Regulation of information and advertising

Competition Policy International

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 169-192

  Rubin, Paul H ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 69649105389     PISSN: 15540189     EISSN: 15546853     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (53)

1. This paper is an extension and updating of Rubin (1991), and many additional references may be found there. See P. Rubin, The Economics of Regulating Deception, 10(3) CATO J. 667-90 (Winter 1991).
2. A very important excellent general source is J. CALFEE, FEAR OF PERSUASION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON ADVERTISING & REGULATION (1997).
3. See also A. Schwartz & L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 630-82 (1979);
4. E. Jordan & P. Rubin, An Economic Analysis of the Law of False Advertising, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 116-55 (June 1979),
5. reprinted in P. RUBIN, BUSINESS FIRMS & THE COMMON LAW, PRAEGER (1983);
6. H. Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 291-539 (1981).
7. For some more general surveys, see W. Comanor & T. Wilson, The Effect of Advertising on Competition: A Survey, 17 J. ECON. LIT. 453-76 (1979);
8. R. McAuliffe, ADVERTISING, COMPETITION, & PUBLIC POLICY: THEORIES & NEW EVIDENCE (1987);
9. R. Ekelund, Jr. & D. Saurman, ADVERTISING & THE MARKET PROCESS (1988);
10. and Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 3, ch. 28 (M. Armstrong & R. Porter, eds. 2007). This survey is quite extensive, but does not consider deception.
11. For a discussion of private self-regulation, see Calfee (1997), supra note 1.
12. See F. McChesney, De-Bates and Re-Bates: The Supreme Court's Latest Commercial Speech Cases, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 81-139 (1997). For a useful legal analysis, see U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Comments of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics, The Bureau of Consumer Protection, and The Office of Policy Planning of the Federal Trade Commission Before The Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, in the Matter Of Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, Docket No. 02n-0209 (Sep. 13, 2002).
13. See also Hugo Mialon & Paul H. Rubin, The Economics of the Bill of Rights, AM. L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
14. See L. Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L & ECON. 337-53 (1972).
15. See U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2002), supra note 4.
16. For a good analysis of these issues, see Calfee (1997), supra note 1, at ch. 7.
17. See Ekelund & Saurman (1988), supra note 2.
18. See Schwartz & Wilde (1979), supra note 1.
19. See J. Urbany et al., The Effect of Plausible and Exaggerated Reference Prices on Consumer Perceptions and Price Search, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 95-110 (1988).
20. See R. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661-701, 688 (1977).
21. See R. Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 658-732 (1985).
22. See S. Peltzman, The Effects of FTC Advertising Regulation, 24 J.L. & ECON. 403-48 (1981).
23. See A. Mathios & M. Plummer, The Regulation of Advertising by the Federal Trade Commission: Capital Market Effects, in 12 RESEARCH IN LAW & ECONOMICS 77-93 (Richard O. Zerbe ed., 1989).
24. For the discussion of search and experience goods, see P. Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729-54 (1974)
25. and P. Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311-29 (1970).
26. For credence goods, see M. Darby & E. Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L & ECON. 67-88 (1973). For an application to regulation of advertising, For an application to regulation of advertising, see Jordan & Rubin (1979), supra note 1.
27. See P. RUBIN, MANAGING BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, ch. 8 (1990).
28. See P. Nelson (1974, 1970), supra note 15.
29. See G. Ackerlof, The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488-500 (1970).
30. See B. Klein & K. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615-41 (1981).
31. See C. Shapiro, Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputation, 98 Q.J. ECON. 659-79 (1983).
32. See M. Lynch et al., Product Quality, Consumer Information and 'Lemons' in Experimental Markets, in Consumer Protection Economics 251-306 (P. Ippolito & D. Scheffman eds., 1986).
33. See Craswell (1985), supra note 12, at 657.
34. See Calfee (1997), supra note 1.
35. For a history, see id.
36. See P. Ippolito & A. Mathios, Information, Advertising and Health Choices: A Study of the Cereal Market, 21(3) RAND J. ECON. 459-80 (1990).
37. See P. Ippolito & J. Pappalardo, Advertising, Nutrition & Health: Evidence from Food Advertising, 1977-1997, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics Staff Report (2002).
38. For a history, see J. Thomas, Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising: Catalyst for a Change in the Therapeutic Model in Psychotherapy?, CONN. L. REV. 209-48 (Fall 2000).
39. For the first article identifying some of these benefits, see A. Masson & P. Rubin, Matching Prescription Drugs and Consumers, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 513-15 (1985).
40. P. Rubin & A. Atherly, The Cost Effectiveness of Direct to Consumer Advertising for Prescription Drugs (Feb. 2008) (mimeo, Emory University), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092164.
41. See H. Beales, FDA Regulation of Pharmaceutical Advertising: Economic Analysis and the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Advertising, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1370 (1994)
42. and A. Tabarrok, Assessing the FDA via the Anomaly of Off-Label Prescribing, V(1) INDEP. REV. 25-53 (Summer 2000).
43. See F. Lichtenberg, Pharmaceutical Knowledge-Capital Accumulation and Longevity, in MEASURING CAPITAL IN THE NEW ECONOMY (C. Corrado et al. eds., 2003)
44. and F. Lichtenberg & S. Virabhak, Pharmaceutical-embodied Technical Progress, Longevity, and Quality of Life: Drugs as "Equipment for Your Health", 28(4-5) MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 371-92 (2007).
45. See S. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461-83 (1981)
46. P. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Application, 12 BELL J. ECON. 380-91 (1981).
47. For a summary discussion, see D. Spulber, REGULATION & MARKETS 449-55 (1989).
48. See J. Calfee, The Ghost of Cigarette Advertising Past, REGULATION 35-45 (Nov/Dec 1986).
49. On the general issue of optimal deterrence, see G. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169-217 (1968);
50. R. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, ch. 7 (7th ed. 2007);
51. and A.M. Polinsky & S. Shavell, The economic theory of public enforcement of law, 38(1) J. ECON. LIT. 45-76 (2000).
52. For a discussion of over-deterrence of "white collar crime," including advertising, see P. Rubin & R. Zwirb, The Economics of Civil RICO, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 883-912 (Spring 1987).
53. See Peltzman (1981), supra note 13 and Mathios & Plummer (1989), supra note 14.