Cheap talk in a large group coordination game

Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport

Volumn , Issue , 2019, Pages 173-200

  Seale, Darryl A ^a   Sundali, James A ^b  

^a KENT STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349302266     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (23)

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