Regionalizing international criminal law?

International Criminal Law Review

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 445-499

  Jalloh, Charles Chernor ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Africa; African concerns about icc; International criminal court

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349289928     PISSN: 1567536X     EISSN: 15718123     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/157181209X457956     Document Type: Article

References (209)

1. BBC News , 'Vow to pursue Sudan over "crimes"', 27 September 2008, online at: 〈http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7639046.stm〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
2. D. Kezio-Musoke , 'Kagame tells why he is against ICCcharging Bashir', Daily Nation , 3 August 2008, online at: 〈 http://allafrica.com/stories/ 200808120157.html〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
3. Professor T. Maluwa , Legal Adviser, OAU Secretariat, Statement at 6 th Plenary, 17 June 1998. See Official Records of the United Nations Diplomaticconference of Plenipotentiaries on theestablishment of an Internationalcriminalcourt , UN doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II) 104, 115-118 at para. 116.
4. Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide - The Report of the International Panel ofeminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surroundingevents (Addis Ababa: OAU, 7 July 2000).
5. Maluwa, supra note 5, at para. 116
6. H. Jallow and F. Bensouda , 'Internationalcriminal law in an Africancontext', in M. du Plessis (ed.), African Guide to Internationalcriminal Justice (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008) pp. 15-54, at 41. See also P. Mochochoko , 'Africa and the Internationalcriminalcourt', ine. Ankumah ande. Kwakwa (eds.), African Perspectives on Internationalcriminal Justice (Accra: Africa Legal Aid, 2005) and S. Maqungo , 'Theestablishment of the Internationalcriminalcourt: SADC's Participation in the Negotiations' 9 African Security Review (2000).
7. H. Jallow and F. Bensouda , 'Internationalcriminal law in an Africancontext', in M. du Plessis (ed.), African Guide to Internationalcriminal Justice (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008) pp. 15-54, at 41. See also P. Mochochoko , 'Africa and the Internationalcriminalcourt', ine. Ankumah ande. Kwakwa (eds.), African Perspectives on Internationalcriminal Justice (Accra: Africa Legal Aid, 2005) and S. Maqungo , 'Theestablishment of the Internationalcriminalcourt: SADC's Participation in the Negotiations' 9 African Security Review (2000).
8. H. Jallow and F. Bensouda , 'Internationalcriminal law in an Africancontext', in M. du Plessis (ed.), African Guide to Internationalcriminal Justice (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008) pp. 15-54, at 41. See also P. Mochochoko , 'Africa and the Internationalcriminalcourt', ine. Ankumah ande. Kwakwa (eds.), African Perspectives on Internationalcriminal Justice (Accra: Africa Legal Aid, 2005) and S. Maqungo , 'Theestablishment of the Internationalcriminalcourt: SADC's Participation in the Negotiations' 9 African Security Review (2000).
9. Significantly, This List Includes The Regional Powers Nigeria and South Africa
10. In addition, the Prosecutor iscurrentlyconducting a preliminary analysis of various other situations. Th ree of those, namelychad, Kenya and Ivorycoast, are in Africa while the others are from around the world including Afghanistan,colombia, Georgia and Palestine. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Frequently Asked Questions: Where is the Office of the Prosecutorcurrently active?' online at: 〈 http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/ Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/FAQ/l 〉 and 'Visit of the Palestinian National Authority Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Mr. Riad al-Maliki, and Minister of Justice, Mr. Ali Khashan, to the Prosecutor of the ICC, 13 February 2009, online at: 〈 http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4CC08515- D0BA-454D-A594-446F30289EF2/280140/ICCOTP20090213Palestinerev.pdf〉 (visited 15 May 2009)
11. In addition, the Prosecutor iscurrentlyconducting a preliminary analysis of various other situations. Th ree of those, namelychad, Kenya and Ivorycoast, are in Africa while the others are from around the world including Afghanistan,colombia, Georgia and Palestine. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Frequently Asked Questions: Where is the Office of the Prosecutorcurrently active?' online at: 〈 http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/ Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+ Prosecutor/FAQ/l 〉 and 'Visit of the Palestinian National Authority Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Mr. Riad al-Maliki, and Minister of Justice, Mr. Ali Khashan, to the Prosecutor of the ICC, 13 February 2009, online at: 〈 http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4CC08515- D0BA-454D-A594-446F30289EF2/280140/ICCOTP20090213Palestinerev.pdf 〉 (visited 15 May 2009)
12. Referral submitted in December, Decision to open investigation followed on 29 July 2004
13. Referral submitted in March Decision to open investigation followed on 5 July 2004.
14. Referral submitted on 7 January, Decision to open investigation followed on 27 May 2007.
15. 15Referrals take place under Art. 14 ICCSt (Referral of a situation by a State Party). Forcommentary, seec. Kress , '"Self Referrals" and "Waivers ofcomplementarity"', 2 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2004) 944-6 and P. Gaeta , 'Is the Practice of 'Self-Referrals" a Sound Start for the ICC?', 2 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2004) 951-952
16. 15Referrals take place under Art. 14 ICCSt (Referral of a situation by a State Party). Forcommentary, seec. Kress , '"Self Referrals" and "Waivers ofcomplementarity"', 2 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2004) 944-6 and P. Gaeta , 'Is the Practice of 'Self-Referrals" a Sound Start for the ICC?', 2 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2004) 951-952
17. Art.17(1)(a) ICCSt (Issues of admissibility)
18. -1155 UNTSt 331. Art. 26 states:every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith
19. On the idea of waiver ofcomplementarity, see generally Kress , supra note 15
20. Art. 27 ICCSt. (Irrelevance of officialcapacity)
21. Art. 28 ICCSt. (Responsibility ofcommanders and other superiors)
22. W.A. Schabas, 'Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism', 6 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2008) 731-761, at 752-753.
23. Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the Fourth Session of the Assembly of State Parties, (noting that, given the gravity of thecrimescommitted by the LRA, it wasclear that 'we must start with the LRA').
24. SC Res. 1593, 31 March 2005.
25. Sudan signed the Rome Statute on 8 September 2000 but has not yet ratified it. While unlikely to do so now, it is still bound to avoidconduct that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.
26. Report of the Internationalcommission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General Pursuant to Securitycouncil Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 (Geneva: UN, January 25, 2005), at paras. 569-589, 647-649.
27. U.S. Fiddles Over ICC While Darfur Burns: U.N. Securitycouncil Should Reject U.S. Scheme for Ad Hoccourt', Human Rights Watch , online at: 〈http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/31/usint10091-txt.htm〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
28. See,e.g., Human Rights Watch , Letter to U.S. Secretary of State Designate Dr.condoleezza Rice dated 21 January 2005, 'ICC Bestchance for Justice in Darfur: U.S. Should Support or Abstain from Securitycouncil Referral of Darfur to the Internationalcriminalcourt', online at: 〈http://hrw.org/ english/docs/2005/01/21/sudan10090.htm〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
29. See,e.g., L.condorelli and A.ciampi , 'Comments on the Securitycouncil Referral of the Situation in Darfur to the ICC', 3 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2005) 590-597
30. in R.S. Lee (ed.), at 395 Participation of non-governmental organizations
31. W.R. Pace and M. Th ieroff , 'Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations', in R.S. Lee (ed.), The Internationalcriminalcourt: The Marking of the Rome Statute - Issues, Negotiations, Results (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) pp. 391-398, at 395. Over 20 African NGOS were invited to participate in the Rome Statute negotiations pursuant to GA Res. 52/60, 15 December 1997. Participation included attending plenary and formal meetings of subsidiary bodies at theconferenceexcept the drafting group, receiving official documents, providing material to delegates and by addressingcertain open andclosed sessions of meetings. See Note by the [UN] Secretary-General, Non-Governmental Organizations Accredited to Participate in theconference , UN doc. A/CONF.183/INF/3, 5 June 1998.
32. W.A. Schabas , An Introduction to the Internationalcriminalcourt (2 ndedn.,cambridge:cUP, 2004), p. 19.
33. Pace and Thieroff , supra note 29, at 397.
34. In other words, I go beyond the suggestion that the relationship is a one-way street and that it is only Africa that needs the ICC. See,e.g., D. Iber , 'Africa Needs Judicial Body', Pan African News Agency , 4 October 1999 (arguing that Africa, with its numerous internal armedconfl icts, is in 'desperate need' for an internationalcriminalcourt).
35. This dependence on statecooperation is starkly illustrated by an importantcase in the UNcriminal tribunal for Rwanda. Following an Appealschamber decision to release Jean Bosco- Barayagwiza for abuse of process on the part of the Prosecutor, Rwanda suspended itscooperation and tookcertain steps to show its displeasure, including denials of visas and access to thecountry. About 16 witnesses were denied permission to travel to the seat of the tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania to testify, threatening to ground judicial proceedings to a halt. An application for reconsideration was duly lodged by the Prosecutor based on alleged new facts about thecircumstances in which the problematic detention of the accused had taken place. The judges revisited the issue and ordered Barayagwiza's trial. Rwanda resumed itscooperation. The accused was laterconvicted. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza (ICTR-97-19-AR72), 'Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration', Appealschamber, 31 March 2000, para. 34 and Declaration of Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia , paras. 1-8.
36. See,e.g., Specialcourt for Sierra Leone, Press Release, 'Warcrimes Prosecutors Meet in Freetown', 27 June 2005 (noting that '' the tribunals are greatly reliant on thecooperation of national states',concluding that ''the tribunalscannot succeed without the fi rmcommitment of sovereign states to discharge their legal and treaty obligations ' Statecooperation with the internationalcriminal tribunals is one of the pillars upon which the future development of international law depends.')
37. Jalloh, 'The Law and Politics of thecharles Taylorcase',canadiancouncil on International Law Web Bulletin , April 2006, online at: 〈 http://www.ccil-ccdi.ca/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id= 165&Itemid=76 〉 (visited 15 May 2009) (observing, in passing, that Africa was the only scene of investigations and the fi rst arrest warrant by the ICC; warning that a failure to address perceptions that internationalcriminal law is being built on the back of Africans may have profound implications whichcould undermine the legitimacy of theemerging internationalcriminal justice system).
38. Nef, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability : The Global Politicaleconomy of Development and Underdevelopment
39. This phrase appears to have been firstcoined within thecontext of development theory by J. Nef, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability : The Global Politicaleconomy of Development and Underdevelopment (2ndedn., Ottawa: IDRC, 1999), 13. The idea was subsequently articulated by I. Head, On a Hinge of History: The Mutual Vulnerability of South and North (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).
40. O. Oko , 'Thechallenges of Internationalcriminal Prosecutions in Africa', 31 Fordham International Law Journal (2008) 343-414, at 343.
41. See,e.g., the Preamble to theconstitutive Act, para. 9; Peace and Security Protocol, para. 10; the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamentalchanges Taking Place in the World, Summit of the Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa,ethiopia, July 1990.
42. Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Securitycouncil : Thecauses ofconfl ict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa , UN doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318, 16 April 1998, at para. 4.
43. cabinet Sub-Committee onconfl ict Prevention in Africa, 'Causes ofconfl icts in Africa',consultation Document - March 2001, online at: 〈http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/conflictafrica.pdf〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
44. L. Harbom and P. Wallensteen , Uppsalaconfl ict Data Program, 'Frequently Asked Questions: How manyconfl icts were there in the world in 2007?', online at: 〈 http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/links-faq/faq.htm#4 〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
45. R. Kaplan , Thecoming Anarchy : Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War (New York: Random House, 2000).
46. See A.M. Kambudzi, 'The Internationalcriminalcourt and Africa: The AU and the ICC', in M. du Plessis and A. Louw (eds.), The Investigation and Prosecution of 'Core Internationalcrimes' and the Role of the Internationalcriminalcourt in Africa (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007) 27-39, at 29.
47. These rivalries played out in the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa where the two power blocs had strategic interests. Proxy wars were fought in the region. Forexample, South Africa attacked Angola in 1975 while Somalia invadedethiopia in 1977.
48. A.cassese , 'Internationalcriminal Justice: Is it Really so Needed in the Present Worldcommunity?', Public Lecture (London School ofeconomics) 13 November 2001, online at: 〈 http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/ PublicLectures/PL-InternationalCriminalJustice.pdf 〉 (visited 15 May 2009) (arguing that a 'striking feature' of international relations today is that the UN Securitycouncil has proved unable to 'solve major internationalcrises').
49. C. McGreal , 'Blairconfronts Scar on World'sconscience', The Guardian , 7 February 2002.
50. The Independent , 14 August 2004.
51. Preamble,constitutive Act, para. 8.
52. Kambudzi , supra note 43, at 30.
53. Arts. 3(a)(Objectives) and 14 (Peace building), Peace and Security Protocol.
54. These include, for instance, the AU Non-Aggression andcommon Defence Pact, adopted by the 4th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Abuja, Nigeria (January 2005).
55. AUcommissionconfl ict Management Division, Meeting thechallenge ofconfl ict Prevention in Africa: Towards the Operationalization of thecontinentalearly Warning System (Addis Ababa: AU, 2008), Foreword.
56. temphasis added.
57. temphasis added.
58. The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) aims to balanceconcerns about state sovereignty and the imperative to act, if need be with force, to halt genocide andcrimes against humanity. See The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Internationalcommission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: ICISS, 2001) online at: 〈 http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission- Report.pdf 〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
59. R2P wasendorsed by SC Res. 1674, 28 April 2006 on the protection ofcivilians in armedconfl ict and GA Res. 60/1, 24 October 2005 setting out the World Summit outcome. For more on the R2P and the AU, see K. Powell , 'The African Union'semerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities andchallenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect', May 2005 Working Paper (The North-South Institute), online at: 〈 http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pdf/ responsibility-protect-africa.pdf 〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
60. Art. 13(C),constitutive Act; Arts. 17(4) and 20, Peace and Security Protocol.
61. Kambudz i, supra note 43, at 35-37.
62. A.cassese , Internationalcriminal Law (1 stedn., Oxford: OUP, 2003), 3.
63. Internationalcriminal Law 1 stedn.Ibid.2003 at 5-14.
64. Seecomments of the Rwandese Representative to the Securitycouncil, UN doc S/PV.3453, 1994 at 14 and S.R. Ratner and J.S. Abrams , Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (2 ndedn., Oxford: OUP, 2001), at 191 and 201.
65. H.J. Steiner and P. Alston , International Human Rights Law incontext: Law, Politics, Morals (2ndedn., Oxford: OUP, 2000), at 1155.
66. The UN has more recently also supported theestablishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon. However, that is an internationalizedcourt solely addressingcommoncrimes under Lebanese law. For a thorough overview and keychallenges, see the November 2007 symposium issue on the Lebanon Tribunal by the Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice.
67. For an overview of the origins,establishment and issuesconfronting thosecourts, see W.A. Schabas, The UN Internationalcriminal Tribunals: The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Cambridge:cUP, 2006);
68. C.P.R. Romanoet al ., (eds.), Internationalizedcriminalcourts: Sierra Leone,east Timor, Kosovo andcambodia (Oxford: OUP, 2004).
69. For discussions of theircontributions, see,e.g .,e. Mose , 'Main Achievements of the ICTR', 3 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2005) 920;
70. C.C. Jalloh , 'Thecontribution of the Specialcourt for Sierra Leone to the Development of International Law', 15 African Journal of International andcomparative Law (2007) 165-207;
71. L.J. van den Herik , Thecontribution of the Rwandan Tribunal to the Development of International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff , 2005)
72. See,e.g., R. Zacklin , 'The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals', 2 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2004) 541-545, at 545 (concluding that the ad hoc tribunals have been 'toocostly,too inefficient and too ineffective'; and that they reflect an approach that is 'no longer politically or fi nancially viable.')
73. For an overview of the transfer process in relation to the Rwanda Tribunal, see A. Marong,c.C. Jalloh, and D. Kinnecome , 'Concurrent Jurisdiction and the ICTR: Should the Tribunal Transfercases to Rwanda', ine. Decaux, A. Dieng and M. Sow (eds.), From Human Rights to Internationalcriminal Law: Studies in Honour of an African Jurist, the Late Judge Laïty Kama (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff , 2007) pp. 159-201.
74. Seecomments by P. Murphy and M.B. Harmon offering defence and prosecution perspectives respectively.cf. response by Judgeerik Mse, the former President and Vice-President of the Rwanda Tribunal.
75. Statement of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at theceremony held atcampidogliocelebrating the Adoption of the Statute of the Internationalcriminalcourt, 18 May 1998.
76. Press Statement by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan , 11 April 2002.
77. M. Mamdani , 'Darfur, ICC and the New Humanitarian Order: How the ICC's "responsibility to protect" is being turned into an assertion of neo-colonial domination', Pambazuka News 396 (Englishedn.), online at: 〈 http://www.pambazuka.org 〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
78. Mamdani , supra note 70.
79. AU Peace and Securitycouncil Decision (PSC/MIN/Comm (CXLII)), 21 July 2008, para. 3.
80. As reported in the Daily Nation , supra note 2.
81. The use of universal jurisdiction bycertaineuropeancourts to indict African leaders,especially in Rwanda, started the general trend of opposition to the ICC among various states on thecontinent. Th is article does not discuss that important issue for space reasons.
82. See AFP , 'Rwanda's Kagame says ICC Targeting Poor, Africancountries,' 31 July 2008.
83. Reuters, 'Benin leader warns ICC against "harassing" Africans', 27 September 2008, online at:〈 http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/16262.html 〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
84. As will be seen through the discussion in this article, instead of being a foreign imposition, the ICC was actually invited to investigate three of the four African situations by Uganda, thecAR and the DRC. Only the Sudan investigation was imposed by the Securitycouncil. Moreover, it is noteworthy that other Africancountries, such as the Ivorycoast, a non-party, was reportedly lobbying for the referral of its own situation to the ICC. Iteven lodged a declaration accepting ICC jurisdiction. See ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Communications Received by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC', 16 July 2003.
85. The ICC Prosecutor applied for arrests warrants for Ahmad Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Abd-Al-Rahman (aka Ali Kushayb) in May 2007. In addition, the fi rst summons to appear toever be issued by thecourt was made public in May 2009 in respect of Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, an alleged rebel leader in Darfur, who is scheduled to appear forconfi rmation hearings on threecharges of warcrimes against on 12 October 2009.
86. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Press Release, 'ICC issues a warrant of arrest for Omar Al Bashir, President of Sudan', 4 March 2009;
87. 'Public Redacted Version of Prosecutor's Application under Article 58 fi led on 28 July 2008', Pre-Trialchamber, 12 September 2008.
88. Situation in Darfur, Sudan (ICC-02/05-157) 'Public Redacted Version of Prosecutor's Application under Article 58 fi led on 28 July 2008', Pre-Trialchamber, 12 September 2008; Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-157), 'Decision on the Prosecution' Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir', Pre-Trialchamber I, 4 March 2009 and 'Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir', Pre-Trialchamber I, 4 March 2009.
89. The UN Darfurcommission,chaired by the fi rst ICTY President Antoniocassese,concluded that thecrimes in Darfur did not reveal the specific intent tocommit genocide. Th is immediately spawned a debate. After the Prosecutor's public application for an arrest warrant,commentators questioned whether Bashir's allegedcrimes amounted to genocide. See,e.g., A.T.cayley , 'The Prosecutor's Strategy in Seeking the Arrest of Sudanese President Al Bashir oncharges of Genocide', 6 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2008) 829-840
90. A. de Waal , 'Darfur, thecourt and Khartoum: The Politics of State Non-Cooperation', in N. Waddell and P.clark (eds.),courtingconfl ict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa (London: The Royal Africa Society, 2008)
91. In its decision approving the arrest warrant, the ICC Pre-Trialchamber found that the information supplied by the ICC Prosecutor did not show reasonable grounds to believe that the Sudanese government acted with specific intent to destroy, in whole on in part, the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups.charges for genocide were therefore not included for the arrest warrant. Nonetheless, thechamber left a window open for an amendment or modification in light of any new information submitted subsequently under Art. 58(6) ICCSt. See Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Bashir Arrest Warrant, supra note 79, at paras. 206-208.
92. C. Gosnell , 'The Request for an Arrest Warrant in Al Bashir ', 6 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2008) 841-851.
93. A.ciampi 'The Proceedings Against President Al Bashir and the Prospects of their Suspension Under Article 16 ICC Statute', 6 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2008) 885-897.
94. Forexample, see R. Goldstone , 'Catching A Warcriminal in the Act', The New York Times , 15 July 2008.
95. L. Arbour , 'Justice v. Politics', International Herald Tribune , 16 September 2008.
96. AU Peace and Securitycouncil Decision (PSC/MIN/Comm (CXLII)), 21 July 2008, paras. 3, 5, 9, 11(i); AU Assembly Decision on the Application by the Internationalcriminalcourt Prosecutor for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of the Sudan (Dec. 221 (XII), 3 February 2009, paras. 2, 3 and Peace and Securitycouncil Decision (PSC/PR/Comm (CLXXV)), 5 March 2009, paras. 4-6. See also AU Press Statement, 'Thechairperson of thecommissionexpresses Deepconcern at the Decision of the Pre-Trialchamber of the Internationalcriminalcourt on Darfur', 4 March 2009.
97. The AU has been seeking a peaceful resolution to the Darfurcrisis, and as part of this, deployed the fi rst hybrid peacekeeping force between the UN and a regional organization to Sudan in July 2007 pursuant to SC Res. 1769, 31 July 2007.
98. Goldstone , supra note 82 (arguing, inter alia, that '[s]o far, there has been no Darfur peace process to speak of.')
99. Reuters , 'AUchairman backs Sudan's Bashir overcourt', 8 September 2008, online at: 〈 http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL8101824 〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
100. Fore.g., see 'OIC Secretary General [Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu] strongly rejects the ICC indictment against President of the Sudan', 4 March 2009 (expressing his disappointment over the Bashir indictment; warning that itcould lead to 'dangerous ramifications' ; rejecting the 'kind of selectivity and double standards applied by the internationalcommunity' in addressing internationalcrimes and appealing to the Securitycouncil to 'suspend the move by the ICC in the interest of the ongoing peaceeff orts in the Sudan') and 'Statement of theextra-ordinary session of the Ministerialcouncil of the League of Arab States toexamine the Developments in Darfur Region', 8 August 2008.
101. Report of thecommittee ofeminent African Jurists on thecase of Hissène Habré , (Addis Ababa, AU: 2006) online at: 〈 http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/CEJA-Repor0506.pdf 〉 (visited 15 May 2009);
102. AU Assembly Decision (Dec.127(VII)), 2 July 2006 (mandating Senegal 'to prosecute andensure that Hissène Habré is tried, on behalf of Africa, by acompetent Senegalesecourt with guarantees for fair trial') and Dec. 240(XII), 3 February 2009 (urging African and other states tocontribute funds to the budgetestablished for thecase toenable its prosecution). See also ICJ, Press Release No. 2009/13, 'Belgium institutes proceedings against Senegal and requests thecourt to indicate provisional measures', 19 February 2009, online at: 〈 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/fi les/144/15052.pdf 〉; Press Release No. 2009/14, 'Proceedings instituted by the Kingdom of Belgium against the Republic of Senegal Request for the indication of provisional measures', 12 March 2009, online at: 〈 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/fi les/144/15092.pdf (visited 15 May 2009).
103. C. Jalloh and A. Marong , 'Ending Impunity: Thecase for Warcrimes Trials in Liberia' 2 African Journal of Legal Studies (2005) 53-79 (arguing that the political will did notexist for an internationally supported specialcourt for Liberia; suggesting instead that the SCSL be mandated to prosecute internationalcrimescommitted there).
104. J. Rikhof , 'Fewer Places to Hide? The Impact of Domestic Warcrimes Prosecutions on International Impunity', 1criminal Law Forum (2009) 1-51 (reviewing domestic prosecutions in, among others, Africa).
105. As quoted by Kambudzi , supra note 61, at 43.
106. See,e.g., Judge N. Pillay , 'The rise of the Internationalcriminalcourt: complementarity and domestic prosecution of internationalcrimes' in M. du Plessis and A. Louw (eds.), The Investigation and Prosecution of 'core internationalcrimes' and the role of the Internationalcriminalcourt in Africa (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007) pp. 13-22, at 13-14.
107. ciampi , supra note 81, at 892.
108. H. Stuart , 'The ICC in Trouble', 6 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2008) (discussing the stay of proceedings in the Lubangacase and the disclosure debacle).
109. ciampi, supra note 81, at 892.
110. D . Schefferet al, 'Theend ofexceptionalism in Warcrimes: The Internationalcriminalcourt and America'scredibility in the World', Harvard International Review , 21 November 2007.
111. emphasis added.
112. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor', September 2003, at 4.
113. Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 98, at 3.
114. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Statement of the Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to Diplomaticcorps', 12 February 2004, at 4.
115. Schabas , 'Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism', supra note 21, at 752.
116. Jalloh , 'The Law and Politics of thecharles Taylorcase', supra note 35
117. C.C. Jalloh , 'Specialcourt for Sierra Leone Dismisses Taylor Motion forchange of Venue', 10 American Society of International Law Insights 15 (15 June 2006), online at: 〈 http://www.asil.org/insights060615.cfm 〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
118. K. Manson , 'Lack of funds may mean Liberia's Taylor freed - prosecutor' 〈 http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLO563309 〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
119. Jalloh , 'Thecontribution of the Specialcourt for Sierra Leone', supra note 64, at 204 (identifying funding as the fi rst of two bigchallenges that wouldconfront the SCSL when it relocated the Taylor trial to The Hague).
120. The agreement between the SCSL and the ICC provides for the former to pay to the latter, in advance, for all services, facilities and support provided to it. These includedcourtroom and detention services. See Arts. 3, 5 and 18 of the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Administrative Arrangements between the Internationalcriminalcourt and the Specialcourt for Sierra Leone inc.C. Jalloh (ed.),consolidated Legal Texts for the Specialcourt for Sierra Leone (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) 125-136, at 127-128, 135.
121. K.chitiyo and L. Devlin , 'The Internationalcriminalcourt and Africa', 28 The Royal United Services Institute Newsbrief 8 (2008) 67-70, at 69.
122. Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 98, at 5.
123. R. Buteera , 'Best practices andchallengesencountered when prosecuting and investigating internationalcrimes in Uganda', in M. du Plessis and A. Louw (eds.), The Investigation and Prosecution of 'core internationalcrimes' and the role of the Internationalcriminalcourt in Africa (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007) pp. 57-67, at 65.
124. Anotherexample of thechallenges faced by Africancountries inensuring adequate witness protection and the impact of that on potential witnesses' ability to testify recently arose in respect of applications for the transfer of genocidecases to Rwanda for trial. See,e.g., Prosecutor v. Gaspard Kanyurikiga (ICTR-2002-78-R11 bis ), Trialchamber, 'Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda', 6 June 2008, paras. 63-81, 104;
125. affi rmed by the Appealschamber in 'Decision on the Prosecution's Appeal Against Decision on Referral under Rule 11 bis ', 30 October 2008;
126. Prosecutor v. Ildephonse Hategekimana (ICTR-00-55-R11 bis ), Trialchamber, 'Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Referral of thecase of Ildephonse Hategekimana to the Republic of Rwanda,' 19 June 2008, paras. 61-71;
127. affi rmed by the Appealschamber in 'Decision on the Prosecution's Appeal against Decision on Referral under Rule 11 bis ', 4 December 2008.
128. Buteera , supra note 108, at 65 .
129. For instance, see Darfurconsortium, Press Release, 'Bashir warrant: a major step towards justice for victims in Darfur', 4 March 2009, online at: 〈 http://www.darfurconsortium.org 〉 (visited 15 May 2009). Theconsortium is acoalition of more than 50-Africa based and Africa-focused NGOs dedicated to a 'sustainable solution' to the human rightscrisis in Darfur.
130. Chitiyo and Devlin , supra note 106, at 69.
131. Among others, there have been many allegations of torture, disappearances and killings of members of the political opposition,civil society activists and student leaders by government security forces with impunity. See,e.g., United States Department of State, 2008country Reports on Human Rights Practices , Zimbabwe, 25 February 2009, online at: 〈 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ hrrpt/2008/af/119032.htm 〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
132. Schabas , An Introduction to the ICC , supra note 30, at 31.
133. UN Department of Public Information, 'Pressconference on Special Working Group oncrime of Aggression', 13 February 2009.
134. Schabas , An Introduction to the ICC , supra note 30, at 64.
135. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (ICTY-94-1-AR-72), Appealschamber, 'Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction', 2 October 1995, paras. 86-137 at 134
136. (concluding, inter alia, that 'customary international humanitarian law imposescriminal liability for serious violations ofcommon Article 3'). The authoritative ICRCcommentary oncustomary international humanitarian lawcites two other treaties andcontemporary state and international organization practice toconclude that this is now a norm ofcustomary international law. See J-M Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck (eds.),customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge:cUP, 2005) at Rules 151, 551-554.
137. H.E. A. M. Omar , Minister for Justice (Head of South Africa's Delegation to the Rome Negotiations) Statement at 2nd Plenary Meeting, 15 June 1998. See Official Records of the United Nations Diplomaticconference of Plenipotentiaries on theestablishment of an Internationalcriminalcourt , UN doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II) 104, 65 at para. 15.
138. A. Anghie and B.S.chimni , 'Th ird World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility inconfl icts', 2 Chinese Journal of International Law (2003) at 88.
139. A. Anghie and B.S.chimni , 'Th ird World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility inconfl icts', 2 Chinese Journal of International Law Ibid. (2003), supra note 118, at 88.
140. Kambudzi, supra note 43, at 37.
141. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the Fourth Session of the Assembly of State Parties', 28 November - 3 December 2005 at 3.
142. Arts. 53(2)(c) and 53(4) ICCSt (Initiation of an investigation).
143. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice', September 2004, at 8.
144. Ibid. at 8.
145. Schabas , 'Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism', supra note 21, at 749.
146. See,e.g., J. Gettleman , 'UNenvoy Meets with Ugandan Rebel', The New York Times , 13 November 2006 (reporting that the thorniest issue for Kony was the arrest warrants issued by the ICC).
147. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Press Release, 'Statements by ICCchief Prosecutor and the visiting Delegation of Acholi leaders from northern Uganda', 18 March 2005.
148. Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliationcommission, Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliationcommission , Vol.1 (Freetown: TRC, 2004),chapter I, at para. 17.
149. See the full text of the provision and the peace accord in Jalloh (ed.),consolidated Legal Texts for the Specialcourt for Sierra Leone , supra note 105, 563-597 at 572.
150. Buteera , supra note 108, at 64.
151. See,e.g., Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon, Brima Bazzy Kamara (SCSL-2004-15-PT), Appealschamber, 'Decision onchallenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty', 13 March 2004 at para.
152. (concluding that 'a Statecannot bring into oblivion and forgetfulness acrime, such as acrime under international law, which other States areentitled to keep alive and remember.'); Report of the Secretary-General on The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice inconfl ict and Post-Confl ict Situations ,UN doc./S/2004/616 (2004) at para. 32
153. (stating that 'United Nations-endorsed peace agreementscan never promise amnesties for genocide, warcrimes,crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights.') and Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (eds.)customary International Humanitarian Law , supra note 116, Rule 159 at 611-614 (citing state and Securitycouncil practice in relation to amnesties;explaining the ICRC view that Additional Protocol IIcannot be interpreted as allowing warcriminals toescape prosecution).
154. For an in-depth discussion and the relevant statements and documents, see UN, The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993-1996 (UN Blue Books Series, Vol. X, New York: United Nations, Dept. of Public Information, 1996) at 42 and 266-267.
155. The United Nations and Rwanda , supra note 131, at 46 and 273.
156. That foundationalconvention notes, inter alia, that 'the principle of freeconsent' is 'universally recognized'. See VCLT, supra note 17, preambular para. 3.
157. Ironically, this power to assert jurisdiction over nationals of non-parties is one of the major factors that led the United States to refuse to sign on to the Rome Statute at its adoption in Rome in July 1998. Just years later, it participated in Securitycouncil debates that led to a referral under which that very argument was deployed to ground ICC jurisdiction against another state (Sudan). It only abstained from the vote, having secured an immunityexception from ICC jurisdiction for its peacekeepers. See D. J. Scheffer , 'The United States and the Internationalcriminalcourt', 93 American Journal of International Law (1999) 14;
158. R. Wedgwood , 'The Internationalcriminalcourt: An American View', 10european Journal of International Law (1999) 93-107.
159. For anexcellent analysis, see D. Akande , 'The Jurisdiction of the Internationalcriminalcourt over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits', 1 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2003) 618-650.
160. Art. 12(2) (a) ICCSt (Preconditions to theexercise of jurisdiction).
161. Art. 12(3) ICCSt (Preconditions to theexercise of jurisdiction).
162. Art. 39 of the UNcharter provides: The Securitycouncil shall determine theexistence of the any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
163. In fact, Sudan, like many other Africancountries, was a Britishcolony until 1 January 1956. It therefore only became a UN member on 12 November 1956.
164. W. Ali , 'ICCcounselcriticizes Sudan handling of Bashir indictment', Sudan Tribune , 3 August 2008.
165. Aseconcerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic ofcongo v. Belgium) , Judgment, 14 February 2002, para. 58.
166. Arrest Warrant (2002) Judgment, para. 61.
167. D. Akande , 'The Bashir Indictment: Are Serving Heads of State Immune from ICC Prosecution', Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working Paper Series, 30 July 2008 at 2.
168. Akande , ibid, at 2.
169. Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Bashir Arrest Warrant, supra note 79, at paras. 41-45.
170. Akande , supra note 143, at 2.
171. Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Bashir Arrest Warrant, supra note 79, at para. 45 (fi nding that the Securitycouncil, by referring Sudan, 'accepted' that investigations and prosecutions arising therefrom will beconducted under the statutory framework provided for in thecourt's primary and secondary legal instruments).
172. This argument was inspired by a similar one made in relation to achapter VII resolution adopted by the Securitycouncil, which purported to bring into force the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. See B. Fassbender, 'Reflections on the International Legality of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon', 5 Journal of Internationalcriminal Justice (2007) 1090-1105, at 1098.
173. Akande , supra note 143, at 3.
174. See Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Bashir Arrest Warrant, supra note 79, at para. 41.
175. W.A. Schabas , 'First Prosecutions at the Internationalcriminalcourt', 25 Human Rights Law Journal (2006) 25-40, at 8 and 18-19.
176. (arguing that the drafting history of Art. 14 demonstrates that self-referrals were notcontemplated; that historical and logical reasons militate against permitting self-referrals; and that the ICC Prosecutoreffectively allowed Uganda to 'jump the queue' vis-à-vis the 100 or so other States Parties to the Rome Statute).
177. I bid, at 18-19.
178. Gaeta , supra note 15, at 950-951.
179. Kress , supra note 15, at 946.
180. Gaeta , supra note 15, at 950-951.
181. Schabas , 'First Prosecutions', supra note 151 at 28, 30, 31.
182. Ibid. at 38.
183. Prosecutor v. Th omas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trialchamber I, 'Decision on theconsequences of non-disclosure ofexculpatory materialscovered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with others issues raised at the Statusconference on 10 June 2008', 13 June 2008; 'Decision on the release of Th omas Lubanga Dyilo', Trialchamber I, 2 July 2008 and 'Decision on the request of the Prosecutor for suspensiveeffect of his appeal against the "Decision on the release of Th omas Lubanga Dyilo"', Appealschamber, 7 July 2008.
184. Decision on theconsequences of non-disclosure ofexculpatory materials, ibid., at para. 93.
185. Prosecutor v. Th omas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), Appealschamber, 'Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trialchamber Ientitled "Decision on theconsequences of non-disclosure ofexculpatory materialscovered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together withcertain other issues raised at the Statusconference on 10 June 2008"', 21 October 2008.
186. Prosecutor v. Th omas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trialchamber I, 'Reasons for Oral Decision lifting the stay of proceedings', 23 January 2009.
187. M. Palayiwa , 'What's the ICC up to?', 43 New African (May 2009) 16-20, 20.
188. Buteera , supra note 108, at 63-64.
189. In relation to Rwanda, reconciliation isencouraged through the traditional gacaca process though only in respect of lower to middle ranking perpetrators. The highest ranking genocidaires , i.e. those at the level that would attract ICC interest, are tried in regularcriminal trials.
190. Palayiwa , supra note 162, at 20.
191. For a fi ne treatment of the notion of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC, see A.M. Danner, 'Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the Internationalcriminalcourt', 97 American Journal of International Law (2003) 510-552.
192. For an overview of thecore issues, see W.A. Schabas , 'United States Hostility to the Internationalcriminalcourt: It's All About the Securitycouncil', 15european Journal of International Law (2004) 701-720.
193. Schefferet al, supra note 96.
194. See,e.g.,center forconstitutional Rights, Report on Torture andcruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment of Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay,cuba (New York:cCR, 2006) (quoting a U.S. military intelligence officer telling prisoners 'You are in a place where there is no law - we are the law.').
195. ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 'Statement oncommunicationconcerning the situation in Iraq', 9 February 2006.
196. Chitiyo and Devlin , supra note 106, at 69.
197. Coalition for the International criminal court, Press Release, 'US Congress Passes Anti-ICC "Hague Invasion Act"', 26 July 2002, online at: 〈http://www.iccnow.org/documents/07.26.02ASP AthruCongress.pdf 〉 (visited 15 May 2009).
198. Coalition for the Internationalcriminalcourt, 'USA and the ICC: Bilateral Immunity Agreements', online at: 〈 http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=bia 〉 (visited 15 May 2009) and Human Rights Watch, 'Briefi ng Paper on Bilateral Immunity Agreements', New York, 20 June 2003.
199. O. Bekou and S. Shah , 'Realising the Potential of the International criminal court: The African experience', 6 Human Rights Law Review (2006) 499-544, at 537.
200. R. Brody , 'Belgiumcurtails Anti-Atrocity Law Under U.S. Pressure', ACLU Internationalcivil Liberties Report 2003, online at: 〈 http://www.sdshh. com/ICLR/ICLR-2003/12-Brody.pdf 〉 (visited15 May 2009).
201. V. Thalmann , 'French Justice endeavours to Substitute for the ICTR', 6 Journal of International criminal Justice (2008) 995-1002.
202. S. Kanuma , 'I refuse to be a servant of the West', Theeast African , 22-28 December 2008 at p. 8.
203. See,e.g., 'Statement by Ambassador Susane. Rice , U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the ICC's Arrest Warrant for Sudanese President Bashir', 4 March 2009, online at: 〈 http://www.iccnow.org/ documents/Statement-by-AmbassadorRice.pdf 〉 and 'Statement by Ambassador Susane. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations on theexpulsion of Humanitarian Groups from Sudan', 6 March 2009, online at: 〈http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/press-releases/20090306-043.html 〉 (visited 15 May 2009). The U.S.congresseven recently passed a resolutioncommending the ICC for its issuance of the Bashir warrant.
204. Chitiyo and Devlin , supra note 106, at 69 .
205. While Mamdani does notcite this in his article, infl uential Americancommentators have argued thateven if the U.S. does not wish to become a party to the ICC for now, it 'needs the ICC to help itclimb back into a position of global leadership.' Remaking its image as acredible 'friend of the ICC' was suggested as a way for it to infl uence the work of the permanentcourt to its advantage.See Schefferet al, supra note 96.
206. Mamdani , 'Darfur, ICC and the New Humanitarian Order', supra note 70.
207. Concerns have beenexpressed by some Africancountries that the majority of ICC staff hail from other regions of the world. Nonetheless, there appears to be a sizable Africancontingent in thecourt - at least at the senior levels. These include four judges (one of whom is the Vice-President), the Deputy Prosecutor, the Deputy Registrar, the Head of thecomplementarity Division in the Office of the Prosecutor, the Senior Trial Attorney handling the Sudan fi le, the head of the Office of the Publiccounsel for the Defence, a senior legal adviser in the Registry and various other lawyers in these and other units. In relation to thecontroversial Bashir warrant, it is noteworthy that a Ghanaian judge was strategically appointed to preside over the Pre-Trialchamber that assessed the Prosecutor's application. In view of their roles, it is hard to argue that these officials are not partaking of the decisions taken by thecourt.even so, Africa is not as well represented in the offices of the ICC as much as it is in the dock. 183) Anghie andchimni , supra note 118, at 84.
208. Mamdani , 'Darfur, ICC and the New Humanitarian Order', supra note 70.
209. AU Assembly, Decision on the Application by the Internationalcriminalcourt Prosecutor for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of the Sudan (Dec. 221 (XII)), 3 February 2009, para. 5.