Market reform as a stimulus to particularistic politics

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 42, Issue 7, 2009, Pages 971-994

  McMann, Kelly M ^a  

^a CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bribery; Central Asia; Clientelism; Corruption; Market reform; Postcommunism

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349332883     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414008330601     Document Type: Article

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