A dynamic model of social network formation

Understanding Complex Systems

Volumn 2009, Issue , 2009, Pages 231-251

  Skyrms, Brian ^a,b   Pemantle, Robin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 69449104884     PISSN: 18600832     EISSN: 18600840     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-01284-6_11     Document Type: Article

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