Along?' Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo, 'UN General Assembly Voting', January 2002. http://dss.ucsd.edu/ ~egartzke/. The UN voting similarity data are not directional as is the case for trade. That is, unlike trade where the flow from country A to country B is likely different from the flow from country B to country A, the voting similarity between any two countries is symmetric. The regression model is therefore estimated on a un-directed dyad dataset. See Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, The Behavioral Origins of War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004).
42. Aaron L. Friedberg, 'The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2005, pp. 7-45.
43. Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2002).
44. Most experts agree that Beijing underreports these figures. For a side-by-side comparison of several outside estimates of China's military spending see U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2007, p. 26.
45. 'China's Space Plan in 2008 Arouses Foreign Media's Attention', China Daily, 14 January 2008.
46. Edward L. Morse, 'The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization', World Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1970, pp. 371-92.
47. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory.
48. See Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008)
49. Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory', in John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 107-62
50. Robert Lawrence, China and the Multilateral Trading System (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006)
51. and Ann Kent, Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007).
52. For a classic statement of how trade and membership in international organizations lead to a reduced incidence of conflict, see Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).
53. Alistair Ian Johnston, 'Is China a Status Quo Power?' International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2003, pp. 5-56.
54. Robert Ross, 'Beijing as a Conservative Power', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2, 1997, p. 34.
55. As an introduction to India's rise on the global stage see the essays in Sumit Ganguly, ed., India as an Emerging Power (New York: Routledge, 2003).
56. For a discussion of how international order can develop out of the pursuit of national interest rather than strategic intentionality, see Naazneen Barma and Ely Ratner, 'China's Illiberal Challenge', Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, No. 2, 2006, pp. 56-68.
57. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory.
58. G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and International Order (Malden: Polity, 2006), p. 8.
59. Ibid., p. 8.
60. John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1982, pp. 379-415.
61. Naazneen Barma et al., 'Open Authoritarian Regimes: Surviving and Thriving in the Liberal International Order (Project Description)', Democracy & Society, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2009, pp. 8-11.
62. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).
63. See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 39-44 for his discussion of 'systems change', 'systemic change', and 'interaction change'.
64. Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).
65. See Stephen D. Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1976, pp. 317-47
66. and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
67. Robert O. Keohane, 'The Demand for International Regimes', International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1982, pp. 325-55.
68. Krasner et al. define regimes as 'principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given issue-area'; and institutions as persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe and proscribe behavioral roles, constrain activities, and shape expectations about likely behavior. See Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
69. Stephen D. Krasner, 'Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables', International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1982, pp. 497-510.
70. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory.
71. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony is the classic statement.
72. John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis', in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 143.
73. Ibid., p. 142. As opposed to Waltz, who took this term to mean 'sameness' or 'difference', Ruggie uses the more traditional sociological definition of differentiation to mean 'the principles on the basis of which the constituent units are separated from one another'.
74. Ibid., p. 142.
75. Ibid., p. 148.
76. Ibid., p. 148.
77. John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1993, pp. 139-74.
78. Ibid., p. 171.